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Abstract 
 
The rise of China as an economic power has been accompanied by Chinese 
companies’ active engagement in international business. This study looks into 
two Chinese service suppliers, which are involved in international contracting 
with Japanese companies, and operate in both China and Japan. It examines 
how these service providers develop and implement their management 
systems in order to meet their international clients’ requirements, and how 
these management systems are experienced by the employees at 
workplaces.  
 
Taking a Critical Realist ontology (Bhaskar, 1975), and drawing on intensive 
observation and interviews in both China and Japan, this study develops a 
multi-level approach to understanding the management, organisation and 
employment practices in Chinese supply firms. This approach is based on the 
global value chain discussion (Gereffi, Humphrey, & Sturgeon, 2005) and the 
System-Society-Dominance-Corporate (SSDC) framework (Delbridge, 
Hauptmeier, & Sengupta, 2011; Smith & Meiksins, 1995). It locates the 
construction and development of management policies, practices and work 
relations in the global supply chains, while considering their institutional 
contexts at the international, national, local and corporate levels. It thus 
provides a holistic understanding of how SSDC effects are brought together in 
different supply chains and how they are manifested within the workplaces, as 
corporate actors respond to, struggle over and manage these supply chain 
relationships and the  structural forces.   
 
This thesis contributes to existing studies on global suppliers in three key 
ways. First, it compares the supply firms in two different patterns of global 
supply chains (i.e. the market-based supply chain and the captive supply 
chain). In doing so, it is shown that the influence of clients is exerted in 
different ways under different governance structures and this leads to 
divergent consequences in terms of the management practices and 
employment relations in supply firms. Second, it extends the global value 
chain analysis of global supply firms by considering the social-institutional 
embeddedness of the supply firms. Third, it advances our understanding on 
the workplace dynamics in global supply firms, by focusing on the 
indeterminacy of labour power and the contested construction of workplace 
relations. 
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Chapter&1&Introduction&
It has been argued that the world economy is experiencing deep ‘global shifts’ 
of a long-term and structural nature. The global economy has become 
increasingly ‘multipolar’, in the sense that ‘new centres of production – new 
geographical divisions of labour – have emerged in parts of what had been, 
historically, the periphery and semi-periphery of the world economy’. One big 
‘global shift’ that is currently reshaping the global economy is, without doubt, 
the ‘resurgence of East Asia’, especially the spectacular growth and 
development of China in the period since 1979 (all quotations in this 
paragraph from Peter Dicken 2011, p.525).  
Indeed, China’s growing influences on the world economy are manifested in 
many ways: the massive labour force, the exports of cheap goods, the huge 
population of consumers, the large inflow of foreign direct investment, and the 
increasing outward foreign direct investment. All these are balancing and 
rebalancing the development of business and of the economic world in the 
twenty-first century. 
The rise of China as an economic power has been accompanied by Chinese 
companies’ active engagement in international business through various 
channels, such as exporting, international contracting, and outward foreign 
direct investment (FDI) (Child & Rodrigues, 2005). Among these, global 
suppliers based in China, which provide goods or services to international 
clients, has attracted much attention.  
The majority of studies on Chinese suppliers has focused on manufacturing 
factories where millions of poor rural migrant Chinese workers are slogging 
away on assembly lines, churning out toys, clothes and electronics to export 
to high street customers or to corporate customers in other regions or 
countries. These manufacturers rely heavily on the cheap cost of labour in 
China and underlie China’s position as the world’s largest manufacturer and 
exporter. This study, however, looks into two Chinese suppliers in the service 
outsourcing industry. Both companies are global service suppliers which 
provide outsourcing services to international clients. They are heavily 
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engaged in global supply chains and international operations in different 
countries, whilst dealing with the resources and constraints that exist in their 
national and local environments. In this research, I examine how these 
companies construct their management policies and practices within the 
global supply chains, and how these systems and practices are implemented 
and experienced by their employees at workplaces in various countries.  
In this introductory chapter, I first outline the motivations and approach of this 
research, and then give an overview of the structure of this thesis.  
1.1&The&research&
This research is motivated by two main factors; the first of these being the 
lack of research into Chinese supply firms in service outsourcing industry. 
Existing studies on Chinese suppliers predominantly focus on manufacturers 
and we have little knowledge about the work organisation and management in 
Chinese supply firms in the outsourcing service industry. Unlike most export-
oriented manufacturers based in China, service suppliers in outsourcing 
industry heavily engage in international operation in different countries, 
providing both on-shore and off-shore services. Therefore, this research aims 
to shed insight into the international operations of Chinese suppliers, their 
work organisations and their employment relations.   
The second key motivation for this research was to understand how Chinese 
supply firms manage their relationships with the international clients, and how 
different supply chain relationships affect the management systems and 
worker experiences at workplaces. Through ethnographic-intensive case 
studies on the workplaces of two Chinese supply firms in different types of 
global value chains, this research offers detailed analysis on this aspect.  
Specifically, this thesis develops a multi-level approach to understanding the 
management, organisation and employment practices in Chinese supply firms 
in service outsourcing industry. This multi-level approach is based on the 
System-Society-Dominance-Corporate(SSDC) framework, which was initially 
put forward by Smith & Meiksins (1995) and further extended by Delbridge et 
al. (2011). It locates the construction and development of management 
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policies, practices and work relations at Chinese suppliers’ workplaces within 
their contexts at the international, national, local and corporate levels, thus 
providing a holistic understanding of how management practices and work 
relations are constructed and developed at workplaces. The critical realist 
perspective is important for the multi-level analysis undertaken in this thesis. 
That is, critical realism’s stratified ontology and its conceptualisation of a 
structure and agency duality are considered to underpin the ways in which 
social structures at various levels condition the actions of corporate actors in 
Chinese supply firms and the interrelationships between them. In other words, 
the critical realist perspective allows me to pay attention to the multiple 
structural forces (i.e. the SSDC effects) that shape the actions and behaviours 
of actors while also integrating agency within a multi-level model of analysis.  
A comparative case study of two Chinese service providers, which are 
involved in international contracting with Japanese companies, and which 
operate in both China and Japan, is constructed in this thesis. Data were 
collected from four work-sites of these two companies, that is, in the Chinese 
HQ and in the Japanese workplaces of each, using a mix of observational, 
informal conversational and semi-structured interview data.  
With these central elements of the thesis established, a summary of the 
content of each chapter follows. 
1.2&Thesis&overview&
In Chapter 2 of this thesis, I review existing research in global supply chains 
and global suppliers, particularly the global commodity chain (Gereffi, 1994) 
and global value chain (Gereffi, Humphrey, & Sturgeon, 2005). I find that the 
GVC analysis fits well with my research subject as global suppliers since it 
emphasises the importance of power relations between leading firms and 
suppliers within global supply chains. However, I identify three limitations of 
the existing GVC analysis, namely, the lack of comparative study on different 
power relations under different governance structures in global supply chains, 
the neglect of a social-institutional perspective which takes account of the 
specific characteristics of the Chinese context, and the insufficient attention 
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paid to the internal dynamics at workplaces between managers and 
employees. In addressing these gaps, I propose a multi-level approach and 
place the supplier-client relationships in global value chains within its wider 
context at the international, national, local and the corporate levels. A SSDC 
framework, combined with the GVC analysis, is thus adopted to address the 
following research questions: 
1. At the international level, how do different governance structures 
between clients and suppliers influence the work and employment at 
the workplaces of global supply firms?  
2. At the national level, how is the diverse and variegated form of 
capitalism found in China reflected in the work and employment at the 
workplaces of global supply firms? 
3. At the workplace level, how are the contested work relations being 
constructed and developed at the workplaces of global supply firms? 
 
Chapter 3 outlines the research methods used to answer these research 
questions, and places the research within a critical realist ontological 
framework (Bhaskar, 1975). Firstly I discuss the implications of critical realism 
(CR) for my research focus, object and approach. The application of CR is 
then achieved through the utilisation of Houston's (2010) steps of retroduction. 
The research questions and research design are discussed in relation to the 
retroductive strategy. Subsequently, this chapter outlines, justifies and 
evaluates the processes and methods of data collection and analysis. Lastly, 
two case companies studied in this research, Data-Co and Software-Co, are 
introduced, making particular reference to their local environments, Chinese 
and Japanese workplaces, organisational structures, and hierarchies and 
unions.  
Chapter 4 discusses how supply chain relationships have been evolved over 
time in both Data-Co and Software-Co and how their Japanese offices and 
expatriates are organised and managed under different supply chain 
relationships. By describing how these companies internationalise and get 
involved in the Japanese market, this chapter reveals two distinct patterns of 
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supply chain relationships in Data-Co and Software-Co: relationships between 
Data-Co and its clients is featured as transactional and market-oriented, whilst 
the ones between Software-Co and its clients are particularistic and captive. It 
is found that the supply chain relationships have great impacts on the role of 
the Japanese offices and the management and experiences of the expatriates 
in Japan. 
Following this explication of the supply chain relations and their impacts on 
the management and organisation of Japanese offices and the expatriates, 
the next two chapters focus attention on the management systems in the 
Chinese workplaces. Chapter 5 deals with the operational practices in the two 
companies. Given that both companies claim that their operational systems 
are ‘learnt from Japan’, this chapter investigates in particular their operational 
systems in relation to ‘Japanese’ forms of management. My findings show 
that the strategy of ‘learning from Japan’ is not always driven by the Japanese 
clients. In fact, Japanese clients under different types of supply chains have 
different requirements as to whether and to what extent the supply firms 
should be ‘Japanised’. It is also shown that  ‘learning from Japan’ in both 
companies carries significant rhetorical meaning. It is used as a rhetorical 
justification for management systems which are specifically designed to serve 
Japanese clients, and serves as a normative technique in management 
control. It is concluded that the Chinese suppliers’ attempts to ‘learn from 
Japan’ reflects the power of clients within the values chains and the needs for 
Chinese suppliers to meet Japanese standards on operation. Nevertheless, 
the actual ‘learning’ process of ‘Japanese’ practices at workplaces is strongly 
influenced by the managers’ selection and interpretations of ‘Japanese’ 
practices. The implementation of ‘Japanese’ practices involves lots of 
manipulation, modification and negotiation, and leads to diverse outcomes at 
different workplaces. 
Chapter 6 describes the HR policies and practices in recruitment, selection, 
training, pay, performance appraisal, promotion and retention in both 
companies. Unlike the operational systems, which are claimed to have been 
‘learnt from Japan’, the HR systems in both companies are described by 
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managers as having ‘deviated from Japan’. I find that managers in both 
companies tend to compare their HR practices with their perceived ‘Japanese’ 
practices featuring life-time employment and seniority-based pay system. The 
duality of Japanese labour practices, especially the practices used in 
Japanese small firms among non-regular employees are not considered. It is 
also found that the supply chain relationships, the societal effects in different 
Chinese cities, the system effects of both old Chinese capitalism and modern 
Chinese capitalism, and the historical contexts and the ownership-types of the 
companies all play a substantial role in the development of HR policies and 
practices.This chapter also combines findings presented in Chapter 4, and 
draws distinctions between Data-Co’s strategy of ‘managing school pupils’ 
and Software-Co’s strategy of ‘managing a corporate elite’. It concludes that 
Japanese clients in different supply-client relationships play different roles in 
shaping the work organisation and employment relations at their suppliers’ 
workplaces.  
Chapter 7 summarises the empirical findings, and seeks to locate these 
findings within the broader debates surrounding global supply firms. By 
combining the GVC discussion and the SSDC framework, I discuss how 
global supply firms in different types of global supply chains develop their 
management practices and employment relations in order to meet their 
Japanese clients’ requirements. Discussion in this chapter responds to the 
research questions of this study. First, I focus on the construction of structural 
forces (i.e. the SSDC effects) apart from the influence from the clients. It is 
stressed that the supply firms are not only influenced by their clients in the 
global supply chains, but also shaped by their national, local and corporate 
embeddedness. I also argue that none of these structural forces is 
predetermined because they are interdependent and interactional in nature. 
Thus their manifestations in the supply firms are complicated and diverse. 
Secondly, I focus on how these structural forces are managed under different 
supply chain relationships. I argue that the actual practices adopted by the 
companies are mediated through the supply chain relationships between the 
leading firms and the supply firms, and the corporate actors’ strategic choices. 
I also show how societal and dominance effects are put to use by the 
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managers in order to exercise management control. Thirdly, I ‘zoom in’ on the 
labour process and employment relations of the Chinese supply firms in 
different global supply chains, and discuss the indeterminacy of labour power 
and the contested construction of workplace relations under different supply 
chain relationships.The chapter ends with an evaluation of the thesis’s 
contributions, and a discussion of its limitations.  
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Chapter& 2& Global& supply& chains,& global& suppliers& and& the&
Chinese&context&
This study focuses on the management, work and employment of global 
service providers that are based in China and are operating in a cross-
national context. In this chapter, existing research on global supply chains and 
global suppliers are examined.   
In the first section below, I review two influential frameworks in supply chain 
study, namely, the global commodity chain (GCC) framework and the global 
value chain (GVC) framework. I then discuss their implications on the work 
and employment of global suppliers. I conclude that while it is important to 
consider the powerful influence exerted by leading firms on the work and 
employment of suppliers, supply chain relationships could not be fully 
understood without analysing the role and capability of suppliers in managing 
and shaping their power relations with clients. I thus suggest that the five 
types of governance structures discussed by Gereffi, Humphrey, & Sturgeon 
(2005) offer a framework to investigate the dynamics of power relations 
between leading firms and suppliers under different governance structures. It 
allows researchers to compare how different supply relations affect the 
management, work and employment in suppliers’ workplaces. 
In the second section, I argue that the global chain analysis should be 
complemented by a social-institutional perspective, considering firms’ 
embeddedness at the national and local levels. By discussing the distinctive 
features of Chinese capitalism and its impact on Chinese management, I 
emphasise that China’s transition from a centrally-planned economy to a 
market-oriented economy has created multiple types of firms and institutional 
contexts. There is great regional diversity and diversity of ownership-types in 
the Chinese context, which has produced a great deal of flux in terms of how 
different regions and firms are managed and organised. Given this, I conclude 
that existing institutional frameworks such as variety of capitalism (VoC) and 
national business systems, which assume the homogeneity of national 
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institutions, could not capture the diverse and variegated nature of Chinese 
capitalism and there is a need to extend existing discussion on this aspect.  
In the third section, I focus on the internal dynamics between management 
and employees at global supplies’ workplaces. Inspired by labour process 
theory, I argue that the GVC and GCC frameworks pay little attention to the 
internal dynamics such as management control and employee resistance. In 
order to better understand the impact of global supply chains on the work and 
employment of supply firms, it is important to ‘zoom in’ to the workplaces and 
examine workers’ experiences at the workplaces and their responses to the 
day-to-day practices.  
Following the literature review, the fourth section discusses this study’s 
research questions and research design based on a multi-level framework.  
The final section then summarises the conclusions of this chapter.  
2.1&Global&supply&chains&and&global&suppliers&
One of the features of the world economy, particularly since the 1980s, is the 
globalisation of capital accumulation and international production. Companies 
are now able to identify new locations outside their home countries, where 
goods and services can be produced and provided more cheaply at increased 
levels of quality, and outsource their business to providers from such other 
countries. Under this context, many studies discuss the issues regarding to 
the coordination and control of international networks. Among these, the 
global commodity chain (GCC) framework and the global value chain (GVC) 
framework developed by Gary Gereffi and colleagues (Gereffi et al., 2005; 
Gereffi & Korzeniewicz, 1994) have been most influential. In this section, I 
describe both GCCs and GVCs frameworks and consider their implications in 
understanding the work, organisation and employment at global suppliers’ 
workplaces. 
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2.1.1&Global&commodity&chain&(GCC)&and&global&value&chain&(GVC)&framework&
The concept of commodity chain was first developed by Hopkins and 
Wallersterin, who stressed the power of the state in shaping global production 
systems (Terence K Hopkins & Wallersterin, 1977; Terrence K Hopkins & 
Wallersterin, 1986). Later, Gereffi (1994) extended this concept by refocusing 
it on the strategies and activities of firms within chains. GCCs are defined by 
Gereffi (1994) as a set of inter-firm networks which connect manufacturers, 
suppliers and subcontractors in global industries to each other. Specifically, 
Gereffi (1994, 1995) identified four dimensions of the GCCs along which they 
could be analysed: (1) an input-output structure, which refers to the process of 
transforming raw materials and other inputs into final products; (2) a 
geographical configuration; (3) a governance structure, which discusses the 
power relations that exist in the chains and how particular players in the chain 
exert control over other participants; and (4) an institutional context, which 
refers to the ‘rules of games’ bearing on the organisation and operation of 
chains.  
The typical approach of GCC analysis is to identify a full group of firms that 
are involved in the production and distribution of a particular good or service, 
and to find out the kinds of relationships among them. In particular, this 
analysis pays attention to the leading firms in an industry, suggesting that 
these leading firms have the power to exert influence over other firms within 
the same chain, and that there is a requirement for other firms to ‘link up with 
the most significant leading firms in the industry’ (Gereffi 2001, p.1622). It is 
this focus on leading firms that makes the discussion of the ‘governance 
structure’ of certain commodity chains most appealing to scholars. Specifically, 
governance structure focuses on the questions of ‘which firms in the chain are 
most powerful to control various aspects of the production process and how 
they appropriate and/or distribute the value that is created’ (Bair 2005, p.159). 
Based on the ’governance’ function within GCCs framework, Gereffi 
distinguishes two types of commodity chains, namely, the producer-driven 
and the buyer-driven commodity chains. Producer-driven commodity chains 
are normally found in more capital-intensive industries (e.g. automobiles) in 
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which powerful manufacturers control several tiers of suppliers, while being 
buyer-driven is a feature of more light manufacturing industries (e.g. garments) 
in which designers, retailers and brand-name firms play the pivotal roles in the 
coordination and setting up of decentralised production networks in a variety 
of countries, but where they themselves do not actually make the products. 
Nowadays, it is generally agreed that buyer-driven commodity chains are 
becoming increasingly important in global production (Appelbaum, 2008; Bair, 
2005). 
The GCCs framework outlined by Gereffi has been widely influential. The shift 
in focus from the state to the firms in the chain, as well as their inter-
relationships and powers, has been well accepted and put to use by both 
practitioners and researchers, especially those who are interested in the 
development evolution and trajectories of different industrial sectors. Studies 
have looked into the GCCs in the manufacturing, pharmaceutical, agricultural 
and other sectors, considering GCCs as an emergent organisational form 
associated with a relatively recent and novel process of economic integration, 
and have emphasised the role of lead firms in constructing and managing 
international production networks (e.g. Bair & Gereffi, 2001; Dolan & 
Humphrey, 2000; Fitter & Kaplinsky, 2001; Ponte, 2002). Gereffi also 
conducted comparative research, highlighting differences in the 
industrialisation strategies being pursued across regions (e.g. Gereffi & 
Wyman, 1990). Despite the burgeoning literature on GCCs, some scholars 
began to reappraise this approach.  
First, the description of these chains as ‘commodity’ chains is questioned, 
because the word ‘commodity’ denotes undifferentiated products such as 
primary products (e.g. crude oil, agricultural goods) and low-value-added, 
basic goods (e.g. plain T-shirts as ‘commodity’ garments) (Bair, 2009; 
Sturgeon, 2009). Given this, a new term is needed in order to better capture 
the concept of ‘value-added’ and the main sources of economic development 
(i.e. the application of human effort to generate returns on invested capital).  
Second, many researchers criticise that the buyer- and producer-driven GCC 
typology is based on a static view of technology and barriers to entry, which 
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neglects the fact that supply chain relationships may be changed as a result 
of structural changes in the market, industry and institutional environments, or 
as a product of corporate strategies (Henderson, Dicken, Hess, Coe, & Yeung, 
2002; Ponte & Gibbon, 2005). Ahmadjian & Lincoln (2001) discussed how 
three Japanese companies, all of which were once involved in Keiretsu 
relationships with their suppliers, restructured their supplier relationships 
towards either a top-down administrative mode, or an arms-length contracting 
mode. These transformations were either a response to the increased 
standardisation of the market (which leads to a change from Keiretsu to arms-
length contracting), or a strategic move to control or own the critical resources 
(which leads to the takeover of the suppliers, or to the client developing its 
own department to produce the critical resources). To capture these changes, 
a more dynamic view of global commodity chain is required. 
Third, as Gereffi et al. (2005) argue, the original distinction between buyer- 
and producer-driven chains fails to capture the new forms of network 
governance that has recently arisen and this suggests the need for an 
expanded typology.  
In order to address the above issues, in 2005, Gereffi and colleagues (Gereffi 
et al., 2005) adopt the notion of ‘global value chains’ (GVC) and develop a 
typology of five governance structures that describe the network relationships 
linking suppliers to leading firms in global industries. In the GVC framework, a 
value chain describes the full range of activities that firms and workers carry 
out to bring a product from its conception to its end use and beyond. GVC 
analysis draws many insights from the earlier GCC research on governance 
issues, and suggests that relationships between leading firms and suppliers 
differ across sectors due to three independent variables: the complexity of 
transactions, the ability to codify transactions, and the capabilities of suppliers. 
These variables are intended to describe the features of the industry structure 
or production process, including the nature of ‘the knowledge transfer required 
to sustain a particular transaction, particularly with respect to product and 
process certifications, the extent to which this information and knowledge can 
be codified, and therefore, transmitted efficiently and without transaction-
 
21 
specific investment between the parties to the transaction, and the capabilities 
of actual and potential suppliers in relation to the requirements of the 
transaction’ (Gereffi et al., 2005, p.85). 
Five types of governance structures are identified. The ‘market-based’ global 
supply chain, governed by price, involves easily codified transactions, simple 
product specifications and capable suppliers. It represents the arm’s-length 
relationships between suppliers and leading firms. The ‘modular’ supply chain 
involves capable suppliers and complex products that can be unified and 
codified in the form of production modules. Companies in this form of chain 
are involved in more complex transactions than with arms-length transactions, 
but the leading firms do not need to coordinate much due to the modularity 
and codification of the production process. The ‘relational’ chain exists when 
product specification cannot be codified, transactions are complex and 
supplier capabilities are high. Suppliers and leading firms are mutually 
dependent in this chain. Close face-to-face interaction and high levels of 
explicit coordination are needed in order to exchange tacit information. The 
‘captive’ chain involves suppliers with low levels of capabilities, which thus 
require high levels of support from the leading firms. The ‘hierarchy’ chain 
represents the fully internalised operations of vertically integrated firms. 
The GVC framework captures the variety of network forms between actors 
within chains. It helps people to understand and explain why some value 
chain activities are firmly rooted in place and some are more easily relocated. 
It is also suggested that changes in one or more of the three variables could 
alter value chain patterns in predict ways, which not only captures the 
dynamics in supply chain governance, but also underpins the important 
discussion on the upgrading of state, industry and individual firms. Specifically, 
GVC analysts suggest that firms can upgrade by providing more sophisticated 
products with increased unit values (i.e. product upgrading), by improving 
their technology or production system (i.e. process upgrading), by increasing 
the range of functions performed within the same chain (i.e. intra-chain 
upgrading) or by moving from one industry to another (i.e. inter-chain 
upgrading) (Gereffi, Humphrey, Kaplinsky, & Sturgeon, 2001).   
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Based on the GVC framework, empirical studies have documented the efforts 
of global suppliers in various industries to upgrade. Bair & Gereffi (2001) 
discuss how upgrading is achieved as well as limited at both industry and firm 
levels in the blue jeans industry in Torreon, Mexico, as US buyers promote 
full-package apparel production. In particular, it reveals that through the 
adoption of a full-package production system, some first-tier manufacturers in 
Torreon have upgraded their employees’ skill bases, enjoyed higher profits, 
and gained capability to compete in the global market, although they are still 
distanced from the high value-added processes such as design, marketing 
and retail. Likewise, based on the evidence from the small- and medium-sized 
Latin American enterprises in a variety of sectors (traditional manufacturing, 
natural resource-based clusters, complex products and software), Giuliani et 
al. (2005) show that firms’ scope for pursuing upgrading and the extent to 
which they are able to do so is associated with the governance structures of 
the value chain in which they participate.  For example, in a captive chain, the 
pressure to follow the standards imposed by the leading firm enhances 
product and process upgrading, but inhibits functional upgrading.    
In the next section, I discuss the implications of GCC and GVC framework on 
the work and organisation of global suppliers. 
2.1.2&Implications&of&GCC&and&GVC&frameworks&on&work&and&organisation&of&global&
suppliers:&power&in&the&chains&and&governance&structures&
According to both GCC and GVC framework, power is accumulated, held and 
wielded in different ways and in different amount by various actors. In 
particular, in GVC analysis, an industry is basically divided into two broad 
types of firms: leading firms and suppliers (Sturgeon, 2009), which highlights 
the power relations between leading firms and suppliers in the chains. These 
power relations have important implications for understanding the operation 
and management of global suppliers. 
One obvious category of power in the chains concerns the power of leading 
firms in chains. Humphrey & Schmitz (2001) suggest that the leading firms are 
able to set and enforce various kinds of ‘parameters’ which others in the chain 
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must follow. These parameters define not only the specifications of what 
products are to be produced, but also how they are to be produced, including 
aspects of the production process such as quality control, working conditions, 
and environmental standards. In the international service outsourcing industry, 
this means that the management of service providers are bound to their 
clients’ requirements as to what services are to be provided and how these 
services are to be provided. In the meanwhile, since leading firms normally 
have the power to choose and replace suppliers within certain limits, they are 
allowed to explicitly coordinate the activities of its supply chain and to 
pressure suppliers to lower costs, improve quality, adopt specific equipment, 
employ specific business processes, purchase input from specific suppliers, 
and invest in specific locations.  
Recognising the strong leading firm power over the suppliers, some empirical 
studies have emphasised the impact of the power asymmetry on the 
management and organisation of global goods and service suppliers. Chan et 
al. (2013) conducted fieldwork in one supplier of Apple based in China, 
Foxconn. They find that as a principal supplier of Apple’s components, 
Foxconn is under great pressure to meet the rigorous specifications as to 
price, product quality and delivery time. This pressure leaves the company 
little room to improve labour conditions or to increase wages. Locke et al. 
(2009) and Locke (2013) evaluate various private initiates to enforce fair 
labour standards within global supply chains. They find that the ‘compliance-
focused’ model of private voluntary regulation, which is based on asymmetric 
power relationships between global buyers and suppliers, independent third-
party audits and monitoring systems, and some sorts of incentives, is unlikely 
to succeed. Rather, a ‘commitment-oriented’ approach, based on long-term, 
mutually beneficial relationships and support from public institutions, can 
actually improve labour standards in global supply chains. Focusing on the 
workplaces, Pun & Smith (2007) argue that transnational production leads to 
a reconfiguration of labour process at a global scale. Through case studies on 
two foreign-owned factories in China, the authors find that a new form of 
labour regime, termed the ‘dormitory labour regime’, has been constructed 
within China. These Chinese factories provide corporate dormitories to short-
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term migrant workers from rural areas, so that they can effectively control the 
daily reproduction of labour power, and maximise the utilisation of this 
temporary, migrant and contract labour.  
Compared to the emphasis on leading firm power, much less attention is paid 
to the supplier power. Extreme and rare forms of supplier power have been 
referred to as ‘platform leadership’ by Gower & Cusumano (2002). In these 
cases, suppliers either dominant the chain or share power with leading firms, 
becoming what Fold (2002) calls ‘bi-polar’ GVCs.  
A more common form of supplier power is understood as ‘competence power’, 
deriving from technical and service capabilities that are difficult to replace 
(Palpacuer, 2000). Under this circumstance, suppliers wield competence 
power when their products and services are seen as nearly indispensable for 
the leading firms they serve. While leading firms could always use their 
‘purchase power’ to place limits on supplier power, Sturgeon (2009) argues 
that ‘retaining the ability to switch suppliers, even among a very small group of 
two or four, appears to be adequate in most instances to keep supply power 
in check’ (p.129). 
Taking both the leading firm power and supplier power into account, it is 
inappropriate to overemphasise either leading firm power or supplier power. 
Power relationships between leading firms and suppliers should be analysed 
in a dynamic view, exploring how the relationships have been established, 
developed and managed by both the leading firms and suppliers. In particular, 
this thesis will investigate this topic from the perspective of the suppliers, 
discussing how suppliers manage their relationships with international clients. 
The different types of governance structures suggested in GVC framework 
offer a useful approach to analysing the power relations between leading firms 
and suppliers. Different types of governance structures indicate that even if 
suppliers are in a buyer-driven chain, in which clients normally have the power 
to set parameters on what and how suppliers should follow, the extent to 
which the clients use this power and the scope to which suppliers are bound 
by the parameters set by their clients are not predetermined since different 
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governance structures shape how clients exercise their power and how 
suppliers build their competency in different ways. For example, the power 
asymmetry and issues of ‘governance’ are the least relevant in market value 
chains because transactions in such chains are coordinated primarily through 
price. In modular value chains, suppliers take responsibility for their bundles 
of activities and they often have capability and freedom to switch to other 
clients, although their activities are normally monitored and supervised closely 
by their large clients. In relational value chains, the tacit knowledge that 
suppliers bring to the clients provides them with some bargaining power with 
the clients, sometimes making it all but impossible for lead firms to replace 
them. However, as Sturgeon (2009) points out, asset specificity can shift 
power toward either party. Being a relational supplier could also suggests that 
its thick and deep-rooted linkage with certain client(s) may be hard to replicate 
with other client, consequently creating lock-in relations and even higher 
levels of power asymmetry. 
To sum up, in order to understand the work and organisation of global 
suppliers, it is wrong to overemphasise the power of leading firm and explain 
the management, organisation and work of suppliers as simply a response to 
their clients’ requirements. Rather, it is important to consider the specific 
relationships between suppliers and clients, and see how the power relations 
between them are played out under different governance structures.  
Few studies have discussed how suppliers under different governance 
structures organise their work and employees, as well as their relationships 
with clients. This research, therefore, aims to address this issue by looking 
into the work and employment of global suppliers under different governance 
structures. 
2.2&Bring&in&institutions&in&the&GVC&analysis&
While the commodity chain and value chain frameworks provide a useful 
approach to understand the dynamics of power relations between leading 
firms and suppliers, and to explore the impacts of different power relations on 
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work and organisation in global suppliers, there has been criticism that GVC 
framework has neglected the role of institutions (see Whitley, 1996). 
The key argument of GVC framework is that companies are principally 
‘reflexes’ of the way that value chains are organised and of the structural 
requirements that imposes on their operation in specific location (Henderson 
et al., 2002). However, companies are not only active players in the global 
chains, but also actors that are embedded in specific social and institutional 
contexts at the national and local levels. As many researchers have pointed 
out, the GCC and GVC framework pay little attention to the social-institutional 
embeddedness of the firms, and thus fail to understand how national and local 
differences in labour market, educational systems etc. affect the organisation 
of companies in chains (Boyer & Drache, 1996; Henderson et al., 2002; 
Whitley, 1996). Sturgeon (2009) suggests three pillars of global value chain 
analysis: (1) the character of linkages between tasks, or stages, in the chain 
of value-added activities; (2) how power is distributed and exerted among 
firms and other actors in the chain; and (3) the role that institutions play in 
structuring business relationships and industrial locations. While the first two 
pillars reflect the focal points of GVC framework, the third one requires some 
extension of the existing framework by introducing a more social-institutional 
perspective.  
In this section, I first discuss features in Chinese contexts and explore its 
implications on the management of Chinese companies. I then review and 
compare different social-institutional approaches that would take account of 
Chinese contexts and complement the GVC analysis.  
2.2.1&The&Chinese&context&and&management&in&Chinese&companies&
China is in dramatic transition from a centrally planned economy to a market-
oriented economy, which has created a great diversity in Chinese institutions 
and management practices. The diversity of the Chinese context has two 
primary aspects: regional diversity and diversity of ownership-types.  
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Regional)diversity)and)Chinese)companies)
Regional differences in China are closely related to the nature of China’s 
transition. In the first place, the transition of the Chinese economy has taken 
an experimental and incremental form, which means that some regions have 
been more exposed to market competition and have changed faster than 
others. For instance, the southern and coastal cities in China are believed to 
have made a much quicker move towards the market-oriented economy than 
the northern and inland regions (Ding, Goodall, & Warner, 2000). The uneven 
growth of the Chinese economy has resulted in considerable capital and 
labour market differences across Chinese cities, which consequently 
influences the companies in terms of how they access capital and labour from 
the local market. On the one hand, given that the financial systems and 
institutions are more established in the fast-growing cities than in inland cities, 
MNCs from fast-growing cities may get better financial services from local 
institutions and have more choices in corporate finance. On the other hand, 
labour costs in fast-growing cities tend to be higher than in the inland cities, 
and this subjects companies from fast-growing cities to more pressure in 
terms of labour sourcing and retention.  As shown in Figure 2.1, labour costs 
are the highest in the capital city, Beijing, and in the vanguard of China’s 
economic reform, Shanghai. They are followed by coastal cities such as 
Guangzhou and the newly industrial cities such as Dalian. The wage levels in 
some inland cities such as Chongqing, Chengdu and Kunming are lower.  
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Figure!2.1:!Average!annual!wages!of!employees!in!selected!cities!in!2012!!
(Source: the National Bureau of Statistic of China) 
Second, China’s transition is characterised by a great deal of decentralisation 
of decision-making from the central government to the local governments at 
provincial, city and village levels. In particular, local governments are 
encouraged to formulate their own policies in developing the local economy, 
and to establish distinct institutional systems according to their own 
developmental strategies, under the central authority of the Chinese 
Communist Party. For example, in keeping with the goal of becoming the 
world’s financial centre, the Shanghai Government has been offering great 
financial support to institutes of higher education in terms of finance, has been 
making efforts to attract potential financial experts by offering high wages, and 
has been supporting the establishment of financial institutions within the city. 
By contrast, a large part of the economic growth of Dalian City, a former 
colonial city of Japan in the northeast of China, relies on providing relatively 
low-skilled outsourcing services to Japanese organisations. This distinct 
strategy has led to a booming business cluster of hundreds of companies 
providing business process outsourcing (BPO) and information technology 
outsourcing (ITO) services, has encouraged the development of technical 
education, focusing on subjects such as Japanese and computer skills, and 
has produced a labour market with a large population of low-skilled migrant 
workers from the rural areas. In other words, institutional settings in different 
parts of China can be very different depending on the strategies set by the 
local governments. In this sense, China is described as a form of ‘variegated 
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capitalism’, in which diverse regional systems coexist within one country 
(Peck & Zhang 2013). In addition, by tying the career progression of local 
officials to the annual growth in local revenue, the local governments have 
become not just administrative service providers, but also entrepreneurs, who 
need to identify the local competitive advantages, set strategies, allocate 
resources, and bear the risks as well as enjoy the benefits of their 
entrepreneurships (Oi, 2011). This, to a large extent, enhances the 
connection between local governments and the companies. Those companies 
which fit in with the local strategy and are seen as having the potential to 
contribute to the local economy are likely to get various forms of support from 
their local government. For instance, firms in Dalian City, which provide 
outsourcing service to Japanese companies, are offered favourable financial 
support to help them expand within the international market and to set up 
overseas affiliations. 
Given this level of regional diversity, one cannot simply assume a single 
institutional pattern of management and organisation across the country. 
Different regions in China are managed in different ways; thus Chinese 
companies are embedded in highly diverse and variegated institutional 
environments.  
Diversity)of)ownership8types)and)Chinese)companies)))
Before the economic reform, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) represented the 
dominant form of business organisation in China. In 1978, China’s transition 
to a more market-oriented economy led to the privatisation of many SOEs and 
the consequent growth of private enterprises. The number of SOEs reduced 
from 83,700 in 1978 to 6,770 in 2012, whereas the number of private 
enterprises reached 13 million in 2012 (the National Bureau of Statistics of 
China). Today, private enterprises in China include the privatised state-owned 
enterprises as well as the de novo private enterprises set up by private 
entrepreneurs. Meanwhile, foreign direct investors have been permitted to set 
up their own wholly owned subsidies as well as joint ventures with local 
partners in China, from the beginning of 1986, which has encouraged the 
increase of foreign-invested enterprises in China. In 2013, there were 440,609 
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foreign-invested enterprises, investing about three trillion US dollars in China 
(the National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2012).  
Companies with different forms of ownership face different regulatory and 
institutional environments. This is particularly true in terms of how companies 
access bank loans. China’s banking system, especially the state-owned 
banks, has been the main source of corporate financing. However, this 
banking system is suffering from financial repression instigated by policies 
and rules that divert formal credit to state-owned enterprises through the 
state-owned system (Naughton, 2007; Yueh, 2011). For example, the latest 
available statistics show that loans to private enterprises and self-employed 
individuals came to a total of RMB422 million in 2008, out of a total loan 
volume of RMB53.8 billion -- in other words, 0.8 percent (National Bureau of 
Statistics of China, 2009). In 2012, it was reported that the interest rates on 
government loans to private companies were 10% to 30% higher than those 
to state-owned companies (Committee of National People's Congress report, 
2013). This negatively affects the development of private enterprises, and 
creates financial impediments to private entrepreneurs. Under an 
unfavourable financing situation, most private companies have to operate 
under hard budget constraints, relying on self-accumulated capital including 
private savings and loans from family and friends (Rothman, 2005; Tsai, 
2002). By contrast, SOEs have much easier and more reliable access to bank 
loans, and thus have more opportunities to invest in strategic assets and 
pursue long-term development.  
Different forms of ownership also create a great diversity in terms of 
management practices. Before the transition, SOEs’ management was 
characterised by a so-called ‘three irons’ system: the iron rice-bowl, the iron 
chair and the iron wage. The ‘iron rice-bowl’ suggests that all employees are 
provided with lifetime employment, healthcare, corporate accommodation and 
child care through an enterprise-based danwei (or work unit) system. The ‘iron 
chair’ indicates that people’s jobs are centrally planned, and all the 
managerial positions in SOEs are appointed by the government according to 
the candidates’ technical competence (‘expertness’) and political soundness 
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(‘redness’). The ‘iron wages’ refers to an egalitarian pay scheme, which is 
directly administered by the government bodies and predominantly based on 
workers’ age, seniority and loyalty to the work unit (Ding & Warner, 2001). 
The ‘three irons’ system had prevailed for several decades in China at the 
time of the economic reform. However, it is generally agreed that this system 
is inefficient and is one of the most direct causes of SOEs’ poor performance 
(Benson & Zhu, 1999; Ding et al., 2000; Ding & Warner, 1999). SOEs under 
this system suffered from under-utilisation of employees, low work-morale and 
serious financial losses (Child, 1994).  
As part of the economic reform, the Chinese government launched a series of 
systematic reforms of SOEs, among which breaking the ‘three irons’ system, 
learning from advanced economies, and developing efficient management 
models for Chinese companies are emphasised (Hassard, Sheehan, Zhou, 
Terpstra-Tong, & Morris, 2007; Zheng, 2013). The emergence of Western-
style business schools in China and the teaching of Western-style business 
courses in Chinese universities have helped the spread of business and 
management ideas and the so-called ‘best practices’ from the developed 
countries to Chinese SOEs and privatised former SOEs (Warner & Goodall, 
2009). Under these circumstances, it is suggested that the SOEs in China 
have, in stages, moved away from the ‘three irons’ system and many of them 
have introduced a contract labour system, open competition for promotion and 
a reward system focusing more on efficiency and performance (e.g. Ding et al. 
2000; Warner 2009; Warner 1997). Many empirical studies have compared 
the management practices in Chinese SOEs with the typical practices in 
western countries, and indicated a hybrid form of management, in which 
western practices are incorporated but the legacies of the ‘three irons’ system 
are still evident due to the poorly developed system for development of 
management, the old employees who resist changes, and the continuous 
intervention by government (e.g. Benson & Zhu 1999; Glover & Siu 2000; 
Hassard et al. 2004). 
Unlike SOEs, private enterprises, which emerged and developed quickly after 
the economic reform, do not carry many features of the traditional ‘three irons’ 
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system. These companies are strongly influenced by the management 
strategies and practices of developed countries, and are keen on adopting 
performance-based reward system and building employee commitment. Yet, 
research shows that the development of modern management systems in 
these enterprises is not even. A few of the most successful companies such 
as Huawei, Lenovo, TCL and Haier have developed distinctive and 
sophisticated management systems (Teagarden & Cai, 2009), while a large 
majority of them is characterised by short-term oriented business goals, 
nepotistic promotion and succession, and rudimentary management 
techniques (Cooke, 2005a).  
As the main carriers of modern management practices, foreign-invested 
enterprises (including the joint-ventures and wholly owned subsidies) in China 
have spurred a lively literature on the integration and transfer of management 
policies and practices in joint-ventures, as well as between parents and 
subsidies. Many of them have adopted a contingency approach based on the 
comparison between practices in the parent companies and those in the 
Chinese subsidiaries (e.g. Farley et al. 2004; Björkman et al. 2008), while 
some more recent ones have offered more process-oriented and actor-
oriented discussion of these issues (e.g. Gamble 2010; Zheng 2013).  
The regional diversity and the diversity of ownership-types in China suggest 
that China contains multiple types of firms and institutional contexts. There is 
great flux in how different regions and firms are organised and managed. In 
this sense, Chinese companies cannot be understood without analysing their 
specific local institutions, ownership and historical legacies in terms of 
management practices. In the next part of this section, I introduce different 
frameworks from a social-institutional perspective. 
2.2.2&Approaches&to&bringing&in&institutions&
There are various models leading the social-institutional discussion. For the 
purpose of this study, I review two most widely used models, namely the 
varieties-of-capitalism (VoC) model developed by Hall & Soskice (2001) and 
the ‘national business system’ model developed by Whitley (1992). 
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The VoC literature distinguishes between coordinated market economies 
(CMEs) and liberal market economies (LMEs). Hall & Soskice (2001) argue 
that managers have to coordinate their economic activities in at least five 
different spheres – industrial relations, employee relations, education & 
training, inter-company relations, and corporate governance. However, the 
coordination activities need to be done very differently in CMEs on the one 
hand and LMEs on the other. In CMEs, such as Germany, Japan, Sweden 
and Austria, the coordination of business activities does not rely solely upon 
markets, but also on some non-market relationships such as relational 
contracting, industrial associations and labour unions. In LMEs, such as the 
US, UK, Canada and New Zealand, the organisation of economic activities is 
primarily coordinated through the market. Hall and Soskice contend that each 
society develops complementary institutions that shape the rules by which 
organisations operate, and the institutional complementarities define the 
comparative institutional advantages of certain types of capitalism.  
The ‘national business system’ literature demonstrates a close 
interrelationship between the national business system, institutional 
characteristics and the firms’ capabilities and management systems. Whitley 
(1992) argues that institutional contexts directly affect the nature of market 
processes and how economic success can be achieved. Therefore, different 
modes of business structures and practices become established and 
dominant in a particular institutional context, reflecting the specific features of 
that context. Whitley terms the particular configurations of institutional 
contexts ‘business systems’, and suggests that each business system 
combines preferences for particular forms of economic control and 
coordination. Later in 1999, Whitley (1999) described the characteristics of 
economic control and coordination systems as having three dimensions: 
ownership coordination (i.e. the organisation of ownership relations including 
the primary means of owner control, and the extent of ownership integration of 
production chains and sectors), non-ownership coordination (i.e. other forms 
of organisational integration in which authority does not depend on ownership, 
including the extent of alliance-coordination of production chains and sectors, 
and the extent of collaboration between competitors), and employment 
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relations and work management (i.e. employer-employee interdependence, 
delegation to and trust of employees). Different combinations of these 
characteristics produce six types of national business systems, which are 
called ‘fragmented’, ‘coordinated industrial district’, ‘compartmentalised’, 
‘state-organised’, and ‘collaborative’ and ‘highly coordinated’.  
Both frameworks emphasise institutional and social factors influencing the 
work, organisation and employment. In particular, Whitley (1996) has argued 
for an approach that complements the global supply chain framework with a 
business system perspective. However, VoC and national business systems 
have a number of limitations in addressing the specific characteristics of 
Chinese contexts. 
One problem with this approach is that it overemphasises the coherent and 
unitary models of national capitalism, and thus it does not account for the 
possibility of within-country variants. This problem has been addressed by 
several researchers. For example, Katz & Darbishire (2000) identify the 
spread of four patterns of employment relations (low-wage, HRM, Japanese 
oriented, jointed team-based) within seven countries, and indicate that 
different patterns of employment relations can exist in the same country. 
Morgan (2007) reflects on the role of firms and national institutions under the 
context of globalisation, and stresses the possibilities of local variants within 
one national boundary. He argues that, on the one hand, firms are highly 
innovative and are able to use institutions to develop their capacities and 
pursue a diversity of approaches. This will result in a growing diversity of 
organisational structures and strategies within national systems. On the other 
hand, institutions are not strong enough to direct firms to adopt a single, 
dominant pattern of behaviour. Institutions themselves can be undermined 
and reconstructed from within, which provides a great space for firms to 
develop their own distinctive strategies. Recognising the impact that firms 
might have on institutions, Hauptmeier's (2012) empirical research on the 
employment relations in firms in Spain shows that corporate actors with 
varying ideologies shape the construction of national institutions at the firm 
level, which results in changes in and diversity of employment relations within 
 
35 
the country. As I discussed above, there are multiple institutional contexts and 
ownership-types in China, and this suggests the need to pay attention to 
within-country variations and to investigate the role of actors in the interaction 
with national institutions. 
Another problem with this approach is that it neglects the influence of 
practices developed in leading economies, sectors or firms, which are termed 
‘dominance effects’ by Smith & Meiksins (1995). ‘Dominance effects’ can act 
as ‘third-country effects’ and influence companies in other countries. In 
Zheng's (2013) ethnographical study on Japanese MNCs’ subsidiaries in 
China, it is found that the development of subsidiary HR practices is 
significantly influenced by the ‘dominant’ practices developed in the leading 
countries and companies in particular sectors. These ‘dominant’ models could 
either be the ‘German model’ in the household electrical sector or the 
‘American way’ among the synthetic fibre manufacturing units. China is 
considered as a ‘late comer’ in business and management and has been keen 
on learning advanced management practices from developed economies 
(Child & Tsai, 2005). Therefore, it is pertinent to explore the ‘dominance 
effects’ in Chinese companies.  
Related, the comparative institutional approach underestimates the impact 
that organisational learning can have on the management system of 
international companies. Organisational learning can take place through 
introducing ‘dominant’ practices, employing a manager from another country, 
learning though partnerships, and so on.  Beechler et al. (1998) have applied 
the concept of organisational learning and present four types of learning 
cycles in organisations, labelled ‘exportive’, ‘adaptive’, ‘closed hybrid’ and 
‘open hybrid’. The hybrid cycles lead to the modification and innovation of 
existing practice repertoires. Although this work is based on a rationalist point 
of view, it does highlight the potential influence of organisational learning, 
which is under-emphasised in comparative institutionalist studies. 
Overall, the regional diversity and the diversity of ownership-types in China 
suggest that China contains multiple types of firms and institutional contexts. 
There is great flux in how different regions and firms are organised and 
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managed. In this sense, it is impossible to generalise one institutional 
configuration that shapes the management and organisation of all companies 
in China. That is to say, Chinese companies cannot be understood without 
analysing their specific local institutions, ownership and historical legacies in 
terms of management practices. Existing institutional frameworks, which 
assume homogeneity of national institutions, is insufficient to explain Chinese 
companies, which are embedded in a much more diverse and variegated 
institutional environment. In his paper on the field of organisation studies in 
China, Whetten (2009) distinguishes two usages of context effects. One is to 
use context effects to contextualise organisation theories, and the other is to 
use context effects as theories. He also argues that when context effects are 
used as theories, ‘contributions to theory can be characterised as a shift in 
focus from “looking through the lens” to “improving the lens”’ (Whetten 2009, 
p.35). Given this, this study attempts to extend existing theory by considering 
the diversity of Chinese institutional contexts, and investigate its impact on the 
work and employment in Chinese suppliers.   
2.3&Understanding&workplaces&of&global&suppliers&
As I mentioned above, work and employment at workplaces in global 
suppliers have been discussed in various studies (e.g. A. Chan, 2001; J. 
Chan, 2013; Frenkel, 2001; Pun & Smith, 2007). In particular, some studies 
have applied GVC or GCC frameworks and revealed how leading firm power 
in the chains affect the management and work at their suppliers’ workplaces 
and pay attention to the possibility and potential for these suppliers to upgrade 
along the chains and improve their employment relations and conditions (e.g. 
J. Chan, 2013). Despite of this, we still know little about the internal dynamics 
between managers and employees at suppliers’ workplaces, especially 
employees’ experiences at workplaces and their responses to management. 
This is partly because the analytical unit of GCC and GVC frameworks are 
firms rather than workplaces (Bair, 2005, 2009), and partly because the 
majority of extant studies has taken a managerial view, concentrating on 
global suppliers’ strategies, rather than employees’ experience and response.  
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According to the labour process theory (e.g. Edwards 1979; Braveman 1974; 
Burawoy 1979; Friedman 1977), capitalist employment is essentially 
exploitative because employers always need to pursue control strategies in 
order to extract enough profit from employees; thus there is an inherent 
‘structured antagonism’ between employers and employees (P. K. Edwards, 
1986). Such ‘structured antagonism’ between management and labour is 
more complicated in global suppliers in outsourcing industry because these 
suppliers often operate in a cross-national context in order to provide both off-
shore and on-shore services to their international clients. In this sense, the 
cross-national operation that embedding in ‘different national and local 
contexts will heighten the differences of meaning and understanding between 
management and workers’ (Edwards & Bélanger 2009, p.194). Employees 
with different nationalities, ethnicities, work experiences and career 
orientations have their own interests. For example, Zheng's (2013) study on 
China-based Japanese subsidiaries reported the ‘battles’ between local 
managers in China and expatriate managers from Japan on how to build the 
employees’ canteens. She found that while the expatriate managers from 
Japan intended to make expatriates a prioritised group by building a raised 
stage in the canteen for expatriates’ use, local managers fought hard against 
this idea by promoting an ‘egalitarian community’ and insisting on serving the 
same food to all employees.  
Given the structured conflicts between management and labour, the central 
topic of workplace relations is about the management’s control strategies, and 
the employees’ strategies of survival, negotiation and accommodation at the 
workplaces. Under an international context, this topic has been discussed in 
relation to the diffusion of certain models of work organisation cross nationally. 
For instance, Delbridge (1998) detailed the management control system in a 
Japanese electrical subsidiary based in the UK and showed that workers’ 
responses to the management control was best characterised as one of 
‘survival’ strategies. Therefore, although there was wide discontent among 
workers towards management, this did not result in an overt challenge to 
management prerogatives. By contrast, Elger & Smith (2005) studied 
Japanese transplant factories in the UK. They showed that there was deep 
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scepticism among workers about the corporate policies and practices, and 
workers engaged in informal negotiations with management, or expressed 
their dissatisfaction by quitting the jobs. The high turnover rate challenged the 
management prerogatives, and resulted in the modification and adaptation of 
work practices. This study will follow this line of argument and discuss the 
management control systems in Chinese suppliers as well as the employees’ 
response to these systems. 
In the meanwhile, both management and labour have their bargaining 
resources and constraints. This means management can deploy resources to 
support the achievement of its control over employees but at the same time its 
exercise of control may confront significant contradictions. This is also true for 
employees, who can use resources to negotiate with management or resist 
work practices but also face certain constraints. In international firms, these 
resources and constraints are more diverse and complicated than for 
companies operating in a single country. This implies that management-
labour relations at workplaces cannot be understood without exploring their 
interrelationships with the structural factors at various levels; hence the 
importance of a multi-level framework to the study of international companies.  
2.4&Research&questions&and&framework&
Based on the above reviews of literature, this section first outlines and 
explains the research questions of this study. It then presents a multi-level 
approach in this study, which bases on the GVC framework and the system-
society-dominance framework developed by Smith & Meiksins (1995). 
2.4.1&Research&questions&
The objective of this study is to understand how Chinese service suppliers 
construct and develop management practices and employment relations at 
workplaces in order to meet their international clients’ requirements, and how 
their employees experience and respond to these practices at workplaces. By 
reviewing global supply chain studies, I argue that the GVC and GCC 
frameworks have emphasised the power relations between leading firms and 
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suppliers, thus have important implications in understanding the work and 
organisation in global suppliers. In spite of this, I identify three limitations of 
the existing global chain studies. First, existing global supply chain studies 
tend to highlight the powerful influence of leading firms over their suppliers, 
whereas there is a lack of research on the dynamics in supplier-client power 
relations under different governance structures. Second, the GCC and GVC 
analysis of global suppliers overlooks the national and local embeddedness of 
the companies in the chains. I argue that the global supply chain analysis 
should be complemented by a more social-institutional perspective so that to 
capture the specific features of Chinese context and to allow a holistic 
understanding of the construction and development of practices at workplaces 
of Chinese suppliers. Thirdly, there is a lack of studies on the contested 
workplaces in global supply chains, especially in terms of workers’ 
experiences and responses, management control and resistance. Given these, 
this study wishes to advance our understanding of global suppliers by dealing 
with three specific questions at different levels: 
1. At the international level, how do different governance structures 
between clients and suppliers influence the work and employment at 
the workplaces of global supply firms?  
2. At the national level, how is the diverse and variegated form of 
capitalism found in China reflected in the work and employment at the 
workplaces of global supply firms? 
3. At the workplace level, how are the contested work relations being 
constructed and developed at the workplaces of global supply firms? 
The first question concerns the power relationships between clients and 
Chinese suppliers within the supply chains under different governance 
structures. As I will introduce in Chapter 4, the two Chinese suppliers studied 
in this thesis have respectively developed market-oriented relationship and 
captive relationship with their clients. Therefore, this study will consider the 
power relations between clients and Chinese suppliers in market-oriented 
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value chain and captive value chain, and investigate suppliers’ strategies and 
practices in different types of chains.   
The second question deals with the embeddedness of Chinese suppliers at 
both the national and local levels and its impact on the work and employment 
of Chinese suppliers, with a special focus on the diverse nature of the 
Chinese contexts. As I have noted, national institutions and firms in China are 
far from homogeneous. Instead, as a result of the decentralisation and 
marketisation of China’s economic reform, there is now a great deal of variety 
in terms of the institutional contexts and types of firms in China. Such within-
country variations have two implications for my study. First, instead of simply 
tracing the effects of national institutions, it is more appropriate to understand 
the characteristics of the local institutions and situations including the local 
labour market, educational institutions, the mode of skills formation, and the 
organisation of trade unions, and examine how these local institutions 
constrain and enable the firms’ activities, and how Chinese suppliers manage 
these local situations. In other words, while acknowledging the impacts of the 
state and the nationwide economic transition, this study will extend the 
national-level analysis to the local level in different Chinese cities. Second, 
instead of treating Chinese firms as homogeneous, it is important to ask what 
sort of Chinese firms is being considered (SOEs, private, or foreign-invested 
enterprises) and to take account of their specific historical legacies and 
relationships with national and local institutions.  
The third question looks at the workplace dynamics and relations at 
workplaces in Chinese suppliers. Drawing on labour process theory, the 
techniques of management control and the resistance and accommodation of 
employees will be discussed.  
2.4.2&A&multiNlevel&framework&
Given my research questions above, it is clear that my research attempts to 
understand work and employment in Chinese suppliers by investigating the 
supplier-client power relations in their contexts at the international, national 
and local levels. This requires a multi-level approach, which allows me: (1) to 
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locate supplier-client relationships in the wider context at the international, 
national and local levels; and (2) to connect various levels of analysis and 
explore their interactions. In order to achieve these, A framework which draws 
on both global supply chain analysis and the system-society-dominance-
corporate (SSDC) framework developed by Smith & Meiksins (1995) and 
further extended by Delbridge, Hauptmeier, & Sengupta (2011) is applied in 
this research.  
The global supply chain analysis based on GVC frameworks provides the 
basis of this study. Different forms of power dynamics between suppliers and 
clients will be examined under different governance structures in the value 
chains, and this will allow a comparative analysis on how different governance 
structures affect the work and employment at suppliers’ workplaces.  
Meanwhile, the power dynamics within global value chains will be placed 
within their wider contexts at the international, national, local and corporate 
levels while taking account of the variegated and diverse nature of Chinese 
capitalism. In this sense, the SSDC framework provides a holistic approach to 
both bring in a social-institutional perspective and capture the characteristics 
of Chinese capitalism.  
The SSDC framework, originally proposed as the SSD framework, was initially 
developed by Smith & Meiksins (1995) to correct the polarisation between 
convergence and divergence in cross-national organisational analysis. The 
SSD framework suggests that workplace organisation is shaped by a three-
way interaction, in which the nature of the political economic system (‘system 
effects’), the societal features within which the workplace is located (‘societal 
effects’), and the characteristics of the dominant economy, leading sectors 
and leading firms (‘dominance effects’) all influence work in any country.  
‘System effects’ in this framework refers to the common elements of a certain 
type of political economy, such as the active involvement of government in 
economic and managerial affairs within state socialism, or the market-based 
competition and capital-labour conflicts in the capitalist economic system. In 
addition, ‘system effects’ also refers to the forces that transcend national 
borders and have fundamental implications for industrial society, such as the 
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development of global science and technology. ‘Societal effects’ is closely 
allied to the arguments of the comparative institutional approach, but 
recognises the possibilities of internal dissonance and of conflicts within the 
national boundary. ‘Dominance effects’ refers to the ‘best practice’ generated 
and diffused by the ‘society-in dominance’ within the global economy at a 
particular period of time. It reflects the ‘the uneven nature of economic 
development and economic power’, and explains the ‘tendency for one 
society to take the lead in evolving work organisation and business practices 
considered more efficient than those operating within other countries’ (Elger & 
Smith 2005, p.66). 
Elger & Smith's (2005) book Assembling Work: Remaking Factory Regimes in 
Japanese Multinationals in Britain offered a detailed and sophisticated 
application of the SSD framework. This book was based on case studies of 
Japanese-owned subsidiaries in the West Midlands of England, and 
discussed the ways in which these subsidiaries’ work and employment 
practices had been developed over time. It not only illustrated how the effects 
of globalising capitalist forces, national institutional environments and ‘best 
practices’ shaped the diffusion of Japanese practices into the UK, but more 
importantly, revealed how these structural pressures are negotiated and 
mediated through corporate actors. In particular, Elger & Smith emphasised 
the fact that the ways in which specific subsidiaries are positioned within the 
wider corporate strategies of their MNCs had significant impacts on their 
organisational practices, and showed how different types of subsidiaries (i.e. 
transplants, hybrids and branch plants) influenced the workplace practices 
and employment relations within the MNCs. 
Drawing on the insights of Elger & Smith's (2005) discussion, Delbridge et al. 
(2011) extended the SSD framework by introducing a fourth element, termed 
‘corporate effects’, thus producing the SSDC framework. Specifically, 
‘corporate effects’ refers to the ‘systematic but negotiated influence of the 
corporate parent on workplace level practices and employment relations’ 
(Delbridge et al. 2011, p.485). This extended SSDC framework links the 
macro- and meso-level analyses on globalisation, political economy and 
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national and local institutions with corporate dynamics, thus offering a more 
powerful and comprehensive approach through which work organisations and 
practices may be assessed and explained.  
Applying the SSDC framework to this study, ‘system effects’ concerns the 
generic features of capitalism such as property rights, types of ownership, 
capitalist employment relations and globalisation. In particular, ‘system effects’ 
allows me to analyse the transition of Chinese economy from a central-
planned system to a market-oriented system, and to examine how this 
transition leads to changes and continuity in different cities in China and 
Chinese management system. System effects are institutionally mediated and 
are subject to uneven development across countries, industries and firms, 
which points to societal effects and dominance effects. ‘Societal effects’ 
considers institutional arrangements at both national and local levels. It is at 
this point that the diverse and variegated nature of Chinese capitalism will be 
explored, and the within-country variations will be highlighted, and the 
institutional homogeneity assumed VoC and national business systems will be 
corrected. ‘Dominance effects’ examines the influence of ‘best practices’ from 
dominant societies, leading industries and leading firms. It captures the ‘late 
development’ of Chinese economy and companies and will lead me to 
examine the influence of ‘best practices’ from dominant societies on Chinese 
companies. While the ‘corporate effect’ emphasises the HQ-subsidiary 
relationships within MNCs, in this study, the notion of ‘corporate effect’ mainly 
refers to the process through which the corporate strategies in Chinese supply 
firms are constructed and developed. In other words, ‘corporate effects’ 
examines the construction and development of the corporate strategy in 
responding to the market and institutional changes and their impacts on the 
work and employment at workplaces.  
Combining the SSDC framework and the GVC analysis, the multi-level 
framework applied in this study is illustrated in Figure 2.1. The analysis of 
supplier-client relationships within global value chains will be complemented 
by the discussion of the SSDC effects at the international, national and local 
levels. This study will explore how power relations in the supply chains and 
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the SSDC effects are brought together and manifested at workplaces in 
Chinese suppliers, as corporate actors (managers and employees in different 
workplaces) respond to, struggle over and manage these structural forces. 
 
 
Figure!2.2!A!multi<level!framework!!
2.5&Conclusion&
This chapter has reviewed existing research in global supply chains and 
global suppliers, particularly the GCC and GVC frameworks. I find that the 
GVC analysis fits well with my research subject as global suppliers since it 
emphasises the importance of power relations between leading firms and 
suppliers in global supply chains. However, I identify three limitations of the 
existing GVC analysis, namely, the lack of comparative study on power 
relations under different governance structures, the neglect of social-
institutional perspectives taking account of the specific characteristics of the 
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Chinese context, and the insufficient attention paid to the internal dynamics at 
workplaces between managers and employees.  
To address these gaps, I propose a multi-level approach and place the 
supplier-client relationships in global value chains within its wider context at 
the international, national and local levels. An SSDC framework, combined 
with the GVC analysis, will be adopted in this study. 
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Chapter& 3& Researching& the& global& supply& firms:& the& cases& of&
DataNCo&and&SoftwareNCo&
I have stated in the preceding chapter that this study will adopt a multi-level 
approach to understanding the construction and development of management, 
work and employment in global suppliers. This approach attempts to link the 
structural forces at international, national and local levels with the corporate 
actors’ strategies and actions at the corporate and workplace levels. While the 
preceding chapter proposed that the framework that draws upon both the 
GVC analysis and the SSDC framework is an appropriate theoretical 
framework to form the basis for undertaking this multi-level study, this chapter 
focuses on the methodological issues involved in this study. and specifically, 
in investigating the proposed research questions (here repeated from the 
previous chapter for ease of reference): 
1. At the international level, how do different governance structures 
between clients and suppliers influence the work and employment at 
the workplaces of global supply firms?  
2. At the national level, how is the diverse and variegated form of 
capitalism found in China reflected in the work and employment at the 
workplaces of global supply firms? 
3. At the workplace level, how are the contested work relations being 
constructed and developed at the workplaces of global supply firms? 
This chapter is divided into five sections. In the first section, I demonstrate 
that this study adopts a critical realist perspective and discuss its implications 
for my research focus, object and approach. In line with the critical realist 
ontology, a retroductive research strategy is adopted, following Houston's 
(2010) steps to achieve retroduction. The third section discusses the research 
design and the processes of data collection. This research was conducted 
through a comparative case study of two Chinese service providers, which are 
involved in international contracting with Japan in two different forms of global 
value chains (i.e. market-based value chain and captive value chain), and 
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operate in both China and Japan. Data presented in this research were 
collected from four work-sites of these two companies in both their Chinese 
and Japanese workplaces , using a mix of observational, informal 
conversational and semi-structured interview data. In the fourth section, I 
discuss the data analysis and coding process. In the fifth section, I introduce 
the two case companies, Data-Co and Software-Co, making particular 
reference to their local environments, Chinese and Japanese workplaces, 
organisational structures and hierarchies, and unions. 
3.1&A&critical&realist&perspective&for&understanding&global&suppliers&
A clearly defined ontological standpoint provides a set of assumptions about 
reality and knowledge. It is of fundamental importance because it provides a 
set of foundational orientations that shape the ways in which certain studies 
should be undertaken, including the choices of research strategy, research 
methods, data collection and the systems of data analysis. Within the broad 
subject area of international management, researchers have, implicitly or 
explicitly, adopted a variety of ontological perspectives for understanding the 
management and organisation of companies that involve in international 
production and international firms. For example, scholars following a 
contingency theory normally take a positivist perspective by proposing that 
organisational and environmental contingencies will ‘determine’ which 
strategy and practice international companies should adopt. In Taylor's (1999) 
study on the patterns of control within Japanese plants in China, the author 
states his research objective as being ‘to determine what affects the degree of 
control…and to what extent control is related to the degree of…’ (p.858) In 
other words, the author is interested in the cause and effect relationships 
between certain analytical variables (such as the location, size, sector and 
share ownership of the plants) and the patterns of management control in 
companies. Such a positivist approach assumes an ordered social reality 
which is made up of a series of discrete events that can only be identified 
through one’s sensed experiences. The order of this social reality can be 
presented in the form of empirical regularities (Blaikie, 2000). By contrast, 
scholars who take the approach of constructionist ontology emphasise the 
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constitutive role of language and discourse in organisations, paying particular 
attention to the discursive practices and linguistic aspects of companies. They 
tend to reduce the social reality to a discursively manufactured inter-
subjective construct, and assume that this social reality can only be accessed 
and understood through the linguistic and discursive tools (Gergen, 1994). 
Unlike the positivist and constructionist studies, the research focus, object and 
approach of this study are informed by a critical realism (CR) perspective, in 
particular by the CR of Roy Bhaskar (1975) and Margaret Archer (1995). 
In the first place, CR states that there is a reality out there independent of our 
knowledge of it, and that it is stratified and differentiated into three domains: 
the empirical, the actual and the real (Bhaskar, 1975). The domain of the 
empirical consists of empirical events that actors can observe. This is the 
level of actors’ sensations, perceptions and experiences of reality. The 
domain of the actual includes events, whether observed or not. These events 
can happen, yet not be experienced in the domain of the empirical until actors 
have identified them correctly. Beneath the domain of the actual is the domain 
of the real. The domain of the real is ‘the realm of objects, their structures and 
powers’ (Sayer, 2000, p.11). The structured objects with their causal powers 
in this domain have capacities and tendencies to produce outcomes, which 
may lead to perceivable events if activated. The processes by which these 
structures generate events are understood as the ‘generative mechanisms’. It 
is this domain of the real that has central importance in CR research. It 
requires researchers to ‘dig’ beyond the domain of the empirical so as to 
identify and understand the structures and causal powers in the domain of the 
real. Based on this assumption, the focus of this study does not stop at the 
discursive and linguistic aspects of global suppliers, nor does it purely 
concentrate on empirical observations of them. Rather, the central focus of 
this study is how multiple underlying structures play out through different 
levels and come to manifest in global suppliers that operate cross-nationally. 
In this sense, the SSDC framework adopted in this study provides a way to 
integrate the social structures at international, national and corporate levels, 
and to examine their manifestations and impacts in the domain of the actual 
and the empirical.  
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In the second place, CR posits that social reality operates in an ‘open system’, 
in which there are many structures, with their own distinct generative 
mechanisms, operating simultaneously (Bhaskar, 1975). Some mechanisms 
reinforce each other and some contradict each other. As Danermark, Ekström, 
Jakobsen, & Karlsson (2002) note, the effect of a particular generative 
mechanism may be affected, reinforced, weakened, or sometimes neutralised 
by the effects of other mechanisms. Such combined effects of mechanisms 
indicate that we can never ‘predict’ the outcome of any intervention. Those 
mechanisms produce ‘tendencies’, rather than ‘determined outcomes’. This 
principle has implications for the research object of this study. That is, the 
purpose of this study is not to identify the cause and effect relationships 
between the management policies and practices in global suppliers and their 
internal and external environments. Rather, it aims to understand and 
elucidate the structures and processes that generate the events and actions 
in suppliers and their workplaces within particular contexts. 
In the third place, society consists of two separate but related phenomena: 
acting people, who have intentions and can act, and social structures, which 
cannot act. Given CR’s focus on social processes and structures that 
generate events and actions, the relationships between social structures and 
acting people have been a focal point for description, explanation and 
understanding in CR research (Reed, 2009). According to Danermark et al., 
(2002) and Archer (1995), there are four main approaches to conceptualise 
and treat this relationship in social science. The first approach is known as a 
‘downwards conflation’, in which social activity is understood as the 
determinant result of social structures, and the actions of individuals can be 
traced back to their positions in different structures (Archer, 1995). Such an 
approach over-stresses the influence of social structures on social activity and 
human behaviours. The second approach is opposite to the ‘downwards 
conflation’ approach, and is termed ‘upwards conflation’. In this approach, 
structures become epiphenomena of social agents, and they cannot be 
distinguished as independent phenomena with autonomous and independent 
powers. As Gamble (2010) comments, while this approach provides a useful 
corrective to the structural determinism of organisation studies, it is ‘too free 
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floating, unattached and uninhibited by structural constraints’ (p.710). The 
third approach is represented by the structuration theory of Anthony Giddens 
(1984). Giddens argues that structure and agency constitute one another in 
such a way that one cannot be separated from the other. Therefore, instead of 
seeing agency and structure as separate entities, researchers should talk of 
the structure-agency duality and a process of structuration. This structuration 
theory results in what Archer (1995) calls a ‘central conflation’. As Danermark 
et al. (2002) and Layder (2006) comment, acknowledging that agency and 
structure are mutually constitutive does not provide a way to understand the 
structure-agency link. Instead, since the agency and structure are not 
analysed as phenomena possessing powers and mechanisms, the 
structuration analysis denies the concepts of emergence of events and 
actions in social contexts and artificially ‘flattens’ the social world into a single 
dimension (Danermark et al., 2002; Layder, 2006). Because of this, it is 
impossible to examine the different, yet linked, contributions of agency and 
structures to the formation and reproduction of social processes.  
Archer (1995) introduces the fourth approach, which she calls ‘analytical 
dualism’. She contends that ‘structure and agency can only properly be linked 
by teaming the interplay between them over time and that without the proper 
incorporation of time the problem of agency and structure can never be 
satisfactorily resolved’ (Archer 1995, p.65). In other words, analytical dualism: 
(1) considers structure and agency as analytical distinctions without 
emphasising one over the other; (2) places the fundamental model of 
structure and agency into a time dimension. It is thus suggested that structure 
and agency are two different strata with separate powers and mechanisms -- 
structures constrain and enable the actions of the agents, and agents 
reproduce and transform the structures. This interplay between structure and 
agency can be examined over time.  
In this study, I follow Archer’s approach of analytical dualism. I acknowledge 
that the activities of corporate actors are constrained and enabled by the 
structural forces they face. Meanwhile, I hold the opinion that the activities of 
corporate actors cannot be simply read off from the structural influences – as 
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a ‘downwards conflation’ approach would assume. Rather, corporate actors in 
suppliers operate within plural institutional settings and have specific 
relationships with the structural forces that they face. These relationships in 
turn inform how corporate actors might respond to and act within their 
contexts. It brings corporate actors to the fore, and links structural influences 
with the power struggles and political processes among corporate actors.  
In sum, the stratified ontology of CR informs this research’s focus on the 
underlying structures that tend to shape the management and organisation of 
global suppliers. The idea of social society as an ‘open system’ in which 
multiple generative mechanisms interplay at the same time implies that the 
purpose of this study is to understand and elucidate the structures and 
processes that generate the events and actions in suppliers under particular 
contexts. The ‘analytical dualism’ provides an approach to examine the 
relationships between structure and agency over time.  
3.2&Research&strategy:&retroduction&&
As noted above, CR supposes that the ‘real’ world is not directly observable 
and accessible. Therefore, the influence of structures and generative 
mechanisms can only be read through the recurring patterns of actions in the 
domain of the actual, and the sensed experiences in the domain of the 
empirical (Sayer, 2000). In this regard, CR adopts a retroductive research 
strategy, which involves ‘working back’ from the identification of observable 
phenomena, to theoretically postulated structures and causal powers that 
have capabilities to generate these phenomena (Danermark et al., 2002; 
Sayer, 2000).  
The retroductive strategy contrasts with the inductive, deductive and 
abductive strategies, which are also widely adopted in both natural and social 
science. Inductive (observe and generalise) and deductive (hypothesise and 
test) strategies are normally associated with positivism, which primarily aims 
at searching for empirical regularities. They are not appropriate for CR 
research because neither of them gives any guidance on how researchers 
can, from observing particular phenomena, gain knowledge of the deep 
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structures and mechanisms that produce these observable phenomena 
(Danermark et al., 2002). Abduction focuses on the recontextualisation and 
reinterpretation of the motives and accounts of actors involving in particular 
social situations. According to Danermark et al. (2002), abduction does 
involve the search for deep or hidden influences of structures, and it could be 
used complementarily with a retroductive strategy in CR research as a way of 
theoretical redescription. In spite of this, this study will adopt solely the 
retroductive strategy because it is the most commonly used strategy in CR 
research, and it fits with my research agenda. 
Specifically, this study applies Houston's (2010) stages of retroduction (Table 
3.1). In the first stage, Houston suggests that researchers who conduct 
retroduction should ask transcendental questions, which are concerned with 
the underlying structural forces such as ‘what must be the case in order for 
events to occur as they do?’ (Houston 2010, p.83-84) In the second stage, 
Houston argues that in order to answer transcendental questions, researchers 
need to provide ‘a priori’ hypotheses to explain what has been observed. 
These hypotheses may draw on logical inferences and theoretical concepts. 
At the third stage, researchers need to collect evidence to confirm, deny or 
modify the hypothesis. At this stage, mixed-methods are important to ‘capture 
the complexity of the objective and subjective dimensions of social life’ 
(Houston 2010, p.84). At the fourth stage, researchers look to reaffirm the 
earlier hypotheses in order to answer the transcendental questions. 
Explanatory hypotheses may be refined, redefined or reformulated, and then 
further evidenced to a saturated point, where ‘there is a robust connection 
between the hypothesis and the patterns of social activity observable in the 
empirical world’ (Houston 2010, p.85). The final stage involves the instigation 
of emancipatory actions to counter oppressive mechanisms. This stage is not 
included in the research agenda of this study. 
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Table!3.1:!Steps!of!retroduction!
 Retroduction 
Step One Asking a transcendental question 
Step Two Developing a priori hypotheses to address the question in terms 
of: (a) the generative mechanisms at play, (b) the role of 
‘agency’, ‘time’ and ‘context’ 
Step 
Three 
Seeking for evidence in favour of hypotheses by looking for the 
effects of mechanisms and their interplay with ‘agency’, ‘time’ and 
‘context’ 
Step 
Four 
Refining, confirming, falsifying or reworking hypotheses and 
seeking more evidence 
Step Five Instigating emancipatory action to counter oppressive 
mechanisms and activating enabling mechanisms 
Source: Houston (2010, p.83) 
The following sections detail how this study has followed the retroductive 
steps proposed by Houston (2010). Steps one and two will be explained in 
this section, and steps three and four will be detailed in the following sections.  
Step One: Transcendental questions 
All research questions in this study point to the manifestations and impacts of 
structures (in the domain of the real). The first question considers how the 
nature of a global supply chain under global capitalism and the various 
governance structures with chains comes to manifest in specific ways within 
Chinese supply firms. The second question examines the ‘societal effects’ of 
China on Chinese service providers. The third question deals with how 
structural forces at the international, national, local and corporate levels play 
out and shape the labour process and employment relations of workplaces in 
Chinese supply firms. As such, all research questions seek to get a grasp on 
deep level structural forces (i.e. governance structures in GVCs and the 
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SSDC effects), and investigate how their causal powers shape the 
management and organisation of global suppliers and affect the lived 
experience of people in suppliers, and how the causal powers of corporate 
actors both maintain and inform social structural manifestations. 
Step Two: Development of hypothetical relationships among theoretical 
concepts 
In this study, the SSDC framework, combined with GVC framework, are 
utilised to generate hypotheses. From a CR perspective, the SSDC effects 
are considered as generative mechanisms that could give rise to certain 
empirical tendencies within suppliers and their workplaces. The first research 
question relates to the implication of different governance structures on the 
power relationships between leading firms and supply firms, and on the 
management, work and employment at the workplaces of supply firms. The 
concept of ‘governance structures’ suggested in the GVC framework was 
proposed in the literature review as a useful concept to capture the power 
relations between leading firms and suppliers within global supply chains. The 
impact of global supply chains and the governance structures in different 
forms of global supply chains manifest at the corporate level as different 
patterns of governance structures and supplier-client relationships within 
different contexts (of time and space). These supplier-client relationships 
influence the construction and development of the management and 
organisation of global suppliers, and, at the same time, the corporate actors 
manage and react to these supply chain relationships in their own interests 
and needs. Therefore, it is hypothesised that the different governance 
structures with value chains lead to different supplier-client relationships, and 
these may influence the management and organisation of global supply firms, 
and at the same time, these influences are managed and mediated by the 
corporate actors within the supply firms. 
The second question asks how the structural forces at the international and 
national levels are manifested and play out in Chinese supply firms in different 
forms of global supply chains. In particular, it aims to investigate the 
institutional factors that surrounding the Chinese firms. Compared to the 
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stable, consistent and institutionalised forms of capitalism prevalent in many 
developed countries, it is hypothesised that the diverse and variegated form of 
Chinese capitalism manifests and plays out in various ways across different 
areas of China and in different types of firms. Thus, the manifestations of the 
‘societal effects’ in China should be analysed at the local level, with particular 
attention paid to the specific types of firm. 
The third question concerns the active and contested construction of 
workplace relations in global suppliers . The management policies and 
practices in global suppliers are, on the one hand, shaped by the SSDC 
effects, but, on the other hand, negotiated between management and labour. 
While management and labour both face constraints from the social 
environments in which they are embedded, they may also mobilise local 
resources to negotiate with each other and to support their own interests. In 
this sense, it is hypothesised that the combined effects of SSDC and their 
dynamic with management and labour in suppliers will shape the specific 
features of labour processes and employment relations within a specific 
context.  
The third step for retroduction involves seeking evidence for these theoretical 
and hypothesised relationships. I therefore explain the research design and 
data collection methods for doing so in the following section. 
3.3&Research&design&and&data&collection&
While Sayer (2000) argues that CR is compatible with a wide range of 
research methods, he stresses that the particular choices of research 
methods ‘should depend on the nature of the object of study and what one 
wants to learn about it’ (p.19). My research focus is to develop a multi-level 
approach to understanding how social structures and generative mechanisms 
manifest themselves in specific contexts, and influence the management and 
organisation of global suppliers in China. The interplay between systemic, 
societal, dominance and their effects on Chinese suppliers can only be 
understood by accessing the understanding and experiences of managers 
and employees under specific contexts, and by investigating how corporate 
 
56 
actors respond to, struggle over and make use of these structural forces at a 
given point in time and space. In this sense, this study adopts an ‘intensive’ 
research design, which uses case study as the research strategy, and collects 
a combination of observational and interview (informal and formal) data. 
‘Intensive’ research design, which focuses on one or just a few particular 
cases in context using interviews, ethnography and qualitative analysis, 
contrasts with ‘extensive’ research design, which employs large scale surveys, 
formal questionnaires and statistical analysis (Sayer, 2000). In the following 
parts of this chapter, the selection of research sites, research access and data 
collection are discussed in detail.  
3.3.1&Selection&of&research&sites&
The selection of research sites is basically informed by my research questions 
and the hypothesised relationships mentioned above. First, since this study is 
interested in the governance structures between leading firms and suppliers 
and their impact on the management, work and employment of suppliers, it is 
sensible to choose companies which are heavily engaged in global supply 
chains. For this reason, companies in the international service outsourcing 
sector have been chosen, because they are, by nature, involved in 
international production networks, and supplier-client relationships are of 
fundamental importance to the survival and growth of these companies. 
Japan has been one of the earliest and the most important clients of China’s 
offshore industry, and this underpins my choice of Japan as the host country 
in this study. 
Second, comparison is a key element of this study. In particular, two 
contrasting types of governance structures are examined in this study, namely 
the market-based GVC and the captive GVC. These different GVC 
governance structures lead to different power relationships between suppliers 
and their clients, which offer a comparative base for this study. Market-based 
GVC is primarily governed by price, and represents the arm’s length 
relationships between clients and suppliers. Since market-based GVC 
involves easily codified transactions, simple product specifications and 
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capable suppliers (Gereffi, Humphrey, & Sturgeon, 2005), clients are allowed 
a clean hand-off and do not tend to intervene and involve much in their 
suppliers’ daily operation. Captive GVC, however, involves suppliers with low 
levels of capabilities and thus highly dependent on the powerful client 
company. Therefore, suppliers within captive chains are frequently featured 
by a high degree of monitoring and control by the leading firms in the chains. 
These two GVC structures have significant implications on the power relations 
between suppliers and clients. Specifically, since the costs of switching to new 
partners are very high to suppliers in a captive GVC, it is supposed that the 
clients are more powerful than suppliers and the power asymmetry between 
them are evident. By contrast, power asymmetry between clients and 
suppliers in a market-based GVC is less evident largely because the 
switching costs to new partners are low for both parties. Comparing the work 
and employment of suppliers in these two contrasting value chains will 
advance our understanding the effect of the supply-chain governance 
structures on the work and employment in suppliers. 
While recognising that Japanese clients are the main actors in this study, 
Japanese clients are not directly accessed in this study. This is because that 
this study focuses on exploring how different supplier-client relationships 
impact the management practices at suppliers’ workplaces and how Chinese 
supply firms organise themselves to meet the demands of the Japanese 
clients. The discussion of ‘governance structures’ in global supply chains 
offers a way for us to understand the power relations between suppliers and 
clients without directly access the clients.  
Third, in line with my interest in the Chinese context, and the assumption that 
the diverse and variegated forms of Chinese capitalism manifest and play out 
in various ways across different areas of China and in different types of firms, 
the research design of this study basically involves two different types of 
Chinese MNCs (private firm versus state-owned firms) in a similar but 
differentiated outsourcing sector (information processing service outsourcing 
versus software service outsourcing), in different parts of China (Dalian City 
versus Shanghai City), but both investing and having overseas offices in 
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Japan. That is to say, the comparison in this study is not based on different 
‘home’ or ‘host’ countries of international companies. Rather, I am more 
interested in how different corporate variations and local variations influence 
the management and organisation within Chinese companies. Details of the 
two cases in my study, Data-Co and Software-Co, are illustrated in Table 3.2.  
Third, in order to explore the contested nature of workplaces and to compare 
the workplaces in different locations within different countries, this study 
involves researching the workplaces in both China and Japan. A great deal of 
research on international firms relies on data from just one or other out of HQs 
or overseas offices or subsidiaries. While this has the benefit of being less 
demanding in terms of gaining access, and of research funding and 
communications skills, it has been criticised for ‘methodological separatism’ 
(Yeung, 1995). Neither HQs nor overseas offices/subsidiaries may be 
assumed to be the sole source of evidence because both HQs and overseas 
offices/subsidiaries are likely to be ignorant or mistaken about the ‘reality on 
the ground’ in the other units (Mezias, Chen, & Murphy, 1999). In order to 
capture the complexity of international firms as a whole and to better 
understand the interaction between their workplaces in different countries, I 
conducted cross-national research at both the Chinese and the Japanese 
workplaces of both Data-Co and Software-Co. This includes four research 
sites: the Chinese workplace of Data-Co in Shanghai City, the Japanese 
workplace of Data-Co in Tokyo, the Chinese workplace of Software-Co in 
Dalian and the Japanese workplace of Software-Co in Tokyo.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
59 
Table!3.2:!Company!profiles!of!the!cases!
Pseudonym Data-Co Software-Co 
Location of HQ Dalian, China Shanghai, China 
Main business Offering information 
processing services such as 
data processing, computer-
aided design (CAD), desktop 
publishing (DTP), for 
Japanese organisations 
Software programming 
and maintenance 
services for Japanese 
organisations 
Ownership Private Chinese company Previously a Japanese-
Chinese joint venture, 
then became a wholly 
state-owned Chinese 
company in 2001 
Established 1992 1991 
No. of employees 
in the Chinese 
workplace at time 
of main fieldwork 
1000+ 850+ 
Location of 
Japanese office  
Tokyo, Japan Tokyo, Japan 
 
Japanese office 
established 
2003 1991 
No. of  
employees in 
Japan at time of 
main fieldwork 
About 55 at time of main 
fieldwork. Among them, ten 
permanent employees, four of 
whom were Japanese, 
working in the Japanese 
office. The other 40 were 
expatriates who worked at 
clients’ worksites.  
About 110 at time of 
main fieldwork. Among 
them, six permanent 
employees, three of 
whom are Japanese, 
working in the Japanese 
office. The other 100 
were expatriates who 
worked at clients’ sites 
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3.3.2&Access&and&phases&of&data&collection&
Given the research questions and the intensive research design of this study, 
it was necessary for me to enter into the specific context, in order to 
understand how independent actors interact with each other and with the 
environment in which the organisations are embedded. Therefore, quantitative 
survey-based methods have not been chosen for this study. Rather, a 
combination of qualitative methods, including observations, formal interviews 
and informal conversations appeared to be appropriate for my data collection. 
This allowed me to become immersed in the workplace realities and to build 
knowledge of the construction and implementation of organisational practices, 
and to get first-hand information about employees’ daily experiences. This 
part of this chapter explains generally how I accessed the workplaces and the 
four phases of my data collection, whereas the details on how I collected 
these data will be discussed in the next two parts.  
Given my demanding requests to engage in observations and interviews with 
a wide range of employees at both the HQs and the Japanese workplaces, 
gaining access and negotiating the scope of access was a continuing and 
challenging process. Managers often had their own agendas and concerns 
about granting access. For example, in the Chinese HQ of Data-Co, I was 
cast in a counselling role by management (two weeks in to my fieldwork), and 
I was expected to help its HR department improve their employee appraisal 
system. This ascribed role provided me free access to talk to a wide range of 
managers and workers. In Software-Co, managers were quite cautious about 
participant observation, so I was not allowed to work with their employees on 
a daily basis. However, I lived with many employees of Software-Co in their 
company accommodation during my stay in Japan. This provided me 
sufficient opportunities to talk with them, and I gained interesting insights into 
their daily life. I realised that my presence and interaction in observation and 
interviews would potentially affect people’s behaviour and responses, and 
thus issues regarding reflexivity on the part of the researcher will be 
discussed later when I detail how I collected data. In order to protect the 
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confidentiality of the companies and the anonymity of my informants, all the 
names used in this thesis are pseudonyms.  
Generally speaking, my data collection comprises four intensive phases 
(Figure 3.1), which I will discuss in detail one by one.  
 
Figure!3.1:!Phases!of!data!collection!
During the first phase between March and May 2011, I did pilot interviews with 
fifteen informants from Data-Co, twelve of them from the Chinese workplace 
and three of them from the Japanese workplaces. This phase was crucial for 
the development of this research, for three reasons. First, I gained a deeper 
understanding of the international service outsourcing industry and the 
general features of Chinese companies in this industry. Interviewees 
confirmed that outward FDI was a general tendency for companies in this 
industry, and a large number of companies in this industry were, or had been, 
engaging in internationalisation. Along with a large amount of governmental 
and media reports that I read during this period, these pilot interviewees 
reassured me that the international service outsourcing industry was an 
appropriate industry for the study of Chinese supply firms. Second, these 
initial interviews provided important information regarding the company’s 
history, organisational structure, business model and approaches to 
internationalisation. In particular, these interviews revealed the existence of 
some tensions and conflicts between the Chinese and Japanese workplaces, 
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which made this case very interesting. Third, through the process of pilot 
interviews, the CEO of Data-Co, whom I approached through the social media 
website ‘Linkedin’, got a clearer idea of my research focus, as well as my 
speciality in international management and human resource management. 
After the pilot interviews, he finally accepted my request to visit the Chinese 
workplace for a period of time.  
My participant observation in Data-Co’s Chinese workplace began at 8.30am 
on 15th May 2011. The administrative manager introduced me to the HR 
department as a PhD researcher, and I was allocated a desk in one of the HR 
offices with three other members of staff. Although some British tea and 
snacks I brought to the office did help to break the ice between me and my 
new officemates, I was soon left unnoticed when everyone went back to work. 
At lunchtime, one of my officemates took me to the company canteen and we 
had lunch together. She was very curious about my purpose in coming to the 
company and my relationships with her managers. I felt that my officemates 
were nice to me because they thought I knew their managers and CEO very 
well, but, at the same time, they were extremely cautious about talking about 
anything related to the company and the management. During the first two 
weeks of my fieldwork, I was not assigned any task, and I did not have 
permission to visit other departments or interview people beyond the HR 
department. However, I did manage to build friendly relationships with my 
officemates and with other people in the HR department through my regular 
presence from 8:30am to 5:30pm every day, chatting over lunch, and offering 
help with business chores such as copying, faxing and delivering things. They 
gradually got to know how I had come to know their CEO and entered into the 
field, and got a basic idea of my research topic. They started showing respect 
for my research, and would enjoy talking with me about their work. At the end 
of the second week of my fieldwork, I got involved in some in-depth 
conversations about HR-related issues in the company, through which I learnt 
that the HR department was attempting to improve their employee appraisal 
system and was hoping to get some professional advice on how companies 
from advanced economies developed their employee appraisal systems. 
Under these circumstances, I told the manager and the HR department that I 
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would like to participate in the project of employee appraisal system if they 
would provide me with access to visit and interview employees. They 
accepted my proposal. From then on, I stepped out of the HR department, 
and was allowed to move freely within the company. I endeavored to arrange 
formal and informal interviews with people during my visits to different 
departments and workplaces, upon the reference of the manager. Most 
informants were very supportive and showed some respect for what I was 
doing. They were willing to share their experiences, and often introduced me 
to other people for more interviews. Apart from the formal interviews, I also 
spent time having informal conversations with workers over lunchtime, breaks 
and sometimes dinners. I was allowed to attend managerial meetings, daily 
briefings and other activities, which offered many interesting insights into the 
decision-making and management processes in Data-Co.  
After my fieldwork in Dalian, I spent several months (August-November, 2011) 
negotiating access with the second supply firms: Software-Co, and arranging 
my trip to Japan. During the third phase of my fieldwork in Japan, I stayed in 
the company accommodation of Software-Co, and spent most of my time 
interviewing people from Software-Co, formally and informally. I visited 
Software-Co’s Japanese office in Tokyo and interviewed all six employees 
(three Japanese and three Chinese). Since the expatriates from Software-Co 
worked at three different locations depending on their clients’ requirements, I 
travelled around different locations in order to hear different ‘voices’. Although 
I was not allowed to visit the expatriates’ workplaces and observe their daily 
work, staying in the company accommodation and participating in their leisure 
activities during their spare time during the week and at weekends enabled 
me to build close relationships with these expatriates, and to better 
understand their daily lives. This also allowed time for me to discuss some 
issues in a more casual way, and to get to understand their concerns about 
and evaluations of the management system within their company.  
During my stay in Japan, I also paid several visits to Data-Co’s Japanese  
office. My previous participation in the Chinese workplace of Data-Co had 
gave me lots of opportunities to contact people in the Japanese workplaces 
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on the telephone and through emails, which, in turn, led to a very smooth and 
rewarding fieldwork in its Japanese workplaces. I conducted interviews with 
people, and was invited to join their ‘Company Away Day’, which deepened 
the level of my observation.  
The last phase of my fieldwork took place in Shanghai, China, where 
Software-Co’s HQ was located. Interviews with a wide range of employees in 
Software-Co constituted the primary research method during this phase, but 
these were coupled with opportunities for non-participant observation, 
informal conversations and collecting corporate documents.  
At the conclusion of these four intensive phases of data collection, I had 
collected a large amount of data in both the HQs and the workplaces of both 
Data-Co and Software-Co (see Table 3.3). The sources of my data included 
company documents, on-site observations, formal interviews and informal 
interviews at the workplaces, canteens, dormitories, after-dinner gatherings 
and all sorts of entertaining activities. After the intensive on-site fieldwork, I 
maintained communication with each company. Several follow-up interviews 
were conducted to address issues upon which I needed more information, 
and to update my accounts.  
Since corporate documentary data are general and basic, they are only used 
here as background information concerning each company and the industry. 
In what follows, I detail how I collected data through observation, informal 
conversations and formal interviews.  
!
!
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Table!3.3:!Data!sources!!
Research 
sites 
Data-Co 
(Chinese 
HQ) 
Data-Co 
(Japanese 
workplaces) 
Software-Co 
(Chinese 
HQ) 
Software-Co 
(Japanese 
workplaces) 
Semi-
structured 
interviews 
43  
(including 
eight 
telephone 
interviews) 
 
15  
(including 
three 
telephone 
interviews 
and four with 
Japanese 
38 44 
(three with 
Japanese) 
Informal 
conversations 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observation Two-month 
participant 
observations 
Non-
participant 
observations 
Non-
participant 
observations 
No 
Corporate 
documents 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
3.3.3&Collecting&data&through&observation&and&informal&conversations&
Observations and informal conversations are important sources of data in this 
study. Data gathered include (1) participant observational data gathered at the 
Chinese workplace of Data-Co; (2) non-participant observational data 
gathered when I attended managerial meetings, daily briefings, and visited 
workplaces and so on; (3) spontaneous, informal conversations in offices, 
canteens, hallways, accommodation, or during various entertaining activities. 
Scholars have different opinions on whether and how accounts generated 
from observation and informal conversations can be used as a valid source of 
research data. For positivists, observational and informal data are subjective, 
and thus cannot be used as valid data for explanation; they are social 
products that are to be explained. For constructionists, observational and 
informal data are part of the natural and interactive data, which constitute the 
 
66 
social world.  Therefore, these sorts of data are much appreciated and not 
subjected to critical scrutiny as to its validity. From a CR perspective, I adopt 
Hammersley & Atkinson's (1995) view that that the validity of ‘insider accounts’ 
gathered from observation (‘unsolicited accounts’) and informal conversations 
(‘solicited accounts’) cannot be taken for granted but are to be subjected to 
critical scrutiny. They suggest two complementary ways to read and critically 
evaluate such ‘insider accounts’. First, it is necessary to understand the 
‘information’ provided by informants, which refers to events, activities and 
processes that researchers wish to analyse. Second, the validity of such 
‘information’ should be assessed by considering the ‘perspectives’ of the 
informants, including their standpoints, concerns, contexts and so on. As 
Hammersley & Atkinson (1995) pointed out, ‘the more effectively we can 
understand an account and its context – the presuppositions on which it relies, 
who produced it, for whom, and why – the better able we are to anticipate the 
ways in which it may suffer from biases of one kind or another as a source of 
information’ (p. 126).   
Bearing this in mind, I paid particular attention to the specific contexts under 
which certain events were observed as well as the ‘perspectives’ of the 
informants. For example, working in the HR office of Data-Co gave me 
opportunities to listen to conversations between workers and HR employees, 
providing rich accounts regarding workers’ discontents and concerns, and the 
HR people’s responses to the workers. While recording these conversations 
in my field notes, I always tried to get more information about the workers who 
were involved in the conversations, such as their departments, their team 
leaders, why they were worried about certain things, and so on. In a few 
cases, I managed to talk to these workers later and asked them to reflect on 
their conversations with the HR employees. I also sought further explanation 
and clarification from the HR employees involving in such conversations when 
appropriate. By doing this, I got a better understanding of each event I 
observed and each conversation I heard, which enabled me to evaluate the 
validity of the data. 
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As observer and interviewer, I was well aware that I was part of the social 
world I was studying. Regarding this, the effects of my presence as a 
researcher has been dealt with in two ways. First, I tried to avoid unnecessary 
bias by taking a ‘neutral’ position as much as I could. For example, although I 
took a consulting role at the Chinese workplace of Data-Co, I tended to 
introduce myself to my informants as a PhD researcher, who was interested in 
their experience in working for a Chinese supply firms. Through my doing this, 
informants would not be bothered by or feel distanced as a result of my 
‘professional’ role, and would be more likely to share their true experiences 
and opinions with me. I did ask my informants’ opinions on their existing 
appraisal system so that I could contribute to the HR department. 
Nevertheless, these questions fitted well with my research agenda, and thus 
they did not add extra tasks, and nor did they affect my stance as a 
researcher. Second, I acknowledged that I could not be completely ‘neutral’ 
since the research was interactive in nature. Therefore, I needed to be 
reflexive in my data collection. Hammersley & Atkinson (1995) suggest that 
‘how people respond to the presence of the researcher may be as informative 
as how they react to other situations’ (p.18). In this sense, how my presence 
affected people’s actions and behaviour over time may become a part of the 
analysis. For instance, one employee in Software-Co thought I was an 
employee of the company, and asked me whether I was working in 
Department X. After I explained to him, he said, ‘Oh, no wonder I have not 
seen you before. We rarely see people from Department X so I thought you 
were from there.’ Later, I got to know that Department X normally consisted of 
‘allocated but undesired employees’, who were often the relatives or friends of 
the university or of government officials. This special phenomenon, which 
derived from the employees’ response to my presence, was associated with 
the important fact that Software-Co was a university-owned company and was 
subject to governmental interference in its employment practices.    
Informal conversations were generally conducted in a quite loose manner 
without a well-established research agenda. The purpose was to allow new 
events and concepts to emerge, and to build rapport with people. 
Nevertheless, as Hammersley & Atkinson (1995) have suggested, I did try to 
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control the proceedings of these conversations by asking informants to 
discuss specific incidents, offer further details concerning specific phenomena, 
or comments on alternative (often contrasting) accounts.    
Field notes were taken every day to record the day-to-day events I observed, 
the dialogues I heard or overheard, the informal conversations in which I was 
involved, the meetings I attended and my various thoughts. An important part 
of the field notes was to describe and explain the contexts within which certain 
events and conversations occurred, and to record background information 
about the informants. Such contextual and background information was 
sometimes added to or revised as I collected more information. Some field 
notes were taken right after the observations and conversations, while some 
of them were taken every evening after I had left work. 
While an understanding of informants’ perspectives supports the critical 
evaluation of the adequacy and validity of the observational and informal 
conversational data, Hammersley & Atkinson (1995) also stress the 
importance of comparing these accounts with the information gathered from 
different interviews and from other research methods, so as to develop a 
more adequate understanding of social structures and processes. Regarding 
this, formal semi-structured interviews were used to complement the 
observational and informal conversational data.  
3.3.4&Collecting&data&through&semiNstructured&interviews&
As mentioned above, one major data collection method in this study was 
semi-structured interviews. It should be noted that sometimes there was no 
neat distinction between the formal interviews and the informal conversations 
I have already discussed. Roughly speaking, I took the spontaneous 
conversations as informal conversations, whereas I took the arranged 
interviews as formal interviews. The length of the interviews varied from one, 
to one-and-a-half hours each. Most interviews were conducted in the Chinese 
language. For the seven interviews with Japanese informants, two were in 
Chinese, one was in English, and the other four were in Japanese with the 
help of an interpreter who spoke both Chinese and Japanese. Interviews were 
 
69 
normally conducted in offices or in meeting rooms with no third party present 
(except for the interpreter where necessary). In particular, among 44 
interviews with employees from Software-Co in Japan, six were conducted in 
the Japanese office, 30 were conducted in the coffee bars near their 
workplaces because I was not allowed to enter their offices, and eight were 
conducted in the place where I lived. All interviews were tape-recorded. In 
case the recording quality was not ideal (e.g. in coffee bars), note-taking 
served as a necessary complement.  
There are different approaches to interviewing depending on the ontological 
assumptions of the studies. For positivists, the interview aims to ‘generate 
data which hold independently of both the research setting and the researcher 
or interviewer’ (Silverman, 2006, p.121). Therefore, interviews should be 
structured, standardised and tightly controlled. By contrast, constructionists 
assert that interviews represent a distinctive sort of ‘communicative 
interaction’, in which interviewers and interviewees interact and collaborate in 
the construction of meanings and narratives. In this sense, from the 
constructionist point of view an interview is normally carried out in a non-
directive fashion, allowing the interviewees to produce complex meanings that 
address relevant issues without being confined by predetermined agendas 
(Holstein & Gubrium, 1997).  
Similar to the constructionist approach to interviewing, CR recognises that 
interviewers and interviewees need to engage in a ‘fluid interactive process’ in 
order to generate a set of responses that are relevant to the research agenda 
(Smith & Elger, 2013). However, while constructionists emphasise that such 
interviews are local and situated narratives that cannot be seen as referencing 
a wider reality (Alvesson, 2011). CR argues that interviews not only offer 
access to the attitudes and emotions of informants, but, more importantly, 
allow researchers to gain rich accounts of events, experiences and processes, 
which represent different aspects of the stratified social reality (Smith & Elger, 
2013). In this sense, two features of interviewing in CR research can be 
identified. First, researchers are active and reflexive in the process of data 
generation. Second, interviews can be used as a tool to understand the deep 
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structures and mechanisms, and the social processes through which these 
structures are manifested, produced and reproduced. 
Acknowledging that I myself was an active participant in the research process, 
my aim in the interviews was not to minimise reactivity to become a neutral 
data collector. Instead, as I mentioned above, the fact that my interaction 
might have influenced the informants’ responses was seen as an important 
part of my analysis. In many cases, I expressed my doubts as to informants’ 
accounts, in order to generate further and clearer explanations, as shown in 
the following dialogue between me and one shop-floor workers from Data-Co: 
Interviewee: It [Data-Co] is like a family. My team leaders are like my sister, 
taking care of me and being very nice to me.   
Interviewer: But your ‘family’ won’t ‘fire’ you when you do not behave well, and 
you do not leave your ‘family’ and join another ‘family’, do you? 
Interviewer: Well, that’s true. I mean, I will not stay in the company 
forever…Actually, perhaps it [Data-Co] is more like a school. We come and go, 
and our team leaders are like our teachers. 
Like observational and informal conversational data, interview data cannot be 
understood as illustrating ‘truth’ or objective reality without critical scrutiny. 
Given this, in order to understand the social structures and processes through 
these interview data, three strategies were adopted. Firstly, a wide range of 
employees were interviewed covering different occupations, sections, 
employment statuses, nationalities, tenures, ages and genders. I also sought 
to include informants from different levels: managers in Chinese workplaces 
and in the Japanese offices, senior managers, department managers, team 
leaders, supervisors, expatriates and shop-floor workers. This spread of 
informants enabled me to hear voices from all sections of the workforce. More 
importantly, it generated contrasting accounts from different perspectives, 
which often became the focus of explanation. For example, when talking of 
the recruitment strategy for employees in Japanese office, HQ managers in 
Data-Co preferred ethnic Chinese who lived in Japan, while the manager in 
Japanese office insisted on local Japanese. The explanation for these 
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contrasting accounts led to a discussion on the societal differences between 
China and Japan, the power struggles between Chinese and Japanese 
workplaces, and so on.  
Secondly, instead of a flexible research agenda adopted in informal 
conversations, the research agenda in formal interviews was semi-structured 
and had certain theory-driven directions. Interviews followed a common range 
of topics, tailored to be appropriate to HQ employees, employees in Japan, 
managers, expatriates and shop-floor workers as the case may be. Given my 
research questions and the SSDC framework, the shared agenda covered the 
following themes: 
• comments on the company’s internationalisation strategy and 
practices 
• relations and contacts with Japanese clients 
• perceptions and experience of ‘Japanese’ management and 
practices 
• local situations (labour market, educational institutions, 
regulations etc.) and their impact on employees’ job choices 
• local situations (labour market, educational institutions, 
regulations etc.) and their impact on management policies and 
practices in supply firms 
• relations and contacts with the Chinese (or Japanese) 
workplaces 
• employees’ areas of content or discontent 
• the overall character of the management system of the company 
• significant events and changes in the company 
A loosely theory-driven research agenda provides an approach to 
investigating relationships between underlying structures and mechanisms, 
the varying context in which such mechanisms operate, and the resultant 
outcomes observed and experienced in MNCs and their workplaces ( see 
Pawson & Tiley, 1997)  
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Thirdly, Smith & Elger (2013) suggest that interviews should be treated as 
‘cumulative and iterative, rather than simply discrete indicators of attitudes or 
sources of narratives’ (p.24). That is to say, later interviews should be 
informed in accordance with the insights gained from earlier findings. This 
iterative approach helped me to identify new phenomena and concepts 
emerging from the interviews, and allowed for the iterative development of an 
analysis of the social relations and processes in relation to certain 
phenomena. For example, during my first talk with the CEO of Data-Co, he 
said that the operational practices in Data-Co’s HQ were ‘learnt from Japan’. I 
then probed the concept of ‘learning from Japan’, in my following interviews 
with other informants, explored what practices were ‘learnt’ from Japan, why 
they were ‘learning from Japan’ and how to ‘learn’ from Japan. Some 
responses from informants were then related to the ‘dominance effects’ of 
Japanese practices, which again led to my questions regarding how the 
‘dominance effects’ of Japanese practices are constructed. Questions such as, 
‘Why do you think Japanese practices are better than Chinese practices?’, 
and, ‘Where did you hear about Japanese practices?’ were asked. Indeed, 
this iterative approach enabled me to ‘read through’ the empirical accounts 
and to understand the underlying social structures and generative 
mechanisms.   
In sum, observational, informal conversational data and formal semi-
structured interviews are complementary to each other. Observations and 
informal conversations have advantages in exploring new and emergent 
concepts, whereas semi-structured interviews play an important role in linking 
empirical data with theory and helped me to understand the underlying 
structures and generative mechanisms, as well as the stratified nature of the 
social reality. In addition, multiple data sources enabled me to triangulate and 
enhance the validity of the data, as discussed below. 
3.3.5&Issues&of&generalisation&and&triangulation&
Qualitative case studies often face questions about generalisation. Regarding 
this, Danermark et al. (2002) distinguish two different ways of defining the 
concept of generality. The first is called the empiricist concept of generality. In 
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this concept, generality concerns ‘how large a group of events or other 
phenomena an empirical observation can be generalised to’ (p.76). 
Generalisation following this concept is confined to the domain of the 
empirical, and is not interested in the deep structures of reality. By contrast, 
the second concept of generality is understood as the realist concept of 
generality. This pattern of generalisation refers to the trans-factual conditions, 
that is, the fundamental and constituent properties and structures of human 
activities. This generalisation moves from the domain of the empirical to the 
domain of structures and mechanisms, attempting to abstract what the basic 
constituent is. In accordance with this distinction, this study adopts the realist 
concept of generality, seeking to analyse the underlying causes and 
explanations for the observable phenomena, and to explore the implications 
of the research findings for the existing theories. This concept of generality is 
in line with the retroductive research strategy and the intensive research 
design discussed above.  
The technique of triangulation is used in this study. According to Mason 
(2002), triangulation refers to the use of a combination of data and methods to 
explore one set of research questions. In this study, I use a combination of the 
observational, informal conversational and semi-structured interview data. 
This pattern of triangulation serves two purposes in my study. First, as I have 
mentioned, multiple data sources enabled a comparison of accounts from 
different perspectives, and the better capture of ‘information’ and the 
‘perspective’ of the accounts. This is considered to be an important way to 
enhance the validity of qualitative data (Hammersley & Atkinson, 1995; Yin, 
2009). Second, in relation to a retroductive research strategy informed by the 
CR perspective, Downward & Mearman (2007) argue that triangulation plays 
a key role in retroductive activity. Multiple data sources enabled me to identify 
contrasting and complementary accounts so that I could better relate these 
empirical accounts to the underlying structures and mechanisms.   
3.4&Data&analysis&
This process is part of Houston's (2010) fourth step in which researchers are 
required to elaborate, refine and falsify the research findings. The hypotheses 
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underlying the research questions should be confirmed or refined during this 
stage so that the findings can reflect the most persuasive and comprehensive 
answer to the research agenda. At the end of my main fieldwork, I had 
generated hundreds of pages of transcribed interview data and field notes. All 
these data were iteratively analysed following the procedure below. 
Before I started coding data, I undertook several careful readings of all of the 
data. The purpose of this stage was to get a comprehensive understanding of 
the data; to identify interesting, surprising, and puzzling accounts; and to find 
out any inconsistencies or contradictions among the views of different groups 
or individuals. Lots of these issues had been noticed during the fieldwork and 
had already been noted in my field notes. However, given the large amount of 
data from different sites, it was still rewarding to read and get familiar with all 
the data.  
I started my data coding by picking out key events, issues and interactions 
from the interview transcriptions and field notes from Data-Co. I thereby 
created a long list of codes, which were predominantly descriptive in nature. 
The second round of coding further explored these events, issues and 
interactions in more depth, focusing on the justificatory discourses, 
explanations and arguments surrounding them. At this stage, this process of 
coding was iteratively conducted between theoretical concepts and the data. 
The coding was loosely informed by the MNC literature. Lines of interview and 
conversational data were examined by referring to concepts derived from 
previous research.  
I then analysed data from Software-Co on the basis of codes generated 
through the analysis of Data-Co’s data. I grouped the events, issues and 
interactions into the existing codes, and added to or amended these codes to 
incorporate these additional instances. During this process, data from Data-
Co was examined again: when new codes emerged, previously coded data 
were recorded to see if they contained any examples of the new codes. In this 
sense, the process of coding is a recurrent one. I repeated the iterative and 
recurrent process of coding, until I had come out with a coding framework, 
which centred on six categories and incorporated 27 themes (Table 3.4). 
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Table!3.4:!Coding!framework!
Categories Themes 
 
Corporate background 1. History 
2. Entrepreneurship 
3. Other factual data on the companies 
 
Local and industrial 
background 
 
4. Local labour market 
5. Governmental policies 
6. Local economy and others 
7. Industrial information 
 
Internationalisation/Cross-
country operation 
 
8. Internationalisation strategies and 
stages 
9. Relations with Japanese clients 
10. management practices and policies in 
Japanese workplaces 
11. Management of expatriates 
12. Expatriates’ work, life, roles and 
experiences 
 
Operational system 13. Quality management and work 
procedures 
14. Teamwork 
15. Security 
16. Perceived ‘Japanese’ operational 
practices 
 
HRM system 17. Recruitment and selection 
18. Training 
19. Appraisal and promotion 
20. Dismissal, turnover and retention 
21. Perceived ‘Japanese’ HR practices 
 
Workplace dynamics 22. Accommodation, indulgence and 
resistance 
23. Supervisor-worker relationships 
24. Inter-personal relationships 
25. Micro-politics (conflicts of interests, 
power struggles) 
26. Employees’ experiences and 
perceptions 
 
During my data analysis, I used NVivo, a qualitative data analysis software 
program, to help me organise and code the data. However, in order to 
maintain the contextual richness of this research and to avoid the risk of being 
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alienated from the data (Fielding & Lee, 2002), I used it only minimally as a 
technique for simple coding and for restoring the electronic format of data.  
The structure of this thesis basically follows from the coding process 
described above. After an introduction to the research sites, there are 
chapters discussing the internationalisation of the companies and the 
management of the Japanese offices, expatriates, operational practices and 
HRM practices in both supply firms. Quotes from interviews and extracts from 
my field notes are included in this thesis where appropriate.   
3.5&Research&sites&
This section introduces the two global suppliers, Data-Co and Software-Co, 
respectively. I will review their local environments, Chinese and Japanese 
workplaces, organisational structures and hierarchies, and unions.  
3.5.1&DataNCo&
Data-Co was founded in 1992 by a female entrepreneur, Yang. It was sold to 
Group A in 2007, one of the best and largest Chinese software and 
information services providers. Data-Co provides information processing 
services such as data processing, computer-aided design (CAD), desktop 
publishing (DTP). Its major clients include NTT Data, Fuji Xerox and NEC. At 
the time of the research, there were around 1,000 employees in the HQ. Apart 
from about 60 employees in functional departments such as marketing, 
administration and finance, the other employees worked for three business 
units (BUs) called ‘business process outsourcing’ (BPO), ‘engineering process 
outsourcing’ (EPO) and ‘knowledge process outsourcing’ (KPO). BPO work 
involves Chinese workers taking handwritten Japanese documents, which are 
scanned, faxed or emailed over from Japan, and typing them into a digital 
database in the Japanese language. EPO work involves Chinese workers 
turning hand-drawn designs of Japanese-designed device architectures into 
digital manufacturing blueprints. It also involves some low-skilled animation 
production and design. KPO work mainly deals with information gathering for 
market research. The BPO unit was the biggest and most profitable BU 
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among the three, accounting for about 650 employees. The KPO was a new 
BU which was established in 2010 with about 50 employees.  
As to the international operation of Data-Co, the company established a 
Japanese office in Tokyo in 2003. At the time of my main fieldwork, there 
were more than 50 employees working in Japan. Ten of them worked in the 
Japanese office and the others were expatriates from the Chinese HQ that 
worked at the Japanese clients’ workplaces. Data-Co also set up offices in the 
US and the UK in 2008 and 2009 respectively, aiming to expand their 
international market in more foreign countries. During my fieldwork, the US 
office had about eight employees, mainly in charge of marketing, while the UK 
office was in the process of recruiting employees. Given the purpose of this 
study, I will focus on the Chinese operation of Data-Co and its Japanese 
market and office.  
Business in Data-Co largely depends on the season. Every year, the period 
from August to the following February is considered to be the ‘hot season’, 
because the company gets a large amount of business involving inputting 
annual reports for Japanese institutions and editing Christmas and New Year 
cards. March to July is seen as the ‘low season’, during which workers do not 
get much to do.     
The majority of employees in Data-Co, especially in the Chinese workplace, 
are migrant workers who are originally from rural areas and who have come to 
Dalian City to look for job opportunities. Being attracted by the outsourcing 
industry, many young migrant workers enroll in technical schools in or near 
Dalian City, and receive two or three years’ training on computers, data 
inputting and editing. These technical school students become the main 
source of Data-Co’s workforce. High mobility characterises this particular part 
of the workforce. This is partly because these migrant workers normally have 
to return to their rural home after a few years due to the Chinese hukou 
system (the household registration system), and partly because they always 
are always moving between different companies in search of higher wages.    
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Dalian City   The Chinese workplace of Data-Co is located in Dalian City, a 
port city in Liaoning province and the major gateway to China’s northeast 
region. Dalian has a close relationship with Japan for many reasons. 
Geographically, Dalian is less than two hours away from Japan by airplane. 
Historically, Dalian was occupied by Japan as a colony for over 40 years, until 
the defeat of Japan at the end of World War II. Perhaps more significantly for 
this research, in order to achieve large-scale development and robust 
economic growth, the government of Dalian has taken a distinct development 
path since the 1980s, which has largely relied on attracting Japanese 
investment and on building close trade ties with Japan. In particular, it 
believes in the market potential of the outsourcing industry from Japan, and 
has been focusing on the development of the service outsourcing industry 
since the 1990s.  
In line with this development path, the Dalian government has set up special 
incentives for Japanese investors. It also has a series of preferential policies, 
such as giving financial support to service outsourcing enterprises. In 2008, it 
established a special ‘talent development fund’ to attract, cultivate and serve 
talented individuals in the field of service outsourcing. All these measures 
worked well. In 2012, the signed contract value of offshore outsourcing 
services in Dalian reached USD 1.792 billion, a year-on-year increase of 41%. 
By the end of 2012, there were 988 service outsourcing enterprises in Dalian, 
employing a total of 128,000 employees (Dalian Statistics Yearbook, 2012). 
Today, the city contains the only set of innovative software industry clusters 
nationwide, and 20 professional software parks. Its High-Tech Industrial Zone, 
with its leading software and service outsourcing industry, ranks among the 
nation’s best in terms of scale of enterprise, average growth rate, sales 
revenues, space potential, industry and university cooperation, brand image 
and so on. 
In Thomas Friedman's (2005) bestseller ‘The World is Flat’, Dalian City is 
considered the ‘Bangalore of China’. Being impressed by the rapid growth and 
development of Dalian, Friedman described how: 
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Dalian has become for Japan what Bangalore has become for America and 
the other English-speaking countries…Because of its proximity to Japan and 
Korea,  large number of Japanese speakers, its abundance of Internet 
bandwidth, and many parks and a world-class golf course (all of which appeal 
to knowledge workers), Dalian has become an attractive locus for Japanese 
outsourcing. Japanese firms can hire three Chinese software engineers for 
the price of one in Japan and still have change to pay a roomful of call centre 
operators ($90 a month starting salary). No wonder some twenty-eight 
hundred Japanese companies have set up operations here or teamed up with 
Chinese partners. (P.34-35) 
Intriguingly, Dalian’s close relationship with Japan, especially the thriving 
business ties, has kept the nationwide anti-Japanese sentiment and protests 
at bay. While the anti-Japanese protests and riots raged across China over 
various historical and political issues such as the overlapping territorial claims 
in the East China Sea and Japan's refusal to acknowledge its wartime past to 
the satisfaction of China, Dalian has always been immune from these anti-
Japanese sentiments and activities. 
Chinese workplace   Data-Co’s HQ was housed in a six-floor modern 
building in Software Park with a total floor area of the building. The reception 
area was spacious, bright and marble-floored, furnished with two sets of 
leather sofas, and decorated with luxuriant real plants. On the right side of the 
reception, there were the administrative department, finance department, 
managers’ offices and several meeting rooms. On the left, there was one 
operations room called ‘BPO One’, where 30 workers sat in front of computers 
and input data. It was a nice neat room with a large window facing the corridor, 
covered by window-blinds most of the time. People were only allowed to open 
these window-blinds when inspectors and clients wanted to have a look in 
from the outside. There were 30 sets of computer desks and chairs in this 
room, placed in a five by six matrix. One supervisor sat at the front of the 
office. His desk was slightly higher than the other workers’, so that he could 
have a good view of the room. The desks all faced the same direction, to 
facilitate visual supervision. All computers looked new and had 20-inch 
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monitors. There were three posters hanging on the wall: one was about the 
‘corporate culture, vision and mission’, one was about the ‘5S rules of the 
workplace’ and the third one was about a newly announced training 
programme called the ‘managerial elites programme’. At several points round 
the sides of the room were the filing cabinets, an all-in-one printer, and a 
place for workers to make hot drinks. During my fieldwork in summer, there 
were two desk fans flanking either side which made the office quite cool. From 
any point of view, I felt it was quite a comfortable and well-facilitated 
operations room. However, it soon turned out that the impression it had given 
me of working conditions in the company as a whole had been too optimistic. 
Later, I learned that this room was specially designed to serve as a ‘sample’, 
to which most clients and inspectors were led during their visits. I was told that 
clients did not usually have time to go around the company and visit every 
operations room; hence the importance of having an attractive reception area 
and one ‘sample room’ in order to impress them within a short period of time. 
In fact, when there were no visitors, the ‘sample room’ was mainly used as a 
training room for different projects rather than as a BPO operations room. 
Behind the reception area, there were seven large operations rooms and eight 
small ones. The large rooms were twice the size of the ‘sample’ office just 
described, but accommodated about 100 workers, more than three times of 
the number in the sample office (30 workers). In one room I visited, 
regimented desks were placed in two five by ten matrices, leaving a narrow 
passageway in between. Two supervisors sat in front of each matrix, and 
another two sat one on the middle right and one on the middle left hand side 
of the office. Supervisors regularly walked around the office and checked on 
everyone’s progress, while workers were required to sit in front of their 
computers until the bell for break rang. The computer monitors in this office 
were older and smaller (17-inches) than the ones in the sample office, which 
gave workers more eye-strain. Workers also reported that long-time sitting 
and computer work caused occupational diseases such as back pain, stiff 
necks and carpal tunnel syndrome. The contrasting pictures of the ‘sample 
room’ and the other rooms demonstrated the lengths to which the company 
 
81 
went to attract Japanese clients, but also depicted the much less salubrious 
real working environments of the workers.   
Japanese office and expatriates   The Japanese office was established in 
May 2003, initially as a bridge connecting Japanese clients and the Chinese 
HQ in Dalian. It is located in a major shopping area of Tokyo called Akiba. At 
the time of the research, there were ten employees, four Japanese and six 
Chinese, working in the office. The manager of Japanese office was a native 
Japanese, who however could speak fluent Chinese and had worked in China 
for eight years. One Japanese woman was in charge of accounts and two 
other Japanese men were working as senior advisors. Among the six Chinese 
employees, two were Chinese expatriates and four were ethnic Chinese who 
had been living or studying in Japan for many years. These Chinese 
employees were responsible for customer relationship, market development 
and other administrative work.  
Apart from these 10 employees, there were around 40 expatriates in Japan, 
working on eight sites with various clients. All the expatriates were selected by 
HQ according to the clients’ specific requirements. Labour dispatch contracts 
were signed between Data-Co, the clients and each expatriate. Only two of 
them were long-term expatriates (more than one year), while the others were 
all short-term based (one to three months).  
Long-term expatriates are considered to be the most competent group at the 
work in terms of their language and professional skills. However, their 
relationships with Data-Co, both the HQ and the Japanese office, are very 
loose during their expatriation. They spend all their time in the clients’ 
companies and socialise with colleagues there. They follow the rules of and 
report to their supervisors in clients’ companies. Their performance 
assessments are conducted by the client company. In principle, they are 
required to send a progress report to the manager in Japanese office every 
half a year. Apart from this, little contact remains between the expatriates and 
the Japanese office. As one interviewee, who had been working in Japan for 
five years, told me, ‘I feel I have nothing to do with Data-Co except that I 
signed a contract with it.’ 
 
82 
By contrast, the short-term expatriates keep in close contact with the 
Japanese office. Since the majority of the short-term expatriates can speak 
only a little Japanese, employees in the Japanese office play a crucial role in 
introducing them to the client companies, explaining the clients’ requirements 
to them, and making sure their work progresses. Expatriates are required to 
report to their team leaders in HQ on a weekly basis, and the Japanese office 
also informs the HQ frequently as to these expatriates’ performance. Their 
performance during their expatriation will become an important basis for their 
evaluation and promotion after they get back to China. 
Work organisational structure and hierarchy   In general, a matrix 
structure is applied in Data-Co, with three business units (BUs) and six 
functional departments (see Figure 3.2). In the operational areas, the 
organisational hierarchy is pyramidal, as illustrated in Figure 3.3. Under three 
BU managers, there are different departments according to the business lines. 
During my research, there were three departments within BPO, two in EPO 
and four in KPO. In each department, employees are allocated to different 
projects according to the clients they are serving. The project teams are then 
divided into sections, with one section chief in each. The basic unit of 
organisation in each section is the team. The span of control of each team 
leader is between ten and fifteen people. Roughly speaking, about five teams 
are overseen by a section chief, who is responsible for coordinating between 
project managers and teams. Section chiefs do not exist in EPO and KPO 
since there are fewer employees. Project managers also work together with 
workers in operations rooms, but are engaged in more managerial tasks. 
Department managers have separate offices and rarely work in the operations 
rooms. They work very closely with the employees in functional departments 
on various issues such as technical support, quality control and personnel 
management to make sure the projects can proceed smoothly. Due to the 
diversity of the business and skill requirements, little collaboration can be 
achieved among different BUs. Each BU operates independently and has 
been given a lot of autonomy in its personnel management and daily 
operations. 
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Figure!3.2:!Organisational!structure!of!Data<Co!
 
 
 
Figure!3.3:!Organisational!hierarchy!of!Data<Co!
Union   The All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU) plays a central 
role in the Chinese system of industrial relations. It is the only trade union that 
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is recognised by the Chinese government, and has a pyramidal, top-down 
structure that has been designed as a ‘transmission-belt’ between the Party 
and the ‘masses’, since the 1950 (Ng & Warner, 1998). Given that 
independent trade unions are banned in China, union organising in China 
normally means setting up ACFTU branches at regional and enterprise levels, 
‘with the fundamental goal being not so much to protect workers’ rights as to 
strengthen the Chinese Communist Party’s social control’ (Liu 2010, p.31).  
There is one enterprise union in Data-Co, which is under the direct leadership 
of the union association of Dalian High-Tech Industrial Zone. The enterprise 
union pays union fees to the union association at the higher level, and all 
employees in Data-Co are assumed to be union members. The chairman of 
Data-Co’s union is one of the top managers, which implies that the union is 
more like a ‘branch of management’ rather than an ‘employee representative’. 
Indeed, in my conversations with employees in Data-Co, the union was 
primarily understood as one part of the HR department, which ‘provides 
various promotional schemes for employees’. These schemes included 
promotional codes for films, supermarkets, restaurants, entertainment 
activities and so on. None of the employees considered the union as an 
institution which would represent their interests and bargain with the 
management on their behalf. In the employees’ understanding, the union was 
part of the management, which mainly dealt with employee welfare and 
entertainment.  
3.5.2&SoftwareNCo&
Software-Co was originally a product of an international collaboration project 
between the Japan International Development Organisation (known as 
‘JAIDO’) and FD University, one of the best universities in China. JAIDO was 
a governmental institution jointly funded by the Japan Federation of Economic 
Organisation (Keidanren) and the Japanese government. The ultimate goal of 
JAIDO was to promote economic development in developing countries 
through international collaboration and aid. In early 1990, three staff in FD 
University first approached JAIDO to discuss their proposal for international 
collaboration. The main idea was to provide excellent Chinese university 
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graduates with on-the-job training (OJT) opportunities in big Japanese 
companies. Given the mission of JAIDO and the talent shortage in Japan at 
that time, this proposal was welcomed and targeted on training software 
developers. Under the agreement, FD University was in charge of recruiting 
candidates from Chinese universities and providing Japanese language 
training to these candidates, while JAIDO was responsible for arranging OJT 
for these candidates in Japanese companies.  
Software-Co was established in April, 1991 in Shanghai, with JAIDO and FD 
University holding 65% and 35% of shares respectively. In the same year, the 
Japanese office was set up in Tokyo. The first cohort of trainees, 38 in total, 
joined in 1991. Since then, new trainees are hired almost every year. During 
my research, the recruitment of the 17th cohort was ongoing. The exact 
number of new trainees varies each year but is roughly between 15 and 40. In 
2001, JAIDO sold its shares to FD University, and it was dissolved in 2002. 
This announced the end of the international collaboration, and Software-Co 
became a wholly-owned company of FD University. 
Although Software-Co was established initially to facilitate collaboration 
between Japan and China, it later developed into a contractor for Japanese 
companies, providing software services to Japanese clients. Software-Co got 
its first outsourced order in 1996 from Komatsu Soft Ltd (now known as 
QUALICA Inc.). Since then, based on the well-trained developers who came 
back from OJT in Japan, this company has begun to specialise in software 
development and services geared towards the Japanese market. In 2001, 
Nomura Research Institute (NRI), a well-known Japanese company operating 
in the fields of consulting, financial IT solutions and IT platform services, 
began to outsource its business to Chinese companies, and Software-Co 
became one of its seven partners in China. Due to the large and stable 
demand from NRI (around 800 people per year), Software-Co gradually 
terminated its contracts with other companies and concentrated on the orders 
from NRI. At the time of my fieldwork, 90% of its business was from NRI, and 
the other 10% came from its collaborations with Chinese institutions.  
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However, it should be noted that since Software-Co had developed its 
upgrading strategy in 2010, it started to develop new clients again. By the end 
of 2011, it was reported that Software-Co had successfully received the 
outsourcing contracts from Nomura Holdings in the late 2011, being 
responsible for the software design in the post integration of Nomura and 
Lehman brother. In the same year, it also received business contracts from 
Toyota Communication System. These moves had significantly changed the 
domination position of one single client NRI and had been considered as the 
big achievements in the upgrading of Software-Co. Since the new business 
contracts were developed after my main fieldwork, this thesis is mainly based 
on the period when NRI represented the only dominant client in Software-Co.  
The number of employees reached 1,400 in 2005, but dropped to about 800 
during the financial crisis in 2008 and 2009. Employees in Software-Co are 
categorised into two groups: software developers, who are in charge of 
software design and liaison with clients, and software programmers, who are 
responsible for software coding and testing. Developers are all graduates 
from the top four universities in Shanghai. They are given two years of training 
in China and three years of OJT in Japan once they join the company. They 
are treated as the ‘corporate elite’ and are considered to constitute the 
company’s competitive advantage. Programmers, however, can be hired on 
the job markets without it mattering from which university they have graduated. 
They are offered little training, and have limited opportunities in career 
development (details of the labour segmentation between developers and 
programmers will be discussed in Chapters 3 and 4). At the time of my 
research, there were about 950 employees in total, among which about 90 
were working in Japan. There were about 300 developers and 600 
programmers. The other 50 employees worked in various functional 
departments.  
Shanghai City   The HQ of Software-Co is located in Shanghai, the 
commercial and financial centre of mainland China. It is one of the most 
developed cities in China in terms of economy, level of education, 
infrastructure and so on. While Dalian is ideal for foreign investment 
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particularly from Japan, Shanghai is attractive for countries from all over the 
world due to its huge market potential, rapid economic growth and well-
established infrastructure. By the end of 2012, 154 countries and regions had 
invested in Shanghai. Shanghai was hosting 403 MNCs’ regional HQs, 265 
investment companies and 351 foreign R&D centres by the end of 2012.  This 
makes Shanghai one of the biggest job markets in China, and it attracts 
millions of talented potential employees from all over the world.  
There are 67 universities in Shanghai, ten of them listed as ‘National Key 
Universities’ of China. In particular, the top four of them (including FD 
University) belong to the ‘985 League’ of Chinese universities, a Chinese 
equivalent to the US ‘Ivy League’. The high level of education in Shanghai 
explains the initial collaboration between FD University and JAIDO. The high 
reputation of the top four universities in Shanghai imbues their graduates with 
a strong sense of superiority, which, to some extent, underpins the ‘elite’ 
status of software developers within the company and the bias against the 
programmers, who are not from the top four.  
In terms of the international outsourcing service industry, Shanghai focuses 
on developing financial service outsourcing, movie and TV game production, 
and application software development (KPMG, 2013). In 2010, there were 822 
service outsourcing companies in Shanghai. The value of signed service 
outsourcing contracts reached USD 2.753 billion, a year-on-year increase of 
63.6 % (KPMG, 2013).  
Workplace in Chinese   The Chinese workplace workplace of Software-Co is 
located near the campus of FD University, within 5 minutes’ walk of the 
university entrance. As part of the employee benefits, employees in Software-
Co are allowed to use many facilities of the university, including the canteens, 
libraries and so on. The company is housed in a business building on the third 
and fourth floors. Apart from a punch card machine, which is used at the 
entrance to track employees’ working hours, there is no obvious reception 
area in the company. Administrative staff and software developers work on 
the fourth floor in six big offices. The offices have an average of 30 office 
cubicles each. All the programmers work on the third floor. Their offices are 
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slightly bigger than the ones upstairs, but each of them houses 60 to 70 
employees, with desks and computers. Before I visited this workplace, one 
developer in the Japanese office advised me that it was possible to tell which 
floor was for programmers and which was for developers by visiting the 
washrooms on each floor. He claimed this was because programmers were 
not as ‘educated’ as developers and they did not tend to keep their places as 
clean as developers did. I could not agree with this opinion because there was 
three times the number of employees on the third floor, with the same number 
of washrooms as on the fourth floor. However, this idea showed the 
developers’ bias against programmers, and the tension between them.  
Japanese office and expatriates   The Japanese office was established in 
Tokyo at the same time as its Shanghai HQ in 1991. During my visit, there 
were six employees working in the Japanese office, three Japanese women 
and three Chinese men. The CEO of the company held a concurrent post as 
the manager of the Japanese office, while a Japanese woman acted as the 
assistant manager. There was one Japanese accountant and two 
administrative employees, both of whom were in charge of the expatriates’ 
daily life including their accommodation and transportation. There was also a 
senior software developer who had just been sent to the Japanese office from 
the HQ and was in charge of market development. 
Apart from the employees in the Japanese office, 94 expatriates were working 
at three different sites in Japan with their client NRI. The majority of them 
were trainees expatriated between 2008 and 2010 (Cohort 14-16), while some 
were senior developers. These senior developers include those who stayed in 
Japan after OJT and those who were there on their short-term business visits. 
Learning from the interviews, there were no specific OJT plans for the 
trainees. In most cases, they were directly assigned to a team and given tasks.  
The company arranged two places of accommodation for the expatriates, 
according to their workplaces. During my visit, I stayed in one building with 40 
expatriates of this company. Each of us was provided with a self-catering en-
suite apartment which was well furnished, with a TV set, refrigerators, air-
conditioners, and cooking and bathing facilities. It took about 30 minutes to 
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get to the company by metro, and everyone was offered a metro card to cover 
their monthly transportation costs. Due to the fact that they live together for 
years, these expatriates spend most of their spare time together and thus 
build up close personal relationships with each other. Trainees in Japan are 
paid the Japanese minimum salary, which is about 200,000 Japanese Yen 
per month (approx. 1,600RMB per month).  
Work organisational structure and hierarchy   Software-Co has a flat 
organisational structure based on the nature of projects and clients. As shown 
below (Figure 3.4 and 3.5), the director was appointed by FD University, the 
owner of the company. The director is not involved much in the daily operation 
of Software-Co but has the most power in decision-making. The general 
manager is appointed by the director and is in charge of daily operations. 
Departments One, Two and Three all work for Japanese clients. Department 
Four was a newly established department in 2010, with about 30 employees. 
It mainly deals with domestic business from China. The Quality Management 
Department deals with quality- and security-related work.  
 
Figure!3.4:!Organisational!structure!of!Software<Co!
Work in Software-Co is project-based and each project consists of several 
teams. The span of control is normally between twenty to thirty junior software 
developers and programmers under a team leader. Software developers and 
programmers work together in teams, but all the managerial positions, 
including those of team leaders, project managers and department managers, 
are taken by developers (see Chapter 4). 
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Figure!3.5:!Organisational!hierarchy!of!Software<Co!
Union   In principle, workers in Software-Co are organised through the union 
of FD University. However, the majority of employees were indifferent to it, 
and many of them were completely ignorant of its existence. While the CEO of 
Software-Co mentioned that sometimes he was asked to attend union 
meetings in FD University, he said it was ‘just going through the motions’. In 
his opinion, the union existed at the higher level of the university and normally 
dealt with university faculties, and thus Software-Co was not covered by any 
sort of union activities.   
3.6&Summary&
This chapter began by explaining how this study is informed by a CR 
perspective. Through the discussion, it has been made clear how the 
characteristics of CR resonate with my research object, which is to develop a 
multi-level understanding of management, employment and work within global 
suppliers . In particular, the stratified ontology of CR allows me to explore the 
structural forces at different levels of analysis and understand their 
manifestation in Chinese supply firms and their impacts on the management 
practices and the workplace dynamics in companies. Meanwhile, the 
analytical dualism of Archer (1995) enables me to analyse the interaction 
between structures and corporate actors, and this is consistent with my choice 
of a micro-political approach to studying global suppliers.    
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In line with a CR perspective, Houston's (2010) stages of retroduction have 
been used to structure both the research questions and the research 
processes. Firstly, transcendental research questions were presented. Each 
question points to the nature of the social structures and their manifestations 
and impacts. Secondly, the hypothetical relationships among theoretical 
concepts were developed. By drawing on the SSDC framework, combined 
with the concepts of global supply chains and labour process theory, 
theoretical hypotheses were made to illustrate how this study approached 
generative mechanisms, context, time and agency. Thirdly, sources of 
evidence were identified and clarified, including the selection of research sites 
and data collection. A comparative case study on two Chinese supply firms 
was then constructed. The selection of research sites and the ‘intensive’ 
research design were both informed by my research questions. Data were 
collected through observation, informal conversation and formal semi-
structured interviews, and details on how these data were collected were 
explained. Finally, the iterative procedures of analysis were applied to 
elaborate the hypothesised relationship among theoretical concepts, as 
suggested by Houston’s (2010) fourth stage of retroduction.  
In the second part of this chapter, I have introduced the two global suppliers 
studied in this research project, and identified some key aspects of those 
suppliers’ local environments, Japanese workplaces, expatriates, work 
organisations and unions. From this introduction to them, it is clear that these 
two supply firms  are different in many aspects, although they share the 
common home country of China, host country of Japan, and are in the same 
industry. These points form a basis for the interpretation of the management 
practices and employment relations in these companies, and will be 
discussed in detail in the chapters which follow.   
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Chapter& 4& Supply& chain& relationships& and& international&
operation:&Getting&involved&in&Japan&
In the preceding chapter, I introduced the two Chinese supply firms that were 
studied for the purposes of this thesis, making reference to their local 
environments, international operations, Chinese and Japanese workplaces, 
organisational structures, hierarchies, and unions. Given the nature of service 
outsourcing industry, which requires both on-shore and off-shore services, the 
two case companies are heavily engaged in international operation in both 
China and Japan and are actively organising cross-national flows of capital, 
labour, knowledge and organisational practices between China and Japan. It 
is argued that the international operations in both companies have great 
impacts on the construction and development of their management systems 
at Chinese workplaces. Thus, before we go to the details at the Chinese 
workplaces, it is necessary to understand how international operation is 
organised and managed in both companies, in particular in relation to their 
relationships with the Japanese clients. Therefore, this chapter discuss these 
two supply firms, with particular emphasis on how different supply chain 
relationships are developed and how they impact on the international 
operations in both companies.  
As we will see, Data-Co and Software-Co have developed two contrasting 
supply chain relationships with their Japanese clients: relationships between 
Data-Co and its clients are featured as transactional and market-based, whilst 
the ones between Software-Co and its clients are particularistic and captive. 
The different supply chain relationships result in different ways of international 
operations. In both companies, the international operations between China 
and Japan are primarily managed through two interrelated mechanisms: one 
being the Japanese offices and another one being a particular group of 
expatriates in the outsourcing section, whom I have termed ‘on-site 
expatriates’. These expatriates are sent from the Chinese HQs and work at 
clients’ work-sites in Japan for a period of time. In other words, they work at 
neither the HQs’ workplaces nor the Japanese office, but at the clients’ 
workplaces. This chapter traces the evolvement of the supply chain 
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relationships in both companies and investigates how their Japanese offices 
and on-site expatriates are managed in market-based and captive supply 
chains respectively.  
It is found that the supply chain relationships have significant implications on 
the role of the Japanese offices and the management and experience of the 
on-site expatriates. In a market-based supply chain where Data-Co is based, 
the supplier’s focus in international operation tends to be on market diversity 
and expansion. This leads to an emphasis on developing new clients in the 
Japanese office. Meanwhile, given the limited interaction between suppliers 
and clients in a market-based supply chain, expatriates are largely ‘isolated’ 
from the Japanese companies and thus their jobs in Japan are largely short-
term based and task-oriented without opportunities to communicate with 
Japanese colleagues and to ‘learn’ from Japanese companies. By contrast, in 
a captive supply chain where Software-Co is based, the close and long-term 
relationship between the supplier and their client allows the expatriates to get 
involved in the Japanese companies and to work with the Japanese 
colleagues. Based on this, the supplier shows lots of enthusiasm in ‘learning’ 
knowledge and practices from the Japanese clients in the international 
operation and to transfer these knowledge and practices back to the Chinese 
workplaces. Expatriates in this cases are considered to be the learners and 
carriers of Japanese knowledge and practices.  
This chapter consists of three sections. The first two sections discuss Data-Co 
and Software-Co respectively in terms of their management of the Japanese 
offices and the expatriates in different supply chain relationships. The third 
section concludes this chapter by comparing and contrasting the two cases.   
4.1&DataNCo:&International&operation&in&a&marketNbased&supply&chain&&
Data-Co, established in 1992, targeted the Japanese market from its 
inception. It mainly provides BPO service (i.e. data inputting and editing) for 
Japanese organisations, but also engages in other business such as 
engineering process outsourcing (EPO) and knowledge process outsourcing 
(KPO).  
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The establishment of Data-Co was initially driven by one entrepreneur’s 
alertness to a new business opportunity. The founder, Yang, was a Chinese 
woman. She used to work for the Dalian Economic and Information 
Technology Committee (DEITC), in which role she was in touch with large 
Japanese companies, and developed a comprehensive understanding of the 
Japanese market. In 1992, she sensed the potential profit-making opportunity 
of customers from Japan for a Chinese BPO business, and decided to set up 
the company. 
When Data-Co was founded in 1992, the BPO market between Japan and 
China was immature, non-transparent and unregulated. Under these 
circumstances, personal networking and recommendations played a crucial 
role with Japanese companies in finding potential suppliers, and once they 
decided on suppliers, they tended to build long-term and stable relationships 
with them. Under this personal-based and long-term supply chain relationship, 
the founder Yang adopted a marketing strategy which used personal networks 
in developing clients and stressed service quality in retaining clients. 
Specifically, Yang developed all new clients through her own network, and 
employees devoted themselves to improving service quality without worrying 
about the market. For a long time, this marketing strategy worked in a virtuous 
cycle – existing clients were so satisfied with Data-Co’s service quality that 
they were happy to provide positive recommendations to other companies, 
thus helping Data-Co develop new clients. By the end of 2005, the company 
had long-term relationships with six large Japanese companies, and received 
regular orders from them every year.  
However, the market situation had changed since the early 2000s. As the 
market became mature and transparent, BPO work was standardised. Under 
this circumstance, personal recommendation became less important in the 
selection of suppliers than it had used to be. Japanese companies, especially 
the large ones, turned to selecting suppliers through competitive bids in the 
open market, and paid most attention to specific parameters such as price, 
delivery time and security qualifications. This distinctive trend towards arm’s 
length transaction as standardisation rose was spotted by Ahmadjian & 
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Lincoln (2001) in the relationships between Japanese automobile 
manufacturers and suppliers, which had once been in a long-term and intense 
collaboration. Applying a learning perspective, they argued that relation-
specific investments had great value when the learning curve in the industry 
was steep and the level of uncertainty was high. As ‘know-how is routinised, 
processes standardised, asset specificity falls and the value of bilateral 
commitments and cooperation falls with it’ (p.697). Changes in Data-Co 
endorsed this argument: the standardised work procedure, the mature market 
and the increasingly competent suppliers enabled Data-Co’s potential clients 
in Japan easily to locate the least expensive suppliers through competitive 
bidding every year, and allowed a clean hand-off. As a result, Japanese 
clients were unwilling any more to invest in long-term supplier relationships 
with companies providing data input and editing services for them, which were 
considered to be peripheral and low value-added to their organisations. In this 
sense, the supply chain relationship between Data-Co and its Japanese 
clients shifted from a personal-based, long-term one to a market-based one 
featuring the market-based GVC in Gereffi, Humphrey, & Sturgeon (2005). In 
this market-based GVC, suppliers provide standardised services which 
requires low asset specificity and the coordination between suppliers and 
clients are significantly reduced. 
As a result of the market change, Data-Co’s marketing strategy, which largely 
relied on stable relationships with large clients, and on the founder’s ability to 
develop new clients, could no longer support the development of the company 
– several existing clients left Data-Co for cheaper suppliers, and new clients 
were not effectively approached, due to the lack of marketing staff and 
strategy. Informants reported that the company growth was almost stagnant 
during the period from 2002 to 2006 because of the difficulties in developing 
new clients and winning large orders. This, to some extent, resulted in the 
selling of the company to Group A in 2007. 
In response to this change, Data-Co announced an organisational reform, 
which included big changes in the role of the Japanese office. In the following 
sections, I describe how the international operation in Data-Co is organised 
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and managed in a market-based supply chain, by focusing on the 
management of its Japanese office, and the management of expatriates.  
4.1.1&The&Japanese&office&in&a&marketNbased&supply&chain&
Despite the small scale of the Japanese office of Data-Co, it plays an 
important role in the strategic development and daily management of Data-
Co. Given the changes of the supply chain relationships between Data-Co 
and its Japanese clients, the role of the Japanese office was changed 
accordingly.  
The Japanese office had not been set up until 12 years later of the 
establishment of Data-Co. For the first ten years, the primary mechanism of 
Data-Co for internationalisation was to export services by acting as the 
contractor to the Japanese clients. All operations were based in China. Direct 
investment in Japan was kept to a minimum, and there was hardly any labour 
flow between the two countries except for occasional business visits. The 
company penetrated the Japanese market largely through the founder’s 
personal network. Yang established a strategic-partner relationship with a 
large Japanese company, NTT Data, and this collaboration not only provided 
the company with stable business orders, but also opened the door to 
valuable commercial information, based on which Yang approached other 
Japanese companies.  
Given the increasing clients’ demand for on-site work and the intensifying 
market competition in China, a small establishment of just eight employees 
(three Japanese and five Chinese) was set up in Tokyo, Japan in 2003. For 
required on-site work, employees in Data-Co were sent to the clients’ work-
sites in Japan either for training in a particular system or for projects which 
required specific skills. In connection with this, the Japanese office helped 
organise and manage on-site expatriates in various ways. First, it enabled the 
expatriations to be arranged through a ‘company internal transfer’ scheme 
which greatly simplified the visa application process. Second, the office 
assisted the expatriates with their daily lives including accommodation, 
obtaining transportation cards, and bank registration. It also ran a half-day 
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orientation session to teach issues such as safety in Japan, Japanese 
etiquette and the Japanese transportation system. Third, employees in the 
Japanese office, who normally spoke better Japanese than the expatriates, 
could facilitate communication between clients and expatriates when needed. 
Apart from its role in the administration of on-site expatriates, the Japanese 
office was also established in response to intensifying market competition, 
with hundreds of start-ups entering the BPO market targeting Japanese 
clients from 1998 onwards.  
The initial employees in the Japanese office, three Japanese and five 
Chinese, were all expatriates from the HQ. Managers did not consider hiring 
from the Japanese labour market, mainly because of their desire for people 
‘who have experiences in working in HQ and are familiar with the operations 
in China’: 
Candidates had to meet two requirements: knowing about what went 
on at HQ, and being able to speak both Chinese and Japanese. Only 
people who had worked at HQ could meet both requirements at that 
time. People hired in Japan might speak better Japanese, but they did 
not have experience in working for the HQ. (Telephone interview with 
one administrative officer in the Japanese office, 9th April 2011) 
The selection of expatriates was straightforward given that ‘only a few people 
can speak fairly good Japanese’. Priority was given to three native Japanese 
who were working at HQ at that time. Two of them were former employees of 
a big Japanese company, and had joined Data-Co as senior advisors after 
they retired in Japan in their 60s. The other one, Taiji, had finished his 
undergraduate and master programmes in the US in art design, and had 
come to China with the purpose of both travelling and working. He joined 
Data-Co in 2000 as a client service officer. These three Japanese were 
pleased to work for the Japanese office since it offered them a good 
opportunity to work in their home country. Taiji was appointed to be the 
manager of the Japanese office and the two other Japanese worked as part-
time senior advisors. Two Chinese expatriates were assigned to deal with the 
administrative work, while the other three were responsible for client-related 
issues, each for one out of the BPO, EPO and KPO business units at HQ.  
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During the period from 2003 to 2006, the two administrative employees 
changed a few times and were finally replaced by one female expatriate from 
China and one part-time Japanese accountant. The others, including three 
Japanese and three Chinese expatriates remained in their positions. Their 
relative stability was closely related to their marital status and how 
conveniently they could meet with their families. Apart from four Japanese 
employees who lived with their families, two Chinese expatriates (EPO and 
KPO liaisons) were young single females and were quite flexible and open in 
terms of in which countries they might live and work in the future. Another 
expatriate, despite being married, managed to meet with her husband and 
child quite often because her husband made regular trips from China to Japan 
for business.  
Overall, between 2003 and 2006, The Japanese office took on three roles – 
those of a ‘vehicle’ which simplified the visits and expatriations between China 
and Japan; a ‘reception’ for people from the HQ and a ‘window’ connecting 
the HQ and Japanese clients. Despite these multiple functions, the Japanese 
office was at the periphery of decision making. As a ‘vehicle’ and a ‘reception’, 
its work was limited to administration without many value-added activities. As 
a ‘window’, it acted like a ‘speaking pipe’ which passed information between 
both sides. In other words, it did not have access to critical information or 
resources in the company, nor did it get inside the ‘bloodstream’ of the 
business in Japan.  
While the role and responsibility of the Japanese office was initially designed 
in accordance with the company’s marketing strategy, which was to rely on 
personal and long-term relationships with the Japanese clients, this was found 
to be problematic as the supply chain relationship was changed into a market-
based one.  
In 2007, the founder Yang sold the company to Group A, one of the best and 
largest Chinese software and information services providers headquartered in 
Beijing, and Simon, who was the COO of Group A, was appointed as the new 
CEO of Data-Co. Realising the changes in supply chain relationships, the new 
CEO Simon outlined a new marketing strategy which emphasised the 
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importance of developing new clients, instead of customer service and 
maintenance. He encouraged employees to take initiatives to approach 
potential clients, and called for a marketing/sales team which ‘collaborates 
with other divisions within the company and covers a series of duties such as 
conducting market analysis, reaching out to potential clients, preparing for the 
bidding, coming up with promotion plans, arranging negotiations and so on’ 
(the ‘Department Description’ of Data-Co). Based on this, Simon considered 
the Japanese office to be an ideal place for such activities, and decided to 
develop it into a marketing unit. He commented that this decision was not 
merely because of the Japanese office’s geographical position in Japan, but 
more importantly, was driven by his attempt to enhance the office’s 
importance within the company and make it integral to the profitability of the 
company: 
High-quality operation in China and successful marketing in Japan are 
two key factors that drive the growth of the company. The company 
does well in ensuring quality. However, marketing and sales in the local 
market has been the weakest link. That is the opportunity for the 
Japanese office. (Telephone interview, 2nd April 2011) 
The Japanese office should play a much more important role within the 
company than that of a pure administrative and servicing unit. It has 
the potential to contribute more to the company than being a ‘window’. I 
mean, it is close to our market and clients and they [employees in the 
Japanese office] can speak the Japanese language… I aim to force the 
Japanese office into the struggle for market share. Only through this 
can the Japanese office start adding value to the company and 
become an important entity within the company. (29th November 2011 
in Tokyo) 
Following this new strategy, Simon, on the one hand, downplayed the 
Japanese office’s role as a ‘window’ or ‘speaking pipe’ in customer service. 
On the other hand, he emphasised the importance of marketing development, 
and positioned the Japanese office primarily as a ‘marketing team’ which 
focused on developing new clients and winning new business orders. In this 
sense, the Japanese office changed into a ‘marketing satellite’  (White & 
Poynter, 1984) which provided limited customer service and was in charge of 
marketing products and services in the host country. This also indicated a 
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shift in the Japanese office’s value-adding scope from pure supporting 
activities to marketing.  
This reform led to changes in the staffing of the Japanese office. Staff 
members not in accountancy or administrative positions (that is, the manager 
- Taiji, two senior advisors, and three liaisons) were presented with two 
alternatives: either to join the marketing team in the Japanese office, or to 
return to HQ and undertake customer service work there. Simon explained 
that although he realised that they lacked experience in marketing, he was 
satisfied with their attitudes to work and their performance, and thought they 
could be trained to be market representatives in Japan or to be liaisons with 
the Japanese office and with Japanese clients from the HQ.  
Four Japanese employees, including the Japanese accountant, supported this 
reform and accepted their new job responsibilities in marketing. The 
accountant and two advisors said the reform did not affect their daily work 
much and they were pleased that the Japanese office was of more strategic 
importance than it had been before. Taiji particularly mentioned its positive 
impact on his career: 
It is definitely a chance for me. I felt my career in Data-Co had come to 
an end before this [reform]. I had already been seeking other job 
opportunities in Japan at that time because my work was not 
interesting. I was excited about our new mission in marketing 
development and was eager to accept the challenge. (30th November 
2011 in Tokyo) 
Taiji’s opinion was strongly agreed with by one Chinese female expatriate, 
Tang, who was in charge of BPO business. She also considered this a big 
challenge as well as an opportunity to make the most of her ability and 
potential, and adapted to her new role as a marketing woman very quickly. 
She was promoted to the associate manager of the Japanese office in 2011, 
and led the marketing team together with Taiji.  
Apart from these Japanese employees and one Chinese expatriate, the other 
three Chinese did not show much enthusiasm. The administrative employee 
quit and the other two liaisons (in EPO and KPO) decided to go back to the 
HQ one after the other. One of them returned in 2008 but then left for another 
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higher-paying company after one year. The other returned later, in 2010, and 
worked as a liaison between HQ and the Japanese office. During the 
interview, she told me about her difficulties, especially as a female, in 
undertaking marketing work: 
I tried to adapt to this new role, but I found that I was not a marketing 
person. I did not like spending lots of time having dinners and drinking 
with clients. I liked regular life. Especially in Japan, I was dealing with 
men all the time. You know, there was gender bias in Japan. I 
sometimes felt that they did not trust me because I was a ‘young girl’. I 
thought they preferred to have a man to talk with them, in a proper and 
serious manner. (16th June 2011 in Dalian) 
This opinion on gender was echoed by Tang, who complained about long 
working hours in Japan and excessive after-work socialisation: 
As a necessary part of marketing and business negotiations, we 
usually take our clients out to dinner and have various entertainments 
afterwards. It usually goes on until midnight, and people drink a lot. It is 
not an easy job for women, especially those with families. My son and 
husband live in China so I do not have much family commitment so far. 
In addition, most of the marketing people we are dealing with are men 
and sometimes women feel uncomfortable about drinking with lots of 
men, you know. (29th November 2011 in Tokyo) 
The above accounts indicate the different gender models in China and Japan, 
in particular, the different degrees of the ‘male-breadwinner’ model. This 
model is based on a set of assumptions about male and female contributions 
at the household level. That is, men work full time and have the primary 
responsibility for earning, whilst women care for the young and the elderly, 
and are provided for largely by their husbands’ earnings (Lewis, 2001). The 
degree to which a certain society features a male-breadwinner model is 
‘embodied in laws and institutions regulating mutual obligations, rights, and 
relations between women and men within and between the areas of 
production and reproduction’ (Gottfried & O’Reilly 2002, p33). Gottfried & 
O’Reilly (2002) thus presents a framework of strong to weak male-
breadwinner models based on the division of caring responsibility across 
institutional domains (family, state and market), the division of gendered 
labour within the household (from female caregiver to shared care), and 
between the household and the labour market (from single earner to dual 
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earner). According to this framework, Japan represents a typical example of a 
strong male-breadwinner model, in which a male ‘breadwinner’ is expected to 
devote extensive time to the firm and a ‘professional housewife’ is supposed 
to dedicate herself to the management of household affairs, either without 
being employed, or at most being employed only in part-time jobs (Gottfried & 
Hayashi-Kato, 1998). By contrast, the male-breadwinner model in China is 
relatively weak. Female employees account for 40% of the total workforce in 
full-time employment and dual-earner models are commonly found in Chinese 
families (Cooke, 2005b). Women are still the main caregivers for the young 
and the elderly in most areas of China but kin (e.g. the women’s parents and 
parents-in-law) offer a great deal of support and assistance, to the extent that 
many women can still keep a full-time job. The strong male-breadwinner 
model in Japan and the weak model in China explain why the female 
employees find it difficult to get involved in a male-dominant working 
environment. In addition, given Japanese male employees’ high level of 
commitment to their work, and their strong social bonds with co-workers, they 
spend considerable time together in off-the-job socialising, drinking, and 
participating in sports and recreational activities (Lincoln & Kalleberg, 1990), 
which, again, poses challenges for the female employees. 
In the end, four Japanese employees (Taiji, two part-time senior advisors and 
one part-time accountant), and one Chinese expatriate, Tang, stayed at the 
Japanese office. Taiji kept his position as the manager. According to the new 
mission of the Japanese office, a new marketing team was formed in 2007. 
Taiji, Tang and two part-time advisors comprised the initial members of this 
team and there were another five new recruits at the time of my fieldwork. 
Taiji was appointed leader of this marketing team and Tang was promoted to 
associate leader in 2011.  
To sum up, the shift from a personal-based, long-term supply chain 
relationship to a market-based supply chain relationship between Data-Co 
and its Japanese clients, has led the reform of the Japanese office from a 
pure administrative and customer service unit to a marketing unit, which 
focuses on developing new clients and expanding market shares in Japanese 
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market. This change in the Japanese office’s mission consequently leads to 
the changes in staffing and also highlights the gender differences between 
China and Japan.  
4.1.2&Expatriates&in&a&marketNbased&supply&chain&
The market-based supply chain relationships also have impacts on the 
experience of the expatriates in Japan. Basically, there are two occasions on 
which the company sends HQ employees to the clients’ companies in Japan. 
First, on-site expatriates are sent in order to get trained on a particular system 
before the mass operations start in China. These periods of training usually 
take less than one month. Trainees are expected to become competent in the 
system according to the client’s requirements, so that they can teach their 
colleagues in China. Second, on-site expatriates are involved in some 
projects which require specific skills possessed by expatriates and which have 
to be done in Japan. Most on-site assignments are on a short-term (one-three 
months) basis, with only two exceptions, which lasted three years. At the time 
of my research, there were about 40 expatriates in Japan, working for ten 
different projects at eight different workplaces. Ten of them were undertaking 
training, while the others were task-based.  
The selection of expatriates for different purposes varied. Team leaders or 
project managers who are in charge of the new projects in question are 
chosen for the training sessions, whereas the task-based expatriates are 
nominated by team leaders. While all team leaders, in the interviews, 
appeared to stress the importance of candidates’ proficiency in terms of skills 
and personality, there are in practice no explicit criteria. Different team leaders 
seek different kinds of personalities. A few team leaders prefer ‘smart and 
outgoing workers’ who are likely to adapt to a foreign environment more 
quickly and easily, while more of them prefer ‘submissive, introverted and 
careful workers’ who are easy to control and can better concentrate on work. 
More recently, managers suggest team leaders take ‘employee loyalty’ into 
account when selecting the expatriates, as one HR employee explained: 
Lots of workers leave for another company with higher pay after they 
get back from Japan because expatriation experiences are very 
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valuable in the job market. They are certainly people we want to retain 
as well because they are skilled and experienced. So we suggest team 
leaders try to avoid workers who are likely to leave or those who have 
already shown an intention of leaving. It is just a personal, subjective 
judgement, but it can be helpful. (16th June 2011 in Dalian) 
Due to the lack of an agreed standard or process for the selection, workers 
seem to be quite confused. One EPO worker said ‘nobody can read the 
criteria in the team leader’s mind’ and another BPO expatriate shared his 
experience: 
I had a talk with my team leader before I knew I was chosen for 
expatriation. It seemed like an informal talk -- she [my team leader] did 
not call it an interview. She asked me lots of questions including 
whether I was satisfied with the company, what my further career plan 
was, how keen I was to go to Japan, what I would do after the 
expatriation, etc. I guess that was part of the selection. (28th November 
2011 in Tokyo) 
There is no training in Data-Co for expatriates except for a half-day orientation 
given by the Japanese office, mainly about basic work etiquette in Japanese 
companies. During the expatriation, workers are required to keep in close 
contact with their superiors at HQ and report to HQ every day. Their 
performance is assessed by both their superiors at HQ and by the client, and 
the results will become important criteria in their promotions back at HQ. 
Workers are paid the same amount of monthly salary as they are in China as 
well as a daily living allowance in Japanese Yen.  
Training and tasks in Japan take place in different companies, so expatriates 
are dispersed into various places either individually or in small groups 
(normally two or three employees). They are accommodated in different 
places close to their workplaces and there are few contacts between 
expatriates at different workplaces.  
The working experiences at client companies are usually described to be 
‘isolated’ from the Japanese companies and workers. As workers who have 
been on expatriation experiences recalled, they, together with their colleagues 
from Data-Co, spent most of their time working or having training sessions in 
an isolated office alone or with other contractors, most of whom were also 
from China. In most cases, expatriates can only get in touch with one 
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Japanese superior or trainer who is in charge of their projects in a short and 
simple way. If there is anything complicated, Japanese clients would talk 
directly to the Japanese office or to the HQ. Given this, expatriates do not 
have opportunities to actually work with Japanese employees, leave alone 
socialise with them: 
Mr. Yoshida [a Japanese superior] was in charge of our project but he 
only showed up a few times during my expatriation. He spent one day 
with us when we first started to make sure we did right and then he 
came by our office very occasionally to check our progress. He also did 
the final check of our work on the last day and said thank you to us. 
(BPO worker, 4th July 2011 in Dalian) 
I do not feel many differences between my work in Japan and in China. 
I am working with my Chinese colleagues, report to my Chinese 
superior as I normally do in China. (Telephone interview with expatriate 
in EPO, 23rd March 2011)  
In such isolating work environments, expatriates are treated as ‘outsiders’ and 
can hardly get involved in the Japanese companies. Their perceptions of 
Japanese companies are usually limited to a superficial level, such as 
‘Japanese offices are clean’ and ‘Japanese superiors are polite’. Indeed, 
although managers at HQ always stress their attempts to ‘learn from Japan’ 
(see details in chapter 5), none of them see expatriations as a way of 
learning. In their opinions, the purpose of expatriations was finishing the tasks 
rather than learning. This is also evidenced by the fact that except for one 
team leader who engaged in experience sharing among repatriates and other 
team members, no practice has been reported of promoting knowledge 
transfer from expatriates to HQ. 
This is also the case for people in training programmes. The training is 
exclusively on one particular skill or program and is undertaken in an isolating 
environment. Trainees only have contact with one Japanese trainer and have 
little chance to experience the Japanese company and workers. One 
interviewee described it as follows: 
My training was in two parts. The first part focused on theory. It took 
place in a conference room of a hotel. The trainer talked about the 
skills, procedures and key points in practice. We learnt the manual step 
by step and recited them. This was the main part which took about ten 
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days. The second part focused on implementation and it took five days. 
It was held in the operational room in the company and we were given 
computers and several tasks to practice. [In terms of what I learnt apart 
from the technical knowledge], I think I feel from the training that 
Japanese focus on details and are very careful. For example, their 
manuals are detailed, covering every small aspect and every possible 
problem. (6th July 2011 in Dalian) 
Overall, on-site expatriates from Data-Co, either task-based or training-based, 
are ‘demand driven’ rather than ‘learning driven’ (Evans, Pucik, & Barsoux, 
2002). Their missions in Japan are exclusively based on task and their 
performances are assessed based on working results. Expatriates are treated 
as ‘outsiders’ and distanced from the Japanese colleagues and management 
so that the purpose of management learning is largely missing in Data-Co’s 
arrangement of on-site expatriates. In this sense, on-site expatriations in 
Data-Co are no more than a form of ‘labour-service export’. 
The ‘isolating’ experience of expatriates at Japanese workplaces can be 
largely explained by the supplier-client relationships between Data-Co and its 
Japanese clients. As the BPO transactions become standardised and 
transparent, Data-Co is featured as a ‘market-based supplier’ within the global 
supply chain. It provides standardised services to many Japanese clients and 
the transactions are done in a arm’s length market. In a market-based chain, 
the clients do not get involved much in the daily operation and management of 
Data-Co. Even in the case of the on-site expatriates working in Japan, the 
interaction between expatriates and the Japanese companies is kept minimal. 
Because of this, on-site expatriates are ‘isolated’ from the Japanese 
companies and employees, and have little chance to learn practices from the 
Japanese companies during their expatriations there.  
4.1.3&Case&summary&of&DataNCo&
While the supply chain relationships between Data-Co and its Japanese 
clients were initially characterised as personal-based and long-term, the 
standardisation of the BPO business has pushed the development of this 
market and produced a more market-based supply chain between suppliers 
and clients. In response to this change, Data-Co corrected its initial marketing 
strategy, which largely relied on personal networks, and started emphasising 
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the importance of marketing and attracting new Japanese clients. Under this 
circumstance, the Japanese office became the front line of this marketing 
reform, changing from a pure administrative unit to a marketing unit, taking 
change of developing new clients and expanding market share in Japan.  
Meanwhile, the market-based supply chain has kept the interaction between 
clients and suppliers minimal. This is most evident in the cases of on-site 
expatriates. Even though these expatriates are working at the Japanese 
clients’ work-sites, they are ‘isolated’ from the Japanese companies and the 
Japanese colleagues. Therefore, despite of the bilateral flows of labour 
through workers’ expatriations and repatriations, these on-site expatriates are 
primarily ‘demand driven’ and they rarely engage in the transfer of either 
knowledge or organisational practices. This draws a sharp contrast with 
Software-Co, which I discuss below.  
4.2&SoftwareNCo:&International&operation&in&a&captive&supply&chain&
As discussed in the preceding chapter, Software-Co was born as a joint-
venture in 1991 between a company wholly owned and run by FD University 
in China, and a government-funded institution in Japan known as the Japan 
International Development Organization (JAIDO). While Software-Co’s initial 
mission was to provide excellent Chinese university graduates with on-the-job 
training (OJT) opportunities in big Japanese companies, it gradually 
transformed itself into a contractor providing software services to Japanese 
companies. In 2001, JAIDO withdrew its investment and FD University 
acquired its shares, since when, Software-Co has been a completely 
Chinese-owned company.  
FD University’s interest in collaborating with JAIDO and establishing a joint-
venture was triggered by an unanticipated meeting between the University 
and JAIDO. As one of the initiators of Software-Co recalled, a senior dean at 
the university invited a member of JAIDO to give a speech on international 
collaboration at the university, and a cooperative plan was proposed during 
the dinner that took place after the speech: 
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We were aware that JAIDO was sponsored by the Japanese 
government and aimed to promote the economic development of 
developing countries through international collaboration. So we asked 
at the dinner: ‘we have resources in the form of talented graduates, 
and you have access to various resources in Japan. Why don’t we 
conduct some kind of international cooperation based on OUR 
resources?’ JAIDO looked very interested, and we went on to talk 
about the exact project… (One initiator of Software-Co, 10th January 
2012 in Shanghai) 
Despite the serendipity, the process of discussion between FD University and 
JAIDO turned out to be a lengthy one, before both parties finally agreed on an 
international training programme for software developers. The basic idea was 
that the Chinese side would select trainees among its graduates, and the 
Japanese side would provide them with training opportunities in big Japanese 
companies as software developers. The well-trained software developers 
were expected to return to China and promote the software industry in China. 
This project was undertaken as a part of Japanese Official Development 
Assistance (ODA) to China, a programme which sponsored by the Japanese 
government and aimed to promote the economic and technical development 
of developing countries, through financial and technical aid. The initiator 
commented that the joint-venture reflected the interests of both countries at 
that time: 
Japanese companies were facing a shortage of software developers 
dating from the early 1990s, due to the rapid developments taking 
place in engineering [including software engineering and developers]. 
Young Japanese seemed to be losing interest in entering this industry, 
since the work was tiring and not as well paid as some other sectors 
like finance, and this worsened the supply of software developers. By 
contrast, software engineering was new to China, and more and more 
people realised its vast potential. Therefore, Chinese were keen on 
training opportunities in Japan while Japanese companies would not 
mind some talented Chinese people working for them. (10th January 
2012 in Shanghai) 
Based on the proposal for the training programme, the joint venture was 
established in April, 1991, in Shanghai, and in the same year, the Japanese 
office was set up in Tokyo, Japan. Subsequently, the first cohort of trainees, 
38 in total, arrived in Japan in 1992.  
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The company fully engaged in the training programme until 1996, when the 
first year cohort of trainees finished OJT and returned. Based on these skilled 
software developers, along with the relatively low-cost labour in China, 
Software-Co stepped into the area of software outsourcing and received its 
first outsourced order from a Japanese company. From that time, the 
outsourcing business kept expanding as more and more software developers 
returned. By the end of 2000, there were about 120 trained software 
developers and 400 software programmers at the HQ working for about eight 
Japanese companies. In this sense, while Software-Co initially 
internationalised through joint venture and aimed at ‘addressing its 
competitive disadvantages’ in technology and skills, its transformation to an 
outsourcing contractor enabled it to ‘exploit its increasing competitive 
advantage’ in cost and human resource (Child & Rodrigues, 2005).  
The year 2001 was a turning point for Software-Co. During that year, it won a 
large order from Nomura Research Institute (NRI), a well-known Japanese 
company operating in the fields of consulting, financial IT solutions and IT 
platform service, and consequently became NRI’s largest offshore provider in 
China. From then on, in accordance with a marketing strategy which 
downplayed market expansion but stressed the importance of establishing a 
long-term relationship with the major client NRI (details below and in 4.2.2), 
Software-Co gradually terminated its contracts with other existing clients. In 
the meanwhile, given the complexity and specialised nature of NRI’s products, 
the company restructured its work procedures and deployed specific systems 
designed to meet NRI’s needs. These idiosyncratic changes and investments 
helped the company retain its customers from NRI, but confined the company 
virtually to working only for NRI. During the period of my fieldwork, 90% of 
Software-Co’s business came from NRI, with the other 10% mainly from 
collaborations with Chinese institutions. One senior software developer 
suggested:  
NRI has its own specifications for products in terms of the 
programming language, platforms, procedures and systems. For 
instance, we were required to use ‘Cobol’ programming. It is an 
outdated programming approach which most people do not know. 
Therefore, we have to train our programmers to use this particular 
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approach, but it is unlikely to be used for any other clients. (20th 
January 2012 in Shanghai) 
Apart from the customer-specific investment in physical assets as well as 
human capital, some developers also mentioned that as their relationship with 
NRI got closer, ‘NRI began to stress loyalty in the relationship and did not 
want us to develop other clients, especially its competitors in the finance 
industry’. The general manager told me that NRI had cut off a few suppliers in 
China over the years because they found out that these suppliers had other 
clients in the finance sector. Indeed, almost all senior managers interviewed 
were afraid of losing NRI should the company start developing other large 
clients, not only because NRI was their largest and most guaranteed client in 
Japan, but also because they lacked the confidence to develop new clients as 
good as NRI: 
As far as I am concerned, NRI is probably the best client we can 
expect in Japan. Their orders are stable and large, apart from during 
the crisis, I mean. The way they work with us is professional. We [the 
company] did receive small orders from other companies occasionally, 
but we were not really tempted. To be honest, I do not want to take the 
risk of displeasing NRI…We are still a small and young company. We 
are still learning and have not accumulated enough expertise in 
software design. So as to your question [whether there are large 
companies that could be pursued], I would say ‘yes, there are’ but I am 
not confident of winning them. (30th November 2011 in Tokyo) 
In contrast to the market-oriented supply chain relationship which featured 
with Data-Co, the relationship between Software-Co and NRI was 
characterised as a captive supply chain relationship (Gereffi et al., 2005). That 
is, software-Co was smaller and less powerful than NRI in the value chain, 
and thus it was placed in a vertical network which was controlled by NRI and 
became a ‘captive supplier’ of NRI (Bensaou, 1999; Gereffi et al., 2005). It 
was highly dependent on the client and faced big losses once it failed to keep 
receiving business from the client. This was particularly evident when the 
2008 global crisis caused tremendous cutbacks in demand for outsourcing 
from NRI to China and consequently led to a severe stagnation of business in 
Software-Co and a massive reduction of staff, by almost 50%. 
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In 2010, senior managers re-assessed and altered its strategy, so that the 
company went on committing to NRI but tried to upgrade itself from ‘a captive 
supplier’ to a ‘relational supplier’ by providing full-package and higher value-
added services (i.e. providing system solutions rather than just single pieces 
of software). This form of upgrading from a captive to relational value chains 
has been reported in the apparel industry in Gereffi et al. (2005). Producers in 
East Asia managed to become ‘relational suppliers’ from ‘captive suppliers’ 
through providing full-package production and increase supplier competence. 
This is also the case in Software-Co in the software outsourcing industry, in a 
‘relational’ relationship, it is expected that the mutual dependence between 
NRI and Software-Co would increase. Clients in a relational bond with 
suppliers will be motivated to outsource to gain access to complementary 
competencies, and breaking the contracts will impose costs on both sides 
(Gereffi et al., 2005). One vice general manager gave an insight into this 
strategic choice during our lunch together: 
We considered two alternative strategies. The first was to downgrade. 
In this case, we would focus on pure coding and programming, which 
are low value-added activities, but would expand our market to many 
other clients. The second was to upgrade, in which case we would 
develop expertise in software design and enhance our capacity to 
make ourselves important and necessary to NRI. If NRI relied on us in 
software design and programming, we would have bargaining leverage 
over it and the bond would be much more secure… We decided to 
choose the latter in the end because we had these well trained 
developers who were different from programmers. We had invested so 
much in training and we concluded that our development should be 
based on our existing advantages, which were our developers. 
Downgrading might have brought us more orders in the short-run but 
we would have lost our competitiveness, tradition and culture. (2nd 
February 2012 in Shanghai) 
Following this strategy, Software-Co pays more attention to ‘learn’ from Japan 
and increase its competence in providing full-package services through 
various knowledge sharing and Kaizen programmes (see details in Chapter 
5). It successfully received the outsourcing contracts from Nomura Holdings in 
the late 2011, being responsible for the software design in the post integration 
of Nomura and Lehman brother. In the same year, Software-Co also 
developed new clients such as Toyota Communication Systems. These 
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moves were considered as the big achievements in Software-Co’s upgrading 
because it showed Software-Co’s capability to develop new clients and to 
provide higher value-added products. Although Software-Co’s development is 
showing a tendency towards ‘relational’ supply chain relationship, the 
discussion in this study will be mainly based on the management systems and 
practices that were constructed and developed in captive supply chain 
relationships.  
Overall, in contrast with Data-Co, which is interested in market diversification 
and expansion, Software-Co focuses on serving one customer and 
developing its market with this single customer; unlike Data-Co which is 
moving towards standardisation of the production, Software-Co stresses the 
importance of getting deeply involved with NRI to better understand its 
working procedures and management systems and develop solutions that can 
best fit with it, and to ultimately become the ‘indispensable’ supplier/partner of 
NRI.  
In the following sections, I detail the management of the Japanese office and 
the expatriates.  
4.2.1&The&Japanese&office&in&a&captive&supply&chain&
The Japanese office, established at the same time as the HQ in 1991, 
originally represented the Japanese investor, JAIDO. It was a small office 
comprising four employees: one male manager Shiba, two female 
administrative employees who took care of trainees’ needs such as 
accommodation and transportation, and one female accountant who was in 
charge of trainees’ payroll in Japan.  
From 1991 to 2001, the Japanese office was responsible for developing 
partner relationships with Japanese companies where Chinese trainees could 
receive training, and for managing trainees’ work and life in Japan. It also 
sought for opportunities to do outsourced business for Japanese companies 
after the company stepped into outsourcing market in 1996. In other words, 
the Japanese office at that time not only covered all the management related 
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to on-site expatriates in Japan, but also took charge of developing and 
expanding its market in Japan. 
After Software-Co won orders from NRI in 2001, Software-Co decided to stop 
developing other clients and concentrate on building a long-term relationship 
with NRI. This strategic move was based on Software-Co’ business vision to 
provide relatively higher value-added and customised service to one or a 
small number of big clients, instead of standardised, low value-added service 
to many clients. It was this move that directed Software-Co to a captive supply 
chain with NRI. Accordingly, the Japanese office in this captive chain does not 
bear much responsibility in developing new clients, as the one in Data-Co 
does. Instead, the mission of the Japanese office of Software-Co is more on 
taking care of the expatriates’ life and fostering customer relationships with 
NRI.  
In terms of the daily life, the Japanese office managed to rent two blocks of 
flats to accommodate all the expatriates. Each expatriate lived in one 
separate en suite with all necessary facilitates such as fridge, microwave 
oven, TV set, washing machine and so on. They were also given a 
transportation card which enabled them to commute between their places of 
accommodation and the Japanese companies. Two administrative employees 
at the Japanese office, both local Japanese women, dealt with expatriates’ 
enquiries and ensured their safety and health. During my fieldwork in Japan, 
there were about 40 expatriates in the building where I lived. All of them were 
working for NRI, at two different workplaces. They went to work and returned 
home in groups, and spent lots of their spare time together, travelling, playing 
cards, shopping and watching TV. This kind of collective living, on the one 
hand, formed an effective learning network in which senior expatriates shared 
experiences with the younger ones and helped them adapt to the new country 
quickly, but on the other hand, reduced their motivation to socialise with local 
Japanese after work, including informal socialisation with Japanese 
colleagues. One senior manager commented: 
Japanese socialise a lot after work, but our expatriates rarely get 
involved in that. As more and more Chinese expatriates get together in 
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the same building, they easily find out anything they need to know from 
each other, and they can help each other out and spend time with each 
other. They feel comfortable staying within their ‘safe zone’ and do not 
feel motivated to socialise with local people. (7th December 2011 in 
Tokyo) 
There were about ten female on-site expatriates in Japan during the time of 
my fieldwork. As with Data-Co, these female expatriates in Software-Co were 
not keen on socialising with Japanese colleagues, almost all of whom were 
men. I had interviews with three of them. None of them reported particular 
difficulties in working in a male-dominated environment, although all of them 
said they would not choose to be employed by a Japanese company, given 
women’s subordinated status in most Japanese companies. Intriguingly, all 
these Chinese women showed strong empathy towards Japanese women, 
suggesting that Japanese women were confined to doing housework, and 
face severe obstacles in pursuing a career. One of them mentioned: 
Chen [the general manager] always says that we [the female 
employees] would have been serving tea in the office if we were not 
working for Software-Co. That is true -- many Japanese women end up 
typing documents and serving tea even if they have graduated from top 
universities. I do not know whether they [Japanese women] enjoy their 
roles as ‘housewives’, but I probably could not stand it. Well, for sure, I 
would not like it… It’s good that there is no gender bias here in 
Software-Co. (9th December 2011 in Tokyo) 
Indeed, when managers and other male employees in Software-Co talked 
about female employees, they tended to draw a sharp contrast between 
Software-Co and Japanese companies, emphasising that female employees 
in Software-Co were well treated and respected while those in Japanese 
companies had to be submissive and deferential to men. By doing so, female 
employees were made to feel fortunate and grateful to the company.  
As for the work, the former manager of the Japanese office Shiba established 
all the policies and practices in relation to the expatriates. He constantly 
contacted Japanese companies in order to keep track of each expatriate’s 
performance and required every expatriate to submit a detailed report every 
week on what projects they were doing, with whom they were working, what 
the challenges were, what should be improved and so on. One distinctive 
feature of Shiba’s management style was his emphasis on managing 
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expatriates in a purely Japanese way, as recalled by one vice general 
manager: 
Well, it was set out in our corporate vision that ‘the company aims to 
bridge Chinese and Japanese culture’; however, Shiba never bothered 
to integrate Chinese culture with Japanese management. In fact, he 
deliberately refused to learn anything about China for a long time 
because he wanted his management to be purely Japanese. He 
wanted us to be completely involved in and committed to Japanese 
culture, management and work environment, regardless of our 
nationality of origin or the ownership of the company. His logic was 
quite simple – the company served Japanese clients, so should behave 
Japanese. (23rd January 2012 in Shanghai) 
Indeed, Shiba not only carried out lots of practices at the Japanese office 
which were widely used in Japanese companies such as Hansei and Kaizen, 
but also devoted himself to educating expatriates to behave and work like 
local Japanese employees. One form of education took place on the ‘return 
day’ every month when all expatriates gathered in the Japanese office after 
work and Shiba would comment on each expatriate’s progress in adapting to 
the Japanese way of communicating, working and management. His 
education covered every aspect of the expatriates’ work, so much so that I 
was told that he even paid attention to the emails expatriates wrote and 
explained how to phrase them as a Japanese employee would. As well as 
conducting education in groups, Shiba also spent lots of time supervising 
each expatriate individually. I was told lots of similar stories about how Shiba 
helped each expatriate understand clients’ expectations and communicate 
effectively with superiors and colleagues in Japanese companies: 
I would not have understood Japanese management and Japanese 
work so well without Shiba. During my first year in Japan, my client 
almost ‘fired’ me because I did not perform well. Shiba had a long talk 
with me. He told me that Japanese always expected a ‘high quality’ 
and even ‘perfect’ work, rather than a ‘completed’ work. From 
Japanese people’s perspective, there was no difference between a 
major mistake and a minor mistake – every mistake was a serious one. 
Bearing this in mind, Shiba went through my report [for the client] 
sentence by sentence with me and pointed out how careless I was on 
details. It was an impressive talk and it changed my mind and attitude 
towards my work in Japan. (Software developer, 6th year cohort 
trainee, 8th February 2012 in Shanghai) 
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I was shy and was not confident about talking to my colleagues. Shiba 
noticed this, and had a conversation with me about it. He told me it was 
a principle of Japanese culture to ‘keep reporting, contacting and 
communicating’. He also advised me to start with writing emails if I 
found it difficult to talk. I did that, and got good feedback from clients, 
and I became more confident about communicating. (Project manager, 
3rd year cohort trainee, 9th February 2012 in Shanghai) 
In spite of this exclusion of Chinese elements, Shiba’s supervision and 
management were well accepted and followed. Almost all expatriates claimed 
that they had ‘internalised’ the Japanese practices and had been ‘Japanised’, 
apart from a few exceptions who had left the company during their 
expatriations. The high degree of acceptance could be interpreted as a 
product of a mixture of factors. First, all expatriates had joined the company 
directly after university, and thus they had no reference point as to 
management practices and policies at other companies and in other 
countries. Therefore, they were likely to accept the system they were currently 
in. Lots of developers said in their interviews with me that they could not tell 
whether Japanese practices were better than others because they had only 
learnt and experienced Japanese management, and they did not even know 
what alternatives they could apply. Secondly, Shiba’s constant education 
helped the expatriates understand the strengths and advantages of Japanese 
policies and practices. There was no doubt among the expatriates that 
Japanese practices were effective in avoiding mistakes and delivering high 
quality products. Thirdly, their long and deep involvement in Japanese 
companies offered expatriates opportunities to learn from their Japanese 
colleagues and carry out Japanese policies and practices in practical work, 
thus enhancing their internalisation of Japanese practices. Fourthly, as the 
early trained software developers became the managers at the HQ, 
‘managing in a pure Japanese way and behaving like Japanese’ became the 
distinctive pitch and ‘identity’ of both the company and the software 
developers. This reinforced the learning process of on-site expatriates (details 
in Chapter 5). Last but not least, the charismatic leadership of Shiba facilitated 
expatriates’ acceptance of Japanese-style management, as one 6th year 
cohort trainee indicated: 
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Shiba was the life mentor of all the expatriates, the spiritual leader of 
the company. He was strict and tough, but he always protected us and 
spoke up for us in front of our clients. He was thoughtful and patient, 
like a teacher and father to us. He made you believe in him and not 
want to disappoint him. If he said we should do something, then we 
should do it. (27th January 2012 in Shanghai) 
In sum, the Japanese office under a captive supply chain plays an important 
role in maintaining and improving customer relationships by training 
expatriates on how to work in a ‘Japanese’ way and how to provide the most 
customised services. Although a couple of changes of leadership have taken 
place in the Japanese office after Shiba retired in 2006, Software-Co’s overall 
position of being a captive supplier in a captive supply chain and the roles of 
the Japanese office in managing and training expatriates have not been 
changed much. New managers of the Japanese offices has taken the 
educational role and continued to teach Japanese practices to the developers.  
4.2.2&Expatriates&in&a&captive&supply&chain&
Unlike the expatriates in a market-based supply chain, who work in an 
‘isolated’ environment in Japan and predominantly focus on specific tasks, 
expatriates in a captive supply chain have more opportunities to work with 
their Japanese colleagues and to learn from the Japanese companies. 
Therefore, on-site expatriates in Software-Co are largely ‘learning-driven’, 
aiming to learn advanced technology, knowledge and organisaitonal practices 
from Japanese practices through the on-the-job training (OJT) in Japanese 
companies. 
OJT in Japanese companies has been a compulsory part of the training 
programme for software developers in Software-Co since the company was 
established. Although the company was transformed into an outsourcing 
contractor and the role of Japanese companies was changed from ‘trainers’ to 
‘clients’, this training programme has been kept and on-site expatriates are 
sent out almost every year. The company hopes the expatriates will take this 
opportunity to learn skills and managerial practices from Japanese companies 
and ultimately promote the upgrading of the company. During my research, 
there were 94 expatriates working at three work sites with the client NRI. Most 
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of them were expatriated between 2008 and 2010 (14th to 16th year cohort)1 
while a few of them were senior software developers who stayed on sites after 
OJT.  
The supply chain relationships have a great impact on the extent to which on-
site expatriates are able to be involved in the Japanese company and work 
with Japanese colleagues during their OJT. During the period from 1991 to 
2001 when Software-Co was a training agency, Japanese companies acted 
as the ‘trainers’ of Chinese expatriates, based on their agreements with 
JAIDO. Training took place while expatriates were actually working. They 
were assigned to a team in Japanese companies and were given tasks. Their 
tasks were not different from the other Japanese employees, and they were 
allowed to access company information and resources to the same extent as 
their colleagues. Each expatriate was allocated to an experienced member of 
staff who worked as a coach and could provide instructions and help them 
learn skills and processes. Expatriates were managed in the same way as the 
other employees and were required to participate in every formal activity in 
the companies. During that time, expatriates did not feel like ‘outsiders’. 
Instead, except that they were not paid by the Japanese companies, lots of 
them felt they belonged to the Japanese companies. Expatriates during this 
period were considered to be involved most deeply in Japan and had been 
‘Japanised’. 
From 2001 when Software-Co became a contractor to Japanese companies, 
and in particular to NRI, the role played by the Japanese companies was no 
longer that of ‘trainer’, but of ‘client’. Expatriates still worked in the Japanese 
companies but they were assigned specific tasks. Their contacts in the 
Japanese companies were restricted and they were given limited access to 
the company’s information and resources. As ‘suppliers’, expatriates were 
treated as ‘outsiders’. Most policies and practices which applied within the 
Japanese companies were not applied to the expatriates, and the 
                                            
1 There was not expatriation in 2009 due to the economic crisis. 
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management of expatriates was largely results-oriented. Despite these 
changes, three-year work experiences within Japanese companies were 
considered enough for people to get used to Japanese working culture, and to 
learn from doing and observation, as the general manager reflected: 
Japanese managers can be very harsh to the expatriates. Simply 
speaking, when they are trainees, Japanese managers teach them 
when they do things wrong. But when they are suppliers, they fire you. 
This, to some extent, forces our expatriates to effectively communicate 
with their Japanese managers and learn quickly from their daily work. 
With limited direct supervision from Japanese managers, expatriates 
are pushed to observe how and what their Japanese colleagues do 
and imitate their behaviours. In this sense, although the change from 
‘trainees’ to ‘suppliers’ sounded like an adverse one to us, it did not 
affect expatriates’ commitment, involvement and learning results too 
much. (Follow-up telephone interview, 8th July 2013) 
However, the situation was getting worse after the economic crisis in 2008. In 
2010, the Japanese client NRI reorganised the working space for the 
suppliers. As a result, all expatriates moved out of NRI’s main building and 
were relocated to a new building to work with other suppliers. Because of this, 
expatriates were isolated from the employees at NRI and instead spent most 
of their time with Chinese colleagues and other suppliers. One expatriate said: 
The location makes a big difference. You know, I do not even have the 
opportunity to practice my Japanese because most of the time I work 
with my Chinese colleagues. I really doubt the meaningfulness of OJT 
under this ‘isolated’ environment.  (14th December 2011 in Tokyo) 
There were various explanations given for the workplace reorganisation. The 
most common reason concerned information security. It was reported that 
NRI had carried out an overall risk assessment of corporate information 
security and personal information security in 2009 and found suppliers who 
were working with them could access too much of the company’s information 
and this could become a potential risk to the company’s information assets. 
Therefore, they decided to locate expatriates to a separate building in order to 
better control their access to information. Another explanation was again 
related to standardisation, as the general manager told me: 
Although software design work usually involves lots of innovation and 
communication, it is quite different in NRI. The system at NRI is very 
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stable and there is no need for changes. So after such a long time of 
collaboration, our work is mostly standardised. NRI does not require 
innovation, nor does it outsource higher value-added business to us. 
Therefore, it is not necessary for them to keep in close collaboration 
with us and so they relocated us to another building in order to reduce 
their administrative costs. I guess it is the same for the other suppliers, 
and that is why NRI rented this building and gathered all suppliers 
here. (Follow-up telephone interview, 8th July)  
In response to the expatriates’ reduced involvement after the change of 
workplaces, managers at NRI made lots of effort to encourage expatriates to 
be proactive and seek out opportunities to socialise and communicate with 
Japanese clients. For example, managers taught expatriates to give 
constructive suggestions and impressive talks when they had the opportunity 
to meet with clients so as to ‘be noticed by the clients’. The general manager 
gave a gloss on this situation that ‘our way of dealing with this handicap is to 
make ourselves outstanding among the contractors, so we have to take our 
limited opportunities to show our capability and value’. 
Managers in Software-Co was very concerned about this change. They 
realised that the isolation of the on-site expatriates from the Japanese clients 
would potentially reposition the company as a ‘market-based supplier’ which 
would only supply standardised services and thus could no longer benefit 
from the highly skilled and trained suppliers. This, therefore, consequently 
drives the company to focus on upgrading to a ‘relational supplier’ since the 
2010.  
In sum, on-site expatriates in a captive supply chain have opportunities to get 
involved in their Japanese clients’ workplaces. Therefore, they are considered 
as the learners and carriers of ‘Japanese’ knowledge and practices. These 
learning and transferring opportunities and capability underpin the supplier’s 
capability to provide customerised services to a single leading client and to 
foster the particularistic relationship with the clients in a captive supply chain.   
4.2.3&Case&Summary&of&SoftwareNCo&
The historical legacy of Software-Co as a training agency has produced a 
distinctive group of highly trained and skilled software developers, which was 
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considered as the competitive advantage of Software-Co. Based on this, the 
company chose to become a captive suppliers of NRI and secured a stable 
and large business offers from NRI. This  particularistic relationship explains 
Software-Co’s commitment to Japanese practices, and the transfer of 
organisational practices and knowledge from Japan to the HQ.  Meanwhile, 
such long-term relationships also ensure that the on-site expatriates have 
opportunities to work with the Japanese companies and the Japanese 
employees, through which they can learn Japanese management and 
practices. This underlines the flows of knowledge and organisational practices 
carried and diffused by on-site expatriates from Japan to the Chinese HQ. 
Such a long-term and particularistic relationship with a single Japanese client 
has had both advantages and disadvantages. On the one hand, the 
particularistic relationship in a vertical network mainly controlled by the client 
has prevented the company from developing multiple clients. On the other 
hand, the long-term and trust based relationship enables the on-site 
expatriates to engage deeply in and be fully committed to Japanese 
management and practices. However, the supplier-client relationship is not 
static but evolving over time. As Ahmadjian & Lincoln (2001) argue, the 
process of standardisation transforms localised and tacit knowledge into 
shared and explicit knowledge which can be used by different customers and 
suppliers, and thus bilateral ties between buyers and suppliers lose value. In 
Software-Co, there are emerging signs (e.g. the separation of workplaces) 
that the established particularistic relationship is drifting towards a more 
market-oriented contracting, as the service is standardised and modularised. 
This informed the company’s recent strategic choice, to increase its own 
capability through close interaction with the client, build up mutual 
dependence with the client, and upgrade itself from a ‘captive supplier’ to a 
‘relational supplier’ (Gereffi et al., 2005).  
4.3&Summary&
This chapter has discussed how supply relationships have been evolved over 
time in both Data-Co and Software-Co and how their Japanese offices and 
expatriates are organised and managed under different supply chain 
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relationships. This chapter has found that the supply chain relationships have 
great impacts on the role of the Japanese offices and the management and 
experiences of the expatriates in Japan. 
Japanese office in a market-based chain appears to take an important role in 
marketing development, while the one in a captive supply chain pays more 
attention to the customer service and the training of expatriates.  
Likewise, the roles played by the on-site expatriates vary significantly in my 
two cases. On the one hand, the extent to which on-site expatriates are 
involve in Japanese companies and learn from Japanese practices is largely 
affected by the extent to which the Japanese companies are open to 
subcontractors. In a market-based supply chain, subcontractors are isolated 
from the Japanese companies, and this partly explains why expatriates do not 
engage in learning from Japanese management. In a captive supply chain, 
however, on-site expatriates have more opportunities to observe and engage 
in the Japanese workplaces. Because of this, expatriates from Data-Co 
merely focus on the completion of tasks with little intention of learning from 
Japanese management or practices. Meanwhile, there is no mechanism for 
reverse transfer from on-site expatriates to people in the HQ. In contrast, as 
an important part of Software-Co’s development strategy, on-site expatriates 
from Software-Co aim to immerse themselves into the Japanese companies 
and learn skills and practices there. Managers emphasise the importance of 
expatriates communicating and socialising with employees at Japanese 
companies in order to build trust between them. This is particularly the case 
when the client appears to distance itself from its suppliers. 
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Chapter&5&The&construction&of&operational&practices&at&Chinese&
workplaces:&Learning&from&Japan?&
In the preceding chapter, I have detailed how the supply chain relationships 
have been evolved over time in both companies and how these relationships 
shape the international operation of both companies, including the 
management of their Japanese offices and expatriates in Japan. My findings 
reveal a distinction in the patterns of supplier-client relationships between the 
two companies. While transactions between Data-Co and its Japanese clients 
are based on arm’s length contracting, Software-Co has developed a 
particularistic, long-term and trust-based relationship with a dominant client. 
Accordingly, the Japanese office in Data-Co aims to develop as many new 
clients as possible, while the one in Software-Co focuses on maintaining long-
term and close relationship with one client and providing employee training. 
Meanwhile, Software-Co’s expatriates’ length of expatriation and extent of 
involvement with Japanese companies far outstrip those of Data-Co’s 
expatriates. Being aware of the supply chain relationships between the supply 
firms and their Japanese clients as well as their international operations, it is 
appropriate to ask how and to what extent these activities have influenced the 
policies and practices at Chinese workplaces. Therefore, this and the 
following chapter discuss how managers in both companies construct the 
management systems that enable them to develop the Japanese market and 
meet the requirements of their Japanese clients. Specifically, this chapter 
focuses on the operational practices and the next chapter discusses the 
human resource (HR) policies and practices. 
As for the operational systems, people in both Data-Co and Software-Co 
claim that their operational practices are ‘learnt from Japan’. The top 
management in both companies explicitly declared that their operational 
system was ‘of Japanese characteristics’. Here, the term ‘learning from Japan’ 
raises a number of questions.  
1. Why are both companies keen on ‘learning from Japan’? Is it a direct or 
indirect requirement from the Japanese clients, who are the leading firms 
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in the supply chains? How do different supply chain relationships affect the 
process of ‘learning from Japan’ in both companies? 
2. What is meant by ‘learning from Japan’ in both companies? Does it mean 
that these companies have deliberately copied Japanese practices and 
policies and incorporated them in their operational systems in China? Or 
does it represent an ideological justification for an agenda of changes in 
the companies (e.g. Ackroyd, Burrell, Hughes, & Whitaker, 1988)? Or 
again, does it refer to the adoption of practices that are coercively required 
by the Japanese clients? 
3. What has been ‘learnt from Japan’? Have the companies learnt ‘a whole 
package’ of Japanese management techniques including its manufacturing 
methods, work organisation and personnel practices (e.g. Oliver & 
Wilkinson, 1992)? Or have they learnt in a selective manner and only 
‘cherry-picked’ certain elements of Japanese management (e.g. Geppert & 
Matten, 2006)?  Or have they, as Dedoussis (1995) suggested, learnt the 
peripheral practices from the small Japanese firms, rather than the core 
practices from the large Japanese firms?  
4. In what ways are the ‘learnt’ practices integrated with the operational 
systems in China? What adaptations have been made to the specific 
contexts in China?  
5. What are the consequences of ‘learning from Japan’? Has it provided 
efficiency and competitiveness as the companies expected? Has it 
generated worker commitment and involvement, and in general improved 
their work experiences at the workplaces, as the advocates of Japanese 
management opined (e.g. Macduffie, 1995; Womack, Jones, & Roos, 
1990)? Or has it even led to tight and oppressive workplaces which 
worsen the working conditions, as many case studies have shown (e.g. 
Delbridge, 1998; Fucini & Fucini, 1990; Turnbull, 1986, 1988)?  
To answer these questions, this chapter presents and discusses the 
operational systems at both Data-Co and Software-Co. It traces the formation 
and development of the main practices in each operational system, reveals 
how employees experience them and respond to them, and investigates their 
relationships with Japanese management. The findings reveal that these two 
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companies have been influenced by Japanese management in different ways, 
and thus developed two different models of operational systems.  
5.1&DataNCo&
While managers in Data-Co demonstrate that their operational practices are 
‘learnt’ from Japan, they also clarify that their Japanese clients have never 
directly asked them to ‘learn’ from Japan. In fact, several managers said that 
their relationships with the Japanese clients is arm’s length and the clients do 
not show much interest in how the daily operation is organised in supply firms 
and what practices are applied – ‘Japanese clients only care about the 
outcome of our products no matter what practices we are using’. In other 
words, the activity of ‘learning from Japan’ is not directly required by Japan.  
However, the requirements of Japanese clients on quality, price and delivery 
time of the final products do have indirect effects on Data-Co’s daily 
operational practices and its overall strategy of ‘learning from Japan’. These 
managers tend to claim that ‘Japanese’ practices are the ‘best practices’ that 
enable them to deliver good quality products in time as their Japanese clients 
require.   
From the perspective of Data-Co’s managers, Japanese management is 
discerned as having four aspects: an over-riding priority given to quality, a 
punctilious sense of discipline, constant pursuit of improvements, and a 
preventive system in information security. Accordingly, these represent the 
aspects that Data-Co has sought to learn from Japan. The following sections 
discuss these aspects in detail.  
5.1.1&Quality&management&&
Managers in Data-Co perceive that Japanese companies place a 
considerable emphasis on the significance of quality. Specifically, they 
perceive an emphasis on ‘checking and double checking’ in Japanese 
management and attribute Japanese companies’ success in quality 
management largely to their carefulness and patience in delivering a ‘perfect’ 
piece of work, rather a ‘complete’ piece of work.  
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In Data-Co, ‘quality’ refers to the accuracy of data input. The key principle is 
that every piece of work should be delivered on time at a very high level of 
accuracy. Quality is calculated through two indicators: the first-time accuracy, 
which refers to the number of items input correctly the first time, and the 
delivery accuracy, which refers to the accuracy rate of the final work after 
checks and corrections. First-time accuracy is recorded on each individual’s 
performance chart every day and is mainly used for internal evaluation, 
improvement and employee training. The delivery accuracy is based on the 
feedback from clients after delivery. One manager explained, ‘as long as the 
clients do not identify any mistake after delivery, we assume that the delivery 
accuracy for this project is 100%’.  
By looking into the operational system in Data-Co, it is found that the delivery 
accuracy and the first-time accuracy are managed through different 
approaches. While delivery accuracy is controlled by a standardised work 
procedure, first-time accuracy is primarily managed by a daily error reporting 
system in teams.  
Standardised)work)procedure)and)delivery)accuracy)
Delivery accuracy determines the level of customer satisfaction and hence the 
reputation and competitiveness of Data-Co in the Japanese market. Data-Co 
has been giving over-riding priority to delivery accuracy and its ambition has 
been to deliver work without any mistakes - that is, a delivery accuracy of 
100%. In 2010, the deliver accuracy reached 99.997%.  
Delivery accuracy is controlled through a work procedure, which is called 
‘double input and multiple checks’ system. Under this procedure, every piece 
of work needs to be input twice, once each by two separate operators, 
followed by a three-fold checking process which includes a check of 
consistency between the two inputs, a sample check, and a logic check. 
Mistakes identified during the consistency check and the sample check will be 
corrected immediately. If any problem is identified during the logic check, 
workers are likely to be asked to re-do the whole work. In addition, accuracy is 
also achieved through job deskilling. Before workers process data, each 
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scanned document is divided into separate images which contain only one 
sort of information such as address, name, telephone number and so on. This 
segmentation keeps workers inputting the same sort of information repetitively 
and hence less likely to make mistakes. 
Detailed job descriptions are set for each position in the organisational 
hierarchy (see the organisational chart in Chapter 3) according to this work 
procedure. Ordinary operators are responsible for undertaking all the inputting 
of data. The team leaders, section chiefs and project managers very rarely 
input data and are in charge of different stages of the ‘multiple checks’. The 
team leaders do consistency checks for all input and the section chiefs 
conduct an hourly sample check. The project managers do the logic check 
before the whole project is delivered.  
 
Figure!5.1:!Work!procedures!in!Data<Co!
Based on this procedure, the company has gained a reputation for quality 
among its employees and clients. Workers are impressed that the company 
sacrifices its potential profit for quality and see the company as an industrial 
model of quality management. As one newly hired worker reflected, ‘when I 
was told that my work would be input by another person and checked by 
several people before it was finally submitted, I had the feeling that the 
company does give priority to quality’. However, this procedure is a labour 
intensive approach, which relies heavily on the low cost of labour in China and 
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is largely based on repetitive checking and rectification. By paying a second 
worker to input the same piece of work and placing several ‘inspectors’ to 
check each input, the labour cost is increased greatly. This is in sharp 
contrast with the idea of total quality management (TQM), in which quality is 
‘built in’ to the production without adding extra cost to one product (Stephen & 
Wilkinson, 1995; Wilkinson, Godfrey, & Marchington, 1997). In other words, 
while the work procedure does guarantee a high level of delivery accuracy, 
this is achieved only at the price of relatively high labour costs and is far from 
efficient. As the BPO manager reflected: 
This [the ‘double input and multiple checks’ work procedure] is a 
straightforward approach. I mean, what can be more convincing than 
showing our clients this work procedure and telling them mistakes 
could hardly be missed under this procedure?…However, the cost of 
labour in China is getting higher and higher. I am afraid we will be 
unable to afford our labour force soon if we keep this procedure. (BPO 
manager, 14th June 2011 in Dalian) 
Apart from the inefficiency, there is another disadvantage associated with this 
work procedure. As many managers have recognised, the operators under 
this procedure appear to lack a sense of personal responsibility for quality 
because they are aware that their work is being input by someone else and 
will be checked by several quality inspectors. A senior manager pointed out 
this problem at one supervisory briefing: 
Employees are expected to take responsibility for quality and make 
sure every piece of work they submit is of high quality. But our 
operators [in Data-Co] rely too much on the inspectors and pay less 
attention to the accuracy of their own work. (4th July 2011 in Dalian)  
In dealing with this problem, managers have been making efforts to enhance 
the operators’ sense of responsibility for quality. It is in this light that first-time 
accuracy is emphasised. Through constant emphasis on the importance of 
first-time accuracy, operators who input data are made aware of their own 
responsibility to ensure the accuracy of their input and that they should not 
wait for the inspectors to discover their errors.  
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Error)reporting)system,)team)work)and)first8time)accuracy)
First-time accuracy is formally managed through an error recording and 
reporting system. Every operator has an individual chart on which is recorded 
by his/her team leaders every day his/her daily performance, such as the 
quantity of work and the number of errors. Since the team leaders are in 
charge of all consistency checks, they are expected to observe any mismatch 
during their work and identify the individual responsibility for each error. Once 
they have identified the operator who made the error, they will record this on 
this operator’s daily performance chart. In accordance with company policy, 
operators are given penalties for every single error they make. The amount of 
the penalty for each error is informed by the nature of the project, and it is 
usually set and announced by the project manager before the operators start 
working on the project. By the end of each month, the team leaders multiply 
the set penalties for each error by the total number of errors that have been 
recorded for each operator and work out the total amount of penalties for each 
operator. They then submit this result to the HR Department and the HR staff 
will subtract the penalties from each operator’s monthly pay (the pay system 
in Data-Co is discussed in detail in chapter 6). Clearly, this error reporting 
system allows for very specific information as to first-time accuracy to be 
recorded and monitored on a daily basis. Such high levels of surveillance and 
individual responsibility are also found at Japanese manufacturers, as 
reported by Delbridge (1998) and Sewell & Wilkinson (1992). In particular, by 
linking operators’ first-time accuracy with their monthly earning, and having 
the workers pay for their errors, this system aims to enforce the stringent 
standard of first-time accuracy and enhance individual responsibility for 
quality. 
In practice, the implementation of this system is not without an element of 
negotiation and condonement. As we have seen, the team leader plays a 
crucial role in recording the errors for each member of the team and in 
reporting this information to the HR department. However, throughout my 
interviews, the majority of the team leaders admitted that they played tricks in 
reporting errors. In most cases, the reported number of errors for each 
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operator was much smaller than the true number. In other words, these team 
leaders were preventing their team members from being punished, by 
concealing or reducing the number of errors they have made. Ironically, 
despite the top manager’s great efforts and emphasis on first-time accuracy, 
these team leaders justified their indulgence towards the operator’s errors on 
the basis that the errors identified from consistency checks would not cause 
any ‘serious consequences’ because the work had not at this stage been 
delivered to clients and was therefore still correctable. Based on this point of 
view, these team leaders showed empathy with their members: 
Workers are not robots. They get tired and make mistakes. It is all 
normal. I myself was an operator [before I became a team leader] and I 
know that the pay for operators is low. Lots of them are under great 
financial pressure, living in Dalian City. As long as their attitudes 
towards work are good, I prefer not to add more pressure.  (KPO 
project manager, 21st June 2011 in Dalian)  
In particular, some of the team leaders consider these tricks as their tactics to 
‘sustain a harmonious and reciprocal relationship with the operators’: 
Team members will feel grateful if I am a bit tolerant towards their 
mistakes. Then, when I am struggling with the delivery deadline, they 
will be more likely to work overtime for me. It is the spirit of teamwork 
and it is based on reciprocity, isn’t it? (Team leader, 13th June 2011 in 
Dalian) 
From the operators’ perspectives, they appeared to comment quite positively 
on the team leaders who were willing to cover up their errors, regarding them 
to be ‘caring, understanding and thoughtful’. Quite a few operators said that 
they worked hard because their team leaders were so nice to them that they 
did not want to let them down. These points of view endorsed the team 
leaders’ attempts to build up reciprocal relations through this form of 
indulgence. Nevertheless, the operators also pointed out that the extent to 
which they could be exempted from fines was always an issue with lots of 
uncertainties, depending on lots of factors such as whether the operators who 
made mistakes were considered by their team leaders to be hard working and 
diligent; whether their attitudes towards the mistakes was considered to be 
good; whether their relationship with the team leaders was close and so on. In 
particular, one operator stressed the importance of ‘feeling apologetic’: 
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One of my colleagues argued with our leader the other day, saying that 
he made the mistake because the original documents were not clear 
enough. What he said was true – a few others in his team made similar 
mistakes due to the vague documents. However, our team leader was 
irritated by his unapologetic attitude and sent him to the project 
manager. The others, who admitted their mistakes right away, were 
fine. Since then, I have realised that we should never argue with our 
team leaders when we make mistakes, we should admit them and ‘feel’ 
apologetic. Then the leaders might not report our mistakes. (13th June 
2011 in Dalian) 
The uncertainties perceived by the operators can be explained by Delbridge's 
(1998) argument. In his discussion of management indulgence at a Japanese-
owned plant in the UK, Delbridge noted that since the patterns of indulgence 
were not allowed to become institutionalised into the modus operandi, 
‘operators may not expect or assume this indulgence to be repeated and even 
those most sympathetic to their situation do not allow them to “take 
advantage”’(p. 185). In this sense, even though the team leaders expressed 
their willingness to grant ‘indulgence’, it was not able be used by the operators 
to secure any counter-control over the management. 
Apart from the error recording and reporting system, peer pressure, emerging 
from the team structure, appears to be effective in enhancing individual 
responsibility for quality and in ensuring an acceptable level of first-time 
accuracy. For example, when an operator falls behind or regularly makes 
mistakes, others in the team may suffer because they will be forced to correct 
those errors or even re-do the work. It is highly likely that, if lots of corrections 
are needed, the whole team will have to work overtime to keep up with the 
schedule. In this case, the member who has made errors will experience 
resentment from the others. Peer pressure was strongly felt during one 
morning briefing I attended. The team leader announced the best performer 
and the worst performer for the previous day in front of all the team members, 
including the number of items they had completed and the number of errors 
they had made. While she praised the best performer, she particularly said to 
the whole team that ‘Wei [the worst performer] dragged the whole team down 
yesterday and I hope it will not happen again today. We have a deadline to 
meet by the end of today and if anyone keeps making errors, we will have to 
work overtime this evening’. This put lots of pressure on the team members, 
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especially Wei. I saw him blush during the whole of the rest of the meeting. 
During the afternoon break, I visited this operating room again and found Wei 
still hard at work, without taking a rest. The team leader commented that the 
comparison made at the morning briefing was not meant to humiliate 
anybody, but to remind them of their team membership and tell them ‘not to 
be the one who holds the team back’.   
Overall, the management of the delivery accuracy is mainly achieved by a set 
of work procedures, which are inspired by the managers’ perception of 
Japanese management, and emphasises the importance of multiple checks. 
Although this work procedure is not borrowed from Japan, it does act as the 
‘functional equivalent’ (see Oliver & Wilkinson, 1992) to Japanese 
management, in the sense that they both serve to deliver high-quality 
products. As the managers realise that this work procedure is costly and 
unsustainable in the long run, they have started paying attention to ‘first-time 
accuracy’. According to Wilkinson, Marchington, Goodman, & Ackers' (1992) 
distinction between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ quality management, it appears that 
managers in Data-Co have been focusing on the ‘hard’ and quantified 
approaches, such as the work procedures and the error reporting system, 
whereas the ‘soft’ aspects are not formally considered. It was not until the end 
of my fieldwork that I heard the CEO Simon talk about ‘the consciousness of 
quality’, by reference to Japanese management at one managerial briefing: 
I have visited a few Japanese companies over the last few weeks and 
observed how Japanese employees work. I was touched by their 
carefulness, concentration and commitment. This has made me think 
about the secret behind quality management in Japan. You know, we 
have been trying to investigate how Japanese companies manage to 
deliver high-quality products all the time. I think ultimately high quality 
is achieved by the people who make the products, rather than the 
machines. I think Japanese employees have a consciousness of 
quality. They pursue quality, or you could say perfection, from their 
hearts, not because they are forced to… Of course we have a long way 
to go to achieve that, but it is something for us to keep working 
towards. (14th July 2011 in Dalian)  
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5.1.2&Workplace&discipline&
A punctilious sense of discipline is also perceived as a feature of Japanese 
management. In particular, the CEO stressed that ‘being disciplined is the key 
to the effective execution of any practice, policy and strategy’ and attempted 
to establish a rule-based workplace so that ‘workers’ behaviours can be 
regulated and monitored’.  
At the orientation for new employees, an ‘Employees’ Code of Conduct’ 
booklet was distributed to everyone. This booklet covered six aspects of 
workers’ day-to-day life including dress code, attendance, work attitude, 
reporting procedures, rewards and penalties, neatness of the work place. 
Detailed requirements were listed under each of these headings. One staff 
member in the HR department explained each rule to all the new employees 
at the orientation and stressed that ‘being disciplined is the fundamental 
requirement for employees’.  
The following excerpts from my field notes of a normal working day offer a 
snapshot of how discipline affects workers’ working lives: 
It was 8:15 in the morning on a normal working day and the early-
arrived workers have already lined up in front of the No. 1 BPO 
operating room, with their employee cards hung around their necks 
[Workers have to wear the employee card once they enter company 
premises]. They looked sleepy and some were gobbling their bread for 
breakfast before the door opened [No food is allowed in the operating 
rooms]. I was told that most workers, especially the ones who were not 
originally from Dalian, lived far away from the workplace due to the 
expensive rents in city areas. Thus, it usually took them about 2 hours 
to get to work by bus [Being late is financially punished]. Qiang, a 
young girl in the BPO department, described things as follows: ‘I get up 
at 5:30 every day and catch the early bus at 6:30am. If I am lucky 
enough to get a seat, I can catch a nap on the bus. I arrive at about 
8:15’.  At about 8:20am, the door opened. Workers clocked in at the 
punched-card machine in the entrance. Workers cleaned their desks 
and booted up the computers [getting ready to work before the start 
time]. At 8:30am, the bell for work to start rang followed by a morning 
briefing given by the team leaders [morning briefings are held every 
day and every team member must attend on time]. At 10am, the bell 
rang again to signal a 15-minute break during which workers could 
drink water, use the bathroom, chat with colleagues, talk on the 
telephone and so on. [Workers have to keep the operating room quiet 
and are not allowed to talk loudly during break.] After 15 minutes, the 
 
134 
bell rang again. Workers went back to their desks and started working 
again, until the bell for the midday break from 11:30 to 12:30. In the 
afternoon, there were two further 15-minute breaks, at 2pm and 4pm 
respectively. At about 5:15pm, the team leaders checked on work 
progress, and announced that there was no extra work needed, which 
meant workers could leave work on time at 5:30pm. In case of any 
overtime work, workers were allowed one hour for dinner before they 
started work at 6:30pm. The whole day’s work finished with a final ring 
of the bell. Workers tidied up their desks, turned off their computers, 
punched their cards to clock out and left work. [Tidy your desk before 
leaving and keep it tidy at all times]. (4th June 2011 in Dalian) 
As shown by the above excerpts, day-to-day work is arranged according to a 
bell-controlled timetable. Throughout the day, the bell rings a total of ten 
times, to notify workers of when to work, take a break and attend meetings, as 
shown below (Figure 5.2). Overtime is common, especially during the busy 
seasons. Although overtime is voluntary in principle, it is seen as a main 
indicator of one’s attitude to work. Workers who refuse to do overtime without 
good reason are seen as undisciplined and unmotivated, and they are likely to 
be low-rated in promotion assessment. In addition, they will be reported at the 
morning briefings and are likely to feel guilty under peer pressure. One worker 
who was so reported described her feelings, ‘my team members stared at me, 
as if that it was me who left more work for them, so that they had to work till 
late to make up for my laziness’.     
Time 8:30 10:00 10:15 11:30 12:30 14:00 14:15 16:00 17:15 17:30 
Activity work break work lunch 
break 
work break work break daily 
meeting 
leave 
work 
Figure!5.2:!The!bell<controlled!timetable!in!Data<Co!!
Team leaders work in the same operating rooms as their team members and 
monitor their behaviour closely. Operators are required to sit at their desks 
during working hours. They are not allowed to chat with each other and have 
to ask for permission if they need to leave. There is a story that one worker 
was found to have lied to her team leader, saying that she had diarrhoea, in 
order to be able to chat with friends on the telephone while in the toilet. Since 
then, the team leaders have became stricter about permitting workers to leave 
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during working hours. Team leaders walk around the operating rooms every 
half an hour and supervise each team member’s work. If inappropriate 
behaviour occurs, operators are pressured to change immediately. If the 
operators refuse to change, the attention of the section chiefs or project 
managers will be engaged.  
In relation to Japanese management, the attention to discipline in Data-Co is 
claimed to have been ‘learnt from Japan’. Workers are constantly told that 
Japanese workers are disciplined through a military approach and that this 
underlies Japanese companies’ success in efficiency and quality. By doing 
this, the enforcement of discipline in Data-Co is associated with and justified 
by the ‘best practices’ at Japanese companies. This reflects the ‘dominance 
effects’ discussed by Smith and his colleagues (Elger & Smith, 2005; Smith & 
Meiksins, 1995). One interviewee shared her story, 
I felt the rules were excessive when I joined the company. But my team 
leader said I should adapt myself to it. She said Japanese companies – 
well, perhaps all the companies in this industry – do the same in order 
to be productive and successful. It’s the norm of a competitive market. 
You know, if you do not follow it, you will be kicked out. It makes 
sense…I mean, I cannot expect the market to change for me. I have to 
get used to the system instead of complaining.  (4th June 2011 in 
Dalian) 
The enforcement of various rules and disciplines may result in a range of 
types of resistance among the operators. For example, the CEO Simon told 
me that after he took over the company, he decided to put punched-card 
machines at the entrance of each operating room and required employees to 
clock in and out every day. However, many operators felt that they were being 
distrusted and refused to get their cards punched. Simon said he insisted, and 
treated those who did not clock in as absent, no matter whether they had 
worked or not. In the end, about ten employees, including some senior ones, 
left the company voluntarily as a form of protest against the introduction of the 
punched-card machines, and it took several months for the rest of the 
employees to accept this practice. Even at time of my fieldwork, this story was 
still often mentioned by employees, serving as evidence of Simon’s tough 
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management style as well as his determination to enforce workplace 
disciplines.  
At times, managers make compromises. One example concerns the working 
timetable. According to company policy, workers are required to follow the 
timetable every day, even during the low seasons when they do not get much 
work from the Japanese clients. Given that the workers are primarily paid by 
the piece (the piece-rate system will be discussed in chapter 6), lots of them 
feel that it is unnecessary to keep to the timetable when they do not have any 
business to do. One team leader told me in detail about how she herself and 
her project manager handled the confrontation with their subordinates on this 
issue: 
One day, at the daily meeting, four of my team members asked for one 
day’s leave. They told me quite frankly that they just wanted to take a 
break because they had not been assigned much work for the following 
day. It was a common situation during the low seasons that workers did 
not have enough work to do. However, it could be no excuse for them 
to be absent, because company policy required them to keep to the 
timetable every working day. I explained the company policy to them, 
but they insisted on having a day’s leave. So I reported this to my 
section chief and the project manager. When the project manager 
came, one of these operators said that it was a waste of his time to 
spend four hours commuting when there was not much work to do. The 
others all echoed this, complaining that the timetable did not make 
sense during the low seasons. My project manager was very 
experienced, and she did not criticise them at all. Instead, she said that 
she understood their feelings, but the company policy was set by the 
top managers, so that she had no power to break with it. She then 
reviewed each individual’s performance charts, and selected one who 
had performed better than the others. She then made an exception, 
and gave this good performer one day’s leave. She particularly 
stressed that it was a reward for his hard-work, rather than a 
concession as regards company policy. She also promised the others 
that the same reward would be given to them as long as they achieved 
good performance. I felt that these workers were not really completely 
satisfied with this solution, but they did not argue any more. This case 
was settled.  
This team leader continued to reflect on this issue: 
After these workers left, my project manager gave me some 
suggestions as to how to deal with this kind of issue in the future. She 
told me that I could give them leave when appropriate during the low 
seasons. She said the situation in the low seasons was special, and I 
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needed to strike a balance between my team members’ morale and 
workplace discipline. She stressed that the bottom line was to ensure 
progress in the work, and only to give one person leave at a time.  With 
her permission, during the low seasons in the past two years, I have 
given one of my team members a day’s leave every week, and they 
took turns to take it. Good performers have priority. This approach has 
worked fine -- they do not ask for more. (7th July 2011 in Dalian) 
In fact, it was found during my fieldwork that many teams were using the 
same approach during the low seasons, with the tacit acceptance of the 
senior management. One team leader commented that ‘this is an approach 
that successfully combines discipline and humanity’. The operators, though 
they would have preferred more breaks, felt this to be acceptable.   
Resistance from employees may also result in an ‘indulgency pattern’ 
(Gouldner, 1954). In 2009, the managers introduced a ‘5S system’ into the 
workplace. 5S is based on the Japanese acronyms of seiri (tidiness), seiton 
(orderliness), seiso (cleanliness), seiketsu (standardisation) and shitsuke 
(discipline). It is detailed and engrained in Japan as a management practice 
which contributes to cost-effectiveness by maximising both efficiency and 
effectiveness (Gapp, Fisher, & Kobayashi, 2008; Liker, 2004). In particular, 
Data-Co carried out the 5S system in order to ‘suit Japanese clients’ tastes’ 
and ‘impress Japanese clients during their visits to the suppliers’ workplaces’. 
Chang, a middle manager in the BPO department explained that potential 
clients’ visits to potential suppliers’ workplaces were one of the most important 
procedures in their evaluation of the suppliers’ qualifications. Only those 
whose workplaces suit the clients’ tastes and satisfy them will be considered 
qualified suppliers. Chang pointed out that one ‘tip’ for impressing clients was 
to ‘make the company look like a Japanese one’. 5S, which is a visual control 
system, has been introduced to serve this purpose: 
When Japanese clients visit us, we want to give them the feeling that 
they are visiting a Japanese company -- nothing other than a Japanese 
company located in Dalian, China. People want to see something they 
are familiar with, and so do our clients…It is the nature of human 
beings, especially Japanese – they believe they are the best, so they 
will be pleased to find that we are imitating their practices and 
workplaces. (Telephone interview, 11th March 2011) 
 
138 
Based on this system, workers are required to comply with eleven rules 
concerning the tidiness and cleanness of the workplace. For example, chairs 
should be put in line. Employees should keep their working desks tidy and all 
irrelevant things (e.g. cups, plants, calendars) must be removed. Under no 
circumstances are mobile phones allowed to be put on working desks. 
Personal bags should be placed under the desks on the right hand side and 
so on. Not surprisingly, employees felt themselves to be coerced into 
following these rules and wondered what benefit they could get from this 
system. Lots of them described these rules as ‘ridiculous’ and ‘trivial’: 
For example, we are only allowed to put one pen and one piece of 
paper on the desks. But what if I need a staple? I have to put the 
stapler back once I finish using it. It does not make any sense to me. 
They [the managers] said it is for efficiency but I see the opposite. I am 
actually wasting my time in getting things and putting them back. (BPO 
worker, 15th June 2011 in Dalian) 
The above scepticism consequently led to some anti-5S activities attempting 
to ‘beat the system’ (Delbridge, 1998). I was told that there was once a 
warning scheme named ‘Yellow, Red and Black Card’ under which yellow, red 
and black cards were given respectively to employees who broke the rules 
once, twice and three times. Anyone who got a black card would be financially 
punished. This scheme infuriated many workers, especially those who got the 
black cards. Several employees, including some skilled team leaders, quit 
their jobs due to the punishment. At the same time, the implementation of the 
5S system in Data-Co started falling into the ‘indulgency pattern’ noted by 
Gouldner (1955). Team leaders turned a blind eye to their subordinates who 
broke the 5S rules but, in return, called for co-operation when clients paid 
visits to the work sites. This pattern is implicitly agreed by top managers, and 
they explained it as a compromise between the formal rules and the 
resistance from workers: 
We [suggesting it is an informal agreement among workers, team 
leaders and top managers] know it is almost impossible to carry out 
these rules. They [the workers] are young, in their early twenties. It is 
the nature of young people -- the more they are required to do 
something, the stronger they resist. If we push them too harsh, they will 
leave. Therefore, we try to be flexible in practice – we do not require 
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them to follow these rules every day, but at least they have to when the 
clients are visiting us. (Team leader, 16th June 2011 in Dalian) 
Under this indulgency pattern, the inspections, evaluations and controls of the 
5S activities are minimised, while the only responsibility of managers is to 
inform every team leader when clients are visiting, so that team leaders get 
enough time to organise the workplace as required by the ‘5S rules’. In other 
words, managers turn to connive at the breaking of rules by subordinates as 
long as the workers agreed to cooperate with them when clients were visiting. 
Furthermore, managers replaced the disciplinary sanctions by rewards to 
good performers. Under this new rule, ‘5S Stars’ were given to workers who 
complied with the 5S rules, and bonuses were given to those who had been 
granted a ‘5S Star’ at least three times within one year. In fact, this new ‘5S 
Star’ rule has become a benefit to the workers. Team leaders select ‘5S Stars’ 
in turn among team members with the purpose of getting as many members 
as possible rewarded by the end of the year. Eventually, this indulgency 
pattern helped the managers fulfil their goals of attracting clients without 
losing lots of workers. 
Overall, despite the well-established and rigid disciplines, the above 
discussion shows that there is still some space for informal negotiation and 
strategic coping between the workers and the management. The team leaders 
have initial responsibility for dealing with disciplining members and handling 
grievances, and this gives them some autonomy in management. However, 
the team-based organisation and decentralisation is strictly within an agenda 
set by management. Team leaders are required to report and check with their 
supervisors on a daily basis and they are certainly not involved in significant 
power sharing or higher level decision making. As revealed in the above 
examples, the changes that the team leaders made were all with the tacit 
acceptance of their senior managers. Senior managers controlled strictly the 
extent to which and the ways through which concessions were made to 
employees, so that customer satisfaction, efficiency and the general principle 
of ‘a disciplinary workplace’ would not be compromised. This finding can be 
explained by Edwards' (1986) argument about  ‘general control’ and ‘detailed 
control’. The management reduces its detailed control through empowerment, 
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to the team leaders in this case, with the aim of persuading the team leaders 
to use their creativity to overcome problems in the operation. The result is ‘to 
improve general control while reducing the employer’s detailed control’ (p.80). 
Under this form of ‘controlled empowerment’ and given the pyramid hierarchy 
in Data-Co, team leaders have very limited power to make substantial 
changes in workplaces. As one employee found: 
[When workers have problems or complaints], they can talk to the team 
leaders informally. There is no formal way to do this. But I feel team 
leaders can do nothing in terms of the management policies. It is all 
about hierarchy. I talked to my team leader, and she talked to her 
section leader, and then project managers… I guess probably our 
suggestions will never reach the top managers. Who knows? I do not 
even see our project manager much. (3rd June 2011 in Dalian) 
5.1.3&Continuous&improvement&
The philosophy of continuous improvement is epitomised in one of Data-Co’s 
central values, which is termed ‘growing together’ (alongside the value of 
‘creating’ and ‘sharing’). During Data-Co’s annual meeting in 2010, the 
president defined ‘growing’ as ‘a continuous process through which both the 
company and individuals make progress day by day’. He particularly stressed 
that ‘young people [workers in Data-Co] should never be satisfied with 
themselves and should always pursue better skills and productivity’.  
In the company’s daily operations, a large part of continuous improvement 
involves speeding up the amount of items that each worker can input per 
minute accurately. The personal assistant to the BPO manager told me that 
the input speed was 1.5 times than it was in 2006 (from approximately 30 
Japanese words per minute in 2006 to 45 per minute in 2010). This assistant 
suggested that the speeding up of input could be explained by two factors. 
First, software engineers in the IT department, along with the BU managers, 
have been improving the input method so that the inputting process is easier 
and faster. In 2002, Data-Co introduced an input method for typing in the 
Japanese language. This method enabled workers to type Japanese 
characters based on the characters’ structures (appearance), without needing 
to know their pronunciations and meanings. Since then, software engineers 
have worked on optimising this method, and have offered a variety of 
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updates, including intelligent correction, a Latin keyboard and so on. By the 
time of my fieldwork, managers in Data-Co were confident enough to claim 
that they had the most advanced input method in the BPO industry in China. 
Second, speeding up of the inputting is claimed to be achieved through 
intensive on-the-job exercises. ‘On-the-job exercises’ refers to extra tasks that 
are arranged for the workers beyond the work required by clients, with the aim 
of improving workers’ skill-levels. These exercises are most common during 
the low seasons when the workers do not have much business from 
Japanese clients, but they may be arranged whenever the managers think is 
necessary. The following are excerpts from the field notes that I recorded 
during one on-the-job exercise performed by one team at BPO: 
At 12:30, workers came back to work from lunch. There were 12 
workers (nine female and three male) in this team. The team leader Li 
told me that all of them had joined the company one year ago and were 
all in their early 20s. After everyone had sat down and was settled, the 
team leader stood up and said, ‘let’s start our work with some 
exercises. The tasks I have chosen today are from project X which we 
did a few months ago. This was our first project from Company X and 
lots of us found it difficult, mainly because it contained lots of Japanese 
characters. Today, I have selected four tasks for you to input. We will 
do them one by one. For each piece of work, you will be asked to input 
it first. I will record the time taken, and find out who is the fastest. Then 
we will do a consistency check to find out who has been the most 
accurate. At the end, the best performers will be proclaimed the 
winners for today.’ Workers chuckled and some of them looked quite 
excited.  
The first task involved typing one hundred serial numbers. Each of 
them contained 12 characters including both numbers and letters. After 
the team leader said ‘start’ and pressed the stopwatch, everyone typed 
quickly. After a few minutes, a female worker, Peng, raised her hand 
and announced: ‘I’ve finished’. Li nodded to her and said: ‘You are the 
first: six minutes and forty-five seconds’. In the next few minutes, all the 
others finished. Li recorded everyone’s time in her notebook, and 
announced the names and times of the worker in first place and the 
one in last place. Then, she displayed an accurate copy of the input on 
each one’s computer, and asked workers to exchange seats in a clock-
wise manner so that they could do consistency check for each other. 
For the next ten minutes, everyone stared at the screen and 
highlighted the errors. After the consistency check, they reported the 
results to Li, indicating whose work he/she had checked, how many 
errors had been found and whether the errors were in the numbers or 
in the letters. Li took notes and gave a summary of this exercise: ‘Well, 
we’ve got the results. In terms of the inputting speed, Peng is the 
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fastest. She finished in six minutes and forty-five seconds. That is 
impressive. However, she had 4 errors, all of them in the numbers. We 
have got three inputs without any errors, among which the one from Lai 
was done most quickly, in seven minutes and thirty seconds. Both 
Peng and Lai have done a good job but, unfortunately, the work of 
neither of you is perfect. I want to address again the fact that a perfect 
piece of work is one which is done both quickly and accurately. So 
there is still room for improvement. One of you has eight errors. This is 
unacceptable. I do not want to announce the name of this person, but I 
hope all of you can make progress in the next few exercises.’ 
The other three tasks involved typing Japanese characters, and they 
were organised in the same manner as the first one. The whole 
exercise session took about one hour and a half. The team leader Li 
summarised at the end, ‘I want to make two points from this exercise. 
First, the inputting of Japanese characters appears to be a weak point 
for all of you. Both speed and accuracy are unsatisfactory. Therefore, 
we will organise more exercises on this in the future. Meanwhile, you 
should practice by yourselves as well. You know, you can recite the 
input formula in your spare time, for example, while you are waiting for 
the bus. It takes up no time, but will definitely improve your skills. Bear 
in mind that there is no better way to improve than just to practice. 
Second, Peng did very well in this practice, although she made some 
mistakes in the first task. She keeps the record for the fastest input in 
the third and the fourth tasks and her accuracy rate is relatively good. I 
hope all of you learn from her and also challenge her. You should 
never feel satisfied, because there is always room for improvement.’ 
Following this exercise session, workers had a break.  
After the exercises, the team leader Li told me that this kind of exercise had 
two advantages. First, it ‘kept workers busy and disciplined’ during the low 
seasons, during which workers did not have much work from Japanese clients 
but were still required to keep to the work routine as usual. Li said that 
‘workers would have got bored and slacked off if we had not arranged such 
extra exercises’. Second, exercises ‘kept workers motivated’ and ‘made them 
realise the need for improvements’: 
These practices are usually organised in a form of competition, and 
everyone’s performance is recorded and compared with the others’. 
This gives them [workers] a good sense of their rankings among their 
peers. I sometimes set some challenging and difficult tasks for them so 
that they realise that there is always room for improvement and they 
should never be satisfied. (3rd June 2011 in Dalian) 
On the surface, both the ‘continuous improvement’ in Data-Co and the 
philosophy of ‘Kaizen’ practised in Japanese management ask employees to 
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continually find faster or more efficient ways of performing their jobs. 
However, while ‘Kaizen’ in Japan usually involves workers’ active participation 
in problem solving and decision making, and workers are encouraged to make 
suggestions through channels such as quality circles, suggestions’ schemes 
and so on (Kenney & Florida, 1993; Oliver & Wilkinson, 1992), ‘continuous 
improvement’ in Data-Co focuses exclusively on workers’ levels of skills and 
shows no attempts to harness employees’ intelligence with regards problem-
solving, innovation and improvements. This finding appears to reminiscent of 
how Japanese transplant adopted Kaizen in studies such as Delbridge (1998) 
and Dedoussis (1995).  During my fieldwork, only one team leader mentioned 
that he once encouraged his subordinates to make suggestions, but found out 
that most of the issues that his subordinates raised were relatively 
insignificant: 
Our workers are not experienced. The majority of them joined the 
company right after they graduated from school. Therefore, they are 
not capable of proposing valuable suggestions. I received a few 
suggestions, but none of them were practical. Since then, with these 
young operators, I have not bothered to get them involved in 
management. I prefer them to do what they are told. (1st July 2011 in 
Dalian) 
Beneath this approach of ‘continuous improvement’, there is scepticism 
among the operators, especially the older and more experienced ones. One 
interviewee said she came to the company to earn money rather than to 
practice. Another felt she was not being treated as an adult but more like a 
school pupil. Indeed, the workplace discipline, the bell-controlled schedule 
and the on-the-job exercises all remind workers of their school lives. They feel 
they are treated as school pupils whilst their team leaders act as their 
teachers. This teacher-pupil sentiment plays an important role in the 
management control of Data-Co, a point I will be back on in Chapter 6. Even 
some team leaders acknowledged that these forms of practices were more 
acceptable among young and new employees than the old ones. However, 
managers insisted on the importance of on-the-job exercises and stressed 
that workers would benefit from this practice because they could get better 
basic pay with a higher level of skills (the pay system will be discussed in 
chapter 6).  
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Overall, ‘continuous improvement’ in Data-Co has little to do with employee 
empowerment and participation. It is repackaged in Data-Co and reinterpreted 
as a philosophy that pushes the employees to improve their levels of skills. 
Instead of greater employee autonomy and discretion, ‘continuous 
improvement’ results in the intensification of work and increases surveillance.  
5.1.4&Information&security&management&&
Information security has been one of the most important aspects in 
outsourcing given the risks such as inappropriate access to or disclosure of 
sensitive information, loss of intellectual property protection and the inability of 
the outsourcer to live up to agreed service levels. Therefore, BPO companies 
in Dalian often face direct demands for security management from both their 
clients and information security certification programmes at international or 
domestic level.  
In Data-Co, apart from the specific requirements of each client, information 
security is regulated by two certification systems, the ISO27001 Information 
Security Management System, and the Personal Information Protection 
Assessment (PIPA). ISO27001 is a basic requirement for worldwide IT 
outsourcing companies. PIPA is the Chinese counterpart of a Japanese 
standard named the ‘PrivacyMark System’. Compared with ISO 27001, the 
PrivacyMark System puts more emphasis on the importance of personal 
information, and is considered more stringent than ISO27001.  
In practice, the operations department is in charge of both quality 
management and information security management. As for information 
security, the departmental manager, Jia, told me that his work was mainly 
about documents: 
To put it simple, my work is, firstly, to set up rules on information 
security as required in ISO27001 and PIPA, and, secondly, to modify 
the rules when any new potential danger is identified or when existing 
rules are out of date. We now have hundreds of rules on information 
security under 23 categories, and we keep updating these documents. 
(9th June 2011 in Dalian) 
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During my long talk with Jia and two other staff in his department, they talked 
a lot about how they identified the potential weaknesses in the security 
system and how they set about writing the new rules. However, none of them 
mentioned how hundreds of rules were carried out in practice. When I 
persisted in asking more about the implementation, they told me that some of 
the rules were technically controlled (e.g. access permission was controlled 
by each worker’s working card) and some of them were procedure-embedded 
(e.g. the segmentation of documents prevents personal information from 
being disclosed). Despite these points, they did not deny that there were lots 
of rules which were not fully carried out. For instance, it is listed as a rule that 
no one is allowed to move computers out of offices unless approval has been 
obtained from the operations department. Nevertheless, I noticed workers 
moving computers whenever needed between offices at their convenience. 
One informant explained that the rules were set up for inspection by clients, 
but workers could carry them out flexibly in order to pursue more efficiency. In 
other words, although a few rules are technically controlled or procedure-
embedded, the majority of them stay only at the level of the paperwork rather 
than implementation. All three employees working in the operations 
department are mainly responsible for writing and updating the rules 
according to the clients’ changing requirements, but little effort is made to 
enforce them in practice. At the same time, there is no internal inspection and 
evaluation within the company as to the implementation of the security rules. 
As Jia expressed it, ‘my work is all evaluated by my clients’: 
When the clients pay a visit, they will check our documents to see if 
they are complete. In this case, I am responsible for answering their 
questions by showing the relevant rules to them. Moreover, clients 
send us inquiry forms about our rules on information security. These 
are long lists of issues regarding information security, and we are 
asked to tick a box if our documents have covered each issue. If not, 
we need to explain the reason and state how we plan to put it straight. 
(9th June 2011 in Dalian) 
So, do the inspections by Japanese clients boost the enforcement of security 
rules in Data-Co? According to the interviews, the evaluations by Japanese 
clients are always based on taking things at face value. Japanese clients 
merely concern whether the suppliers have the qualifications and whether the 
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existing rules in paperwork have covered all the details, but pay little attention 
on how these rules are carried out in practice. Jia reflected: 
During the visits, they [Japanese clients] walk around the building and 
take a look at our operations rooms. They do not normally ask to enter 
the operations rooms. They just have a look through the windows. 
Frankly, the observations through these visits are superficial. They do 
sometimes ask us orally how certain rules are carried out, but they do 
not check in practice.  (9th June 2011 in Dalian) 
The above accounts show that whilst Japanese clients require an information 
security system to be in place, and stress the importance of security-related 
qualifications, their limited and superficial evaluations allow the suppliers to 
only loosely couple the formal rules with the actual daily work activities, 
especially when the institutionalised security rules conflict with the efficiency 
criteria of the company  (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). 
5.1.5&Case&summary&
While the Japanese clients do not directly involve in the daily operational 
process of Data-Co, their requirements on quality, cost, security and delivery 
time have indirect yet significant impacts on the development and 
implementation of the operational practices at Data-Co’s workplaces. Data-
Co’s focus on quality, workplace discipline, improvement and information 
security is largely informed by the Japanese clients’ concern in delivering high 
quality products in time at the lowest cost. Specifically, the quality of data 
input is secured by a ‘double input and multiple checks’ system, while the 
workplace discipline and continuous improvement aim to increase the 
workers’ productivity in data input. These practices improve the workers’ input 
speed, and thus enable the company to meet the delivery requirements with 
fewer workers and less labour cost. The information security certificates are 
obtained in response to the clients’ basic requirements in looking for 
suppliers, whereas it is implemented in a symbolic way to ensure is will not 
increase the operational cost significantly. In a nutshell, the whole operational 
system in Data-Co is developed and implemented in a way to enable the 
company to offer competitive price in the bidding market for new business and 
at the same time, to deliver products that meet the clients’ requirements on 
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quality and security. Under this system, management controls combine direct, 
bureaucratic, technical and performance-based controls. The technical design  
of the work procedures and the enforcement of workplace disciplines are the 
key parts of management control, and the fundamental elements for Data-Co 
to meet the Japanese clients’ demands. 
The management controls are underpinned by a team-based organisation of 
daily operations. However, teamwork in Data-Co does not result in greater 
flexibility and employee involvement as some influential management thinkers 
advocate (e.g. Drucker, 1988; Womack et al., 1990). Instead, echoing many 
critical studies (e.g. Sewell & Wilkinson, 1992; Webb, 1996), teamwork 
creates a situation where workers have very little autonomy. On average, 
fewer than ten workers are under the direct supervision of and close scrutiny 
by the team leaders. Their duties are clearly defined in their job descriptions, 
and it is not common for the staff who are in charge of data checking to help 
other team members with data input. There is no formal involvement of 
operators in management and problem-solving activities. Operators are 
expected to conform to prescribed standards and activities rather than actively 
participate and show discretion. Equally, teamwork promotes peer 
surveillance and control, which facilitates labour intensification and enables 
‘management by stress’ (see Parker & Slaughter, 1993). 
Team leaders have responsibility for operation-related tasks, and they are 
involved in dealing with operators’ grievances. Therefore, despite the tight 
management control through the work procedures and workplace disciplines, 
team leaders were able to offer some leeway to their team members through, 
for example, not reporting mistakes, in order to relieve their stress. However, 
as I have discussed, the internal hierarchy and bureaucracy limit the extent to 
which team leaders are empowered.  
In relation to Japanese management, except for the 5S system, it is found that 
most operational practices in Data-Co owe little to established Japanese ways 
of working, although some of them may act as functional equivalents to 
Japanese practices. The managerial focus on quality, discipline, security and 
improvement are inspired by or required by Japanese companies, but the 
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specific approaches by which these are managed do not represent a 
borrowed version from Japanese practices. In this sense, the emphasis on 
‘learning from Japan’ appears more significant as an ideological legitimation 
of the management systems, designed to serve the Japanese clients, than in 
providing a repertoire of practices that are borrowed from Japan. Similar 
findings are reported in the case study by Taylor, Elger, & Fairbrother (1994). 
This phenomenon can be explained by the argument made by Ackroyd et al. 
(1988). In their discussion of Japanisation of British industry, they have 
suggested a type of ‘Japanisation’ in which ‘organisations seek to use appeals 
regarding the superior efficiency of Japanese companies and methods of 
working as a way of legitimating the introduction of indigenous changes that 
are viewed as necessary or desirable to safeguard their own long term 
viability’ (p.18). 
Despite the absence of Japanese practices, many practices in Data-Co are 
labelled as ‘Japanese’ including the ‘double input and multiple check’ work 
procedure, the bell-controlled timetable and so on. Here, the rhetoric of being 
Japanese reflects the ‘dominance effects’ discussed by Smith and his 
colleagues (Smith & Meiksins, 1995). They argue that the uneven nature of 
economic development and economic power creates a leading society which 
is able to create ‘dominance effects’ and develop ‘best practices’ or global 
standards that invite emulation and interest from other societies. In Data-Co, 
Japan is assumed to be the leading society not only because of the success 
of leading Japanese companies such as Toyota, but is also related to its 
‘dominance’ position as the country of the clients in the commodity chain of 
the BPO industry, and its historical and economic ties with Dalian City (see 
details in Chapter 7). Therefore, practices that have been developed in Japan 
are accepted as ‘best practices’ which should be learnt. By labelling practices 
as ‘Japanese’, managers were able easily to link them with ‘best practices’ 
and thus justify their enforcement in Data-Co. This is evidenced by such 
discourses as: ‘the company is learning from best practice in Japan’ and ‘only 
companies which apply ‘best practice’ can survive in this market.  
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This symbolic form of ‘learning from Japan’ is closely associated with the 
arm’s length relationship between Data-Co and its Japanese clients. First, 
since most clients of Data-Co are from Japan, it is not surprising that the 
company claim an overall strategy of ‘learning from Japan’. Second, under a 
market-based supply chain, Japanese clients rarely get involved in the daily 
operation of the supply firms and show little interests in their practices. This 
gives the supply firms lots of autonomy to develop practices, that would best 
fulfil the requirements of the clients’ requirements on quality and deliver times 
and to compete in a market where price is the most important parameter, 
even though they are not ‘Japanese’. Third, because the arm’s length 
relationship offers few opportunity for the workers to learn the ‘real’ Japanese 
practices, they are easily convinced that what they are asked to follow at 
workplaces are the so called ‘Japanese best practices’. This allows the use of 
‘learning from Japan’ as a rhetoric in management control. 
5.2&SoftwareNCo&
Ever since the establishment of Software-Co, it has been believed within the 
company that practices learnt from Japan can increase the company’s 
competitiveness. It is also believed that the strategy of ‘learning from Japan’ is 
one essential reason for Software-Co to win and maintain its Japanese 
clients, which implies that Japanese clients may have more direct influence on 
Software-Co’s practices than on Data-Co’s. One vice general manager told 
me that the company wanted to learn from Japanese companies in all 
respects and ultimately ‘aimed to behave like a third-generation Chinese-
Japanese’. To be specific, Japanese management is perceived as having 
three important characteristics: a high level of quality management, 
continuous pursuit of improvements and a prudent attitude towards 
information security. On the surface, the perception of Japanese management 
within Software-Co is very similar to that within Data-Co, and both companies 
seem to put emphasis on quality management, continuous improvement and 
information security management in their initiatives to ‘learn from Japan’. 
However, as many studies have suggested, the interpretation, codification 
and management of any policy or practice are mediated and interact with the 
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home grown conditions and the existing practices in different organisations 
(e.g. Cole, 1989; Elger & Smith, 1994; Preece & Wood, 1995). As a result, 
similar initiatives in Data-Co and Software-Co might have distinctly different 
manifestations and could lead to dissimilar outcomes. In this section, I discuss 
how Software-Co manages quality and information security, and how it 
pursues continuous improvement.   
5.2.1&Quality&management&
Quality in Software-Co means meeting clients’ requirements, and the 
orientation of quality management is to satisfy clients. As I discussed in 
Chapter 4, Software-Co has been providing services to a single client (NRI) 
since the year 2000, under a captive supply chain relationship, and its long-
term strategy is to develop mutual dependence between itself and NRI. In this 
sense, to provide dedicated and customised services to NRI and to satisfy 
NRI is recognised as being of paramount importance.   
Operations in Software-Co involve two main processes: software design, 
which requires close liaison with clients, and software programming which 
involves monotonous coding and testing. Software design is conducted by 
software developers while programming is carried out by software 
programmers. Software developers and software programmers work together 
in task-based teams. The team leaders are all developers and they have the 
greatest responsibility for the operation. They are in charge of the work 
allocation, work pace, scheduling and monitoring quality. They are also 
involved in hiring and firing the team members and settling grievances. The 
span of control is always between twenty to thirty junior software developers 
and programmers under a team leader. The work procedure is described as a 
‘water flow’ which starts from software design and can only move to the phase 
of programming after the design stage has been completed.  
Given the different nature of their work, developers and programmers have 
different emphases in the pursuit of quality. For the developers, ‘high quality’ 
is understood as the best software design able to best meet the client’s 
requirements well and to improve the clients’ existing systems. In order to 
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achieve this, the developers are expected to arrange formal and informal 
meetings with their clients, communicate with them, assess their existing 
systems, conduct demand analysis of each workplace and develop a detailed 
design for each module involved in the tasks. The detailed design, in the form 
of a style book, will be assessed and approved by the clients before it is 
handed over to programmers for coding. During the process of software 
design, effective communication is considered to be the key. 
Misunderstanding, excess communication and lack of communication are all 
seen as wastes within the operation which should be avoided.  
Effective communication between the developers and their Japanese clients 
is guaranteed by two mechanisms. In the first place, all developers have had 
one year of training in the Japanese language and at least three years of on-
the-job training in Japan, during which they have developed their skills in 
communicating with the Japanese clients. In particular, under the supervision 
of the Japanese manager in the Japanese office  (see the details in Chapter 
4), the developers have been trained to understand the principles of, 
etiquettes concerning and tips as to how to deal with this kind of cross-
national communication, including how to write an email, how to make 
appointments with the Japanese clients, how to prepare the agenda for the 
meeting and so on. All these aspects are seen to have contributed to more 
effective communication between the developers and their Japanese clients. 
For example, developers are taught that the Japanese clients pay attention to 
process, and that it is very necessary for the developers to report to their 
clients on a daily basis, even if just briefly. One developer commented, ‘in our 
culture, we normally do not report to our supervisors so intensively unless 
necessary. However, it is a fundamental principle when we communicate with 
our Japanese clients. In addition, in the interviews developers said that their 
lengthy training in Japan had helped them to get used to the communication 
style of their Japanese clients, so that they could glean the clients’ true 
intentions and requirements in the first place. One developer gave an 
example: 
I feel that our Japanese clients do not tend to express themselves 
straightforwardly…For instance, they do not give straightforward 
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feedback. They do not say directly that something ‘is bad’. They just 
imply it. This is not a problem for the local Japanese, but it is not easy 
for foreigners like us. Likewise, if they want something, they do not tell 
you. For example, if they want some water, they will not ask you 
directly to fetch some water. Instead, they say ‘it is too hot’ and if you 
are ‘Japanised’ enough, you should know that they are not really 
talking about the weather, they actually want some water. (20th 
December 2011 in Tokyo) 
In the second place, apart from their expertise in software design, developers 
are required to be familiar with the clients’ industries, work procedures and 
existing systems so that the services they provide can be very much 
‘customised’. For example, since the Japanese client NRI is in the financial 
sector, the developers are encouraged to take college courses in finance for 
which the company pays the tuition fees. Moreover, the experienced 
developers give regular training sessions to the junior developers and help 
them to understand the work procedures and the existing systems in NRI. 
Based on about 15 years of experiences in serving a single client, Software-
Co is very proud to claim that it stands out among all the suppliers of NRI in 
China and is able to provide the best customised services to NRI. 
In fact, given the extensive training offered to the developers and their deep 
involvement in Japanese companies, high-quality and customised design 
have always been the competitive advantages of Software-Co. Developers 
are often considered to be a group of people who are experienced, hard-
working, reliable, highly committed and capable of accomplishing predictable 
results. In day-to-day operations, developers are given plenty of discretion to 
exercise their own judgement in actual implementation and they are 
responsible for the quality of their own designs. This is partly because of the 
intangible and interactive nature of their tasks, and partly due to the trust that 
has been built up through the training they have received. The team leaders 
and the project managers work as facilitators rather than as monitors, 
encouraging participation and the delegation of responsibility and 
accountability. In consequence, the work discipline among developers is 
generally experienced as loose and flexible, as one developer described it: 
Management of developers is ‘result-oriented’. Team leaders assign 
tasks to us and give us a deadline. Then we set up our own schedule 
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and just make sure it is done before the deadline. Team leaders do not 
supervise or monitor us unless there is a problem. We have lots of 
autonomy. (13th January 2012 in Shanghai) 
Once the software design is settled, programmers start converting the design 
into lines of code and conducting tests. For programmers, high-quality work 
means that the codes are in complete accordance with the design and are 
accurate. In particular, high accuracy is achieved through a threefold process 
of code testing including unit tests, integration tests and system tests. Unit 
tests aim to test the function of each unit of code while integration tests 
combine specific units of code and validate the whole against expected 
results. A system test is conducted at the end, in which all units of codes are 
integrated into a whole in accordance with the style book and system design. 
One senior programmer calculated that 70% of his working time was spent on 
testing while less than 30% was spent on coding. 
Unlike the developers who enjoy considerable autonomy during their work, 
programmer’s work is tightly specified and monitored, particularly through the 
requirement to follow the manual strictly. The manual is a minutely prescribed 
guide book on how to test each piece of code. It includes a list of items which 
need to be tested as well as detailed instructions on how to test each item. 
Sticking to the manual requires programmers to conduct tests according to 
the manual one by one even if there are potential problems or weaknesses 
with this. As one programmers said, ‘the manual is the “Bible” which should 
not be questioned or challenged’.  
In practice, programmers need to submit a testing sheet after each test, the 
design of which is completely specified in the manuals. For each item, they 
need to tick a box to confirm that it has been tested and also fill in the 
expected and actual results. If there are differences between the two, they 
should explain the reason, the potential risks and the possible solution. The 
quality of the test reports is evaluated by the team leaders and forms an 
important aspect in each programmer’s performance assessment. In contrast 
with the developers’ work which requires high levels of technical and 
interpersonal skills, programmers’ work is usually experienced to be repetitive, 
monotonous and formalised. In this sense, many programmers described 
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themselves as ‘IT coolies’ who are dealing with low-skill work in the IT 
industry and lack core competencies in the labour market.  
From the managers’ perspective, sticking to the manuals is an easy and 
straightforward approach for the purposes of quality control. Zhuang is a 
project manager who has been in Japan as a programmer for years, and he 
described how his attitude towards the manual had changed after he took 
various managerial positions: 
When I was in Japan, I found it was very boring to stick to the manual. 
However, when I become a team leader, I realised the advantages of 
this principle. It saves me from worrying. I believe that as long as all my 
subordinates follow the instructions, there will not be any big mistakes. 
It is a big relief for me. If there is a mistake, I can simply check their 
[the programmers’] testing sheets step by step and look for deviations. 
If they follow the manual step by step but a mistake still occurs, then it 
is not my fault, it’s the manuals’… The most sensible way for me to 
control the quality of their work is to make sure it is all strictly based on 
the manual. In terms of risk, this is the least risky way. (6th December 
2011 in Tokyo) 
During the tests, the developers get involved whenever problems occur. It is 
at this stage that the programmers and the developers work together in teams 
to assess the problems, adjust the design or code, and solve the problems. I 
was told that it was very rare to have ‘right first time’ production in software 
design and programming, hence the importance of this phase of adjustment. 
Although the programmers and the developers have complementary expertise 
and both contribute to the team’s performance, a sense of team spirit is not 
felt by many of the programmers. These programmers feel that they are 
subordinated to the developers and that the developers tend to give them 
‘commands’ rather than cooperate with them as fellow team members. This 
perception may be explained by four things. First, in terms of work 
procedures, the code must be in complete accordance with the software 
design. In case of any changes, the design must be changed prior to any 
change in the code. In this sense, programmers are not entitled to make 
independent decisions on the adjustment of any work. All action has to be 
approved or instructed by the developers. Second, since high-skilled and 
experienced developers are considered valuable, core assets of the company, 
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and the company has invested a large amount of money in training 
developers (details of the training programme will be discussed in Chapter 6), 
they have a strong sense of superiority, which in turn gives programmers a 
feeling of inferiority. Third, in the organisational hierarchy, all the managerial 
positions, ranging from team leaders to general managers, are occupied by 
developers. In other words, programmers are always subordinated to 
developers. This strengthens their feelings of subordination when doing 
‘teamwork’ (details of promotion will be discussed in Chapter 6). Fourth, job 
rotation between teams is very common for programmers. One programmer 
told that he changed teams every two months because ‘for each project, a 
large amount of programmers are needed in the phases of unit and integrated 
testing while only a few are needed during design and system testing’. 
Therefore, the majority of programmers only get involved in any given project 
at a certain phase and then move on to another. This frequent job rotation 
offers limited chances for the programmers to build close and stable 
relationships with their fellow team members or to get engaged in the teams.  
Given the above facts, there have always been tensions between 
programmers and developers. The general manager told me that the 
programmer-developer relationship had at one time been hostile, because 
some developers had considered programmers inferior to them, and so had 
behaved ‘arrogantly and bossily’ to programmers. Such tensions impose 
stresses upon quality management and teamwork. For example, 
programmers sometimes refuse to take overtime even when their teams are 
working to a very tight deadline. This is a relatively safe method of protest 
because programmers have, in principle, the right to refuse overtime work. In 
some cases, programmers express their resentment of developers by 
deliberately being unhelpful, as one experienced developer told me: 
Not all design is achievable in terms of the technical coding, so when 
there is problem, developers and programmers should work together 
and come up with a solution which is feasible in terms of both design 
and coding. This is the ideal scenario, of course. However, some 
programmers refuse to give input when needed. They simply tell the 
developers ‘I don’t know’ and leave all the work to the developers. This 
can put the developers in a very helpless situation. (24th February 2012 
in Shanghai) 
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Realising the potential problems that can be caused by developer-
programmer tensions, it appears that developers are trying to improve their 
relationships with the programmers. During my fieldwork, developers had 
been emphasising that they partner with the programmers, and stressing that 
there was no discrimination: 
The only difference between us is the speciality. They [programmers] 
are responsible for coding and we [developers] are doing design. We 
depend on each other – I cannot deliver work without coding and they 
do not know about design either. That is why we have to work together. 
Some developers think that we are superior to programmers and I think 
that is nonsense. We are partners in a team! (21st February 2012 in 
Shanghai) 
Although this discourse of ‘partnership’ was welcomed by the programmers 
and could potentially alleviate the programmers’ resentment of the 
developers, managers did not deny that the estrangement between 
developers and programmers was a systematic and historical problem, which 
would be almost impossible to eradicate. More details about the developer-
programmer relationship will be discussed in the next chapter.  
In sum, Software-Co has developed two different approaches to managing 
quality among the developers and the programmers respectively. While 
quality management of developers is mainly achieved through ‘soft’ 
approaches such as employee training and giving great employee discretion 
and autonomy, the management of programmers focuses on the ‘hard’ 
aspects including establishing multiple checking processes and setting up 
strict manuals. To a large extent, quality management in Software-Co, both 
the ‘hard’ and the ‘soft’ aspects, reflect some characteristics of Japanese 
ways of TQM identified by Wilkinson et al. (1997, 1992). For example, the 
great efforts made to best meet the clients’ requirements resonate with the 
fundamental principle of ‘customer orientation’ in TQM. The rigid ‘water-flow’ 
procedure and the emphasis on manual are consistent with the principle of 
‘process orientation’. However, the segmentation of the labour force and the 
divergent management approaches create tensions between the 
programmers and the developers, especially in teamwork, and cause risks for 
the team in terms of meeting the quality standard. Many programmers do not 
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describe themselves as working ‘in a team’. In this sense, the ‘teamwork’, 
which is considered as an essential component in Japanese quality 
management, appears to be problematic in Software-Co.   
5.2.2&Continuous&improvement&
Continuous improvement (Kaizen) is emphasised in Software-Co, especially 
so after the company set itself the long-term strategy of moving up the value 
chain and developing mutual interdependence between itself and the client 
(see details in Chapter 4). During my fieldwork, a Kaizen-oriented suggestion 
system was proposed, using a knowledge sharing programme. This 
programme aims to accumulate knowledge and suggestions through workers’ 
sharing, and ultimately to improve the capabilities of both the developers and 
the company in dealing with complex systems. This programme is threefold. 
Firstly, team leaders get together once a month to share about their recent 
projects with each other, especially in terms of procedural know-how. The 
purpose is to accumulate knowledge and understand the connections 
between different projects. Secondly, project managers are responsible for 
integrating knowledge from different teams and making it visible through 
‘knowledge maps’. This enables people to easily locate either the knowledge 
or the individuals who have the needed knowledge. Thirdly, team leaders are 
encouraged to seek constructive suggestions from their team members and to 
share them in the meetings. The vice project manager who proposed this 
programme told me that knowledge sharing was not new among developers 
and the aim of this programme was to formalise and integrate it into the formal 
managerial system: 
Lots of knowledge sharing among developers happens during dinners, 
parties and outings…in informal conversations, I mean. This program 
attempts to formalise and take a further step toward visualising them, 
to converting individual experience to systematic knowledge that can 
be used by other young developers…(7th February 2012 in Shanghai) 
Indeed, although not formally committed to the banner headline of ‘quality 
circle’, it has become the convention for the developers to get together during 
their spare time and discuss how to improve their work. When I was in Japan 
and lived in the same building as a group of developers, I often heard that 
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someone had knocked at the others’ doors in the evening and called for a 
meeting because he/she was having problems and was seeking suggestions. 
Meanwhile, since these developers worked closely with the other managerial 
staff such as the project managers and the department managers, it was not a 
problem for them to pass their suggestions on to the senior managers. The 
general manager also admitted that ‘junior developers sometimes have more 
creative thoughts than us [senior developers] so lots of their advice has been 
adopted’.  
At the individual level, Hansei is implemented among the developers. Hansei, 
roughly translated as reflection, is considered a practical tool for improvement 
as well as a philosophical belief embedded in Japanese culture (Liker, 2004). 
It requires individuals to be open to negative feedback, to voluntarily take 
personal responsibility and feel deep regret, and to commit to a specific 
course of action to improve. Hansei in Software-Co contains two practices. 
The first practice concerns mistakes. Developers are required to write a report 
whenever a mistake occurs and to investigate its causes as well as to come 
up with countermeasures. The second involves a hansei-kai (reflection 
meeting) after the completion of each project. Each attendant summarises 
his/her work in the project and discusses what can be improved in the future. 
The general manager told me that they had had a long tradition of doing 
Hansei, since they had been trained in Japan, and he felt it was natural to 
keep up this tradition in China: 
Shinba-san [former manager of the Japanese office] taught me to write 
a mistake report during my first week in Japan. I still remember how he 
corrected my report word by word…It is such a valuable learning 
experience. I believe most developers here have the same experience. 
To be honest, we did not even try to introduce this practice to China 
intentionally; every developer just keeps doing what they did in Japan. 
It’s kind of a natural process. (19 January 2012 in Shanghai) 
While the above reflection suggests that the Hansei practice, originally from 
Japan, has been internalised among developers, it has not been imported 
unchanged. One interviewee pointed out that Hansei in China was less harsh 
than in Japan: 
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Hansei in Japan mainly focuses on the negative things, talking about 
the weaknesses, disadvantages, things that need to be improved, and 
mistakes. They do not say much about success and achievement. 
They want people to feel sorry and shamed. In China, we do not 
criticise as harshly as in Japan. We talk about both negative and 
positive things. Good things should be pointed out and kept too. We 
make it clear that the purpose of the meeting is not to blame, but to 
learn from experience and from our mistakes. Japan has culture of 
‘shame’ but China has a culture of ‘face’. So when Hansei-Kai is held 
among Chinese people, some small changes are necessary. (19 
January 2012 in Shanghai) 
While all the above practices follow the philosophy of Kaizen, it is observed 
that all of them are carried out only among the developers, whereas the 
programmers are basically excluded. Just like in Data-Co, managers show no 
interest in utilising the intelligence of the programmers. This is partly due to 
the high turnover among programmers, and partly reflects the programmers’ 
absence of training and involvement in Japan. A project manager, Zhuang, 
gave a gloss, 
I would like to encourage them [programmers] to give suggestions, but 
I find out that they cannot. They have not been trained like us [the 
developers], they lack experience and they do not understand clients 
well enough…Some of them did provide some suggestions before, but 
I did not find them feasible. In fact, most of their suggestions showed 
that they had not fully understood the work. Experience counts in this 
industry. Suggestions can hardly be constructive without long-time 
experience. So I do not bother to ask them to improve now. As long as 
they can follow the manual, everything will be fine. (6th December 2011 
in Tokyo) 
In general, it appears that the philosophy of ‘continuous improvement’ is 
successfully disseminated and accepted among the developers. Developers 
participate in a variety of improvement activities formally and informally, and 
they have a strong sense of responsibility for the improvement at both the 
individual and the company level. There is no assessment or posting of each 
employee’s suggestion rate, so unlike some researchers’ arguments that 
quality circles may become a burden to many workers (Briggs, 1988; Kamata, 
1983), the developers did not report much stress associated with the practices 
of ‘continuous improvement’. 
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The relatively smooth and easy adoption of ‘Japanese’ practices into Chinese 
workplaces among developers is closely associated with their high 
commitment and deep involvement in Japan (see Chapter 4). As Ezzamel, 
Willmott, & Worthington (2001) argue, management practice may be pursued 
not because managers have engaged in economically rational calculation, but 
also because managers have ‘invested in, and become wedded to a particular 
ideology or recipe of management practice’ (p. 1056). In this regard, the 
developers’ commitment to Japanese practices may be influenced by the 
extent to which they have been involved in Japanese companies and 
interacted with Japanese colleagues. Many developers claimed that they were 
just working in the same way as they had observed and learnt when in Japan, 
without considering the origin of these practices. As I discussed in the 
preceding chapter, the more recently recruited developers, particularly the 
ones who started after 2008, are distanced from their Japanese colleagues, 
so that they have limited access to and interaction with the Japanese 
employees. These developers are less likely to be committed to Japanese 
practices, as evidenced by interviews with two of them. Neither of them felt as 
impressed with Japanese Kaizen and Hansei practices as the earlier 
developers were. The only example they mentioned was that they had to write 
a report when they made a mistake but they thought ‘it was going through the 
motions’: 
It is the rule that we submit a report about any mistakes. To be honest, 
I don’t really know how it relates to improvement – nothing happens to 
me after I submit the report. Maybe they read it and make some 
changes to the procedure for the future?  (7th December, 2011 in 
Tokyo) 
Equally, as I mentioned in Chapter 4, the adoption of Japanese practices 
among the developers can be read as a way in which they secure or enhance 
their self-identities within the organisation, and demonstrate they are a 
member of the ‘corporate elite’. The developers are regarded as a special 
group who have opportunities to be trained in Japanese companies and thus 
have intimate knowledge of Japanese practices and management. 
Demonstrating their direct knowledge of Japanese management and applying 
Japanese practices in the HQ enable them to distinguish themselves from 
 
161 
other groups of employees (e.g. software programmers) and confirm 
themselves as being ‘specialists in serving Japanese clients’. Indeed, lots of 
developers in the interviews confirmed that ‘developers who refuse to learn 
Japanese practices do not fit into the company’ and one vice general 
manager stressed that developers were considered the ‘most valued asset’ of 
the company not because of their skills but primarily due to their capabilities in 
internalising Japanese practices and behaving like the Japanese.  
5.2.3&Security&management&
As in Data-Co, the actual implementation of security practices is decoupled 
from the formal rules. Security management is the responsibility of the 
research and development department (R&D) which pays most attention to 
developing new software programs and improving the existing system. I was 
told that security management became one of the job responsibilities of the 
R&D department because this department was once involved in the 
application for the ISO27001 security certification, but it was not their main job 
anymore. When the department manager talked about his current task on 
security management, he said ‘to say what clients want to hear and to show 
them what they want to see’: 
Clients’ requirements are clearly shown on the ISO27001 certificate. 
We have passed the qualification, so we certainly have all the rules 
written down. That’s enough. Clients are not going into the workplaces 
and seeing how you carry out each rule; they just look at the certificate 
and check whether you have rules. (17th February 2012 in Shanghai) 
Managers were quite honest that the implementation of security management 
is more written than done, and they indicated the difficulties in carrying out the 
rules: 
It is impossible to carry them out one by one. For example, there is a 
rule saying that the screensaver should be activated if the computer is 
not in use for more than 3 minutes. We did tell all employees to set 
their computer according to this rule, but how can I know whether they 
do it or not? Obviously, I cannot monitor them every minute. (17th 
February 2012 in Shanghai) 
Interestingly, although managers admit that they do not pay much attention to 
carrying out security rules, programmers complain that their work is 
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conducted under too many security restrictions.  They are not allowed to use 
the internet during work; they are forbidden to use removable data storage 
drives; they cannot take their computers with them when they move to 
another team; they are given lower authority to access information than 
developers, etc. Managers tend to tell programmers that these rules are 
carried out based on Japanese clients’ requirements but programmers are not 
convinced. The following post was posted by an ex-programmer in an on-line 
forum run by a third party: 
If it is the requirement of clients, why don’t developers follow them? 
Why can they [developers] play online games, surf on the internet, 
exchange flash drives and so on while we are banned from everything? 
Security is an excuse! They [managers] keep us from getting the 
information, data and source code because they do not trust us. 
(Accessed on 25th March 2012) 
In general, security management appears to be strict for programmers but 
relaxed for developers. This again reflects the peripheral status of 
programmers. The security rules for programmers attempt to insulate them 
from company-specific knowledge, and marginalise the potential risk arising 
from the high turnover of the programmers.  
5.2.4&Case&summary&
The operational system in Software-Co is developed and implemented 
according to its dominant client’s requirements. Unlike the clients of Data-Co, 
who take an arm’s length approach in regulating their supply firms, the one of 
Software-Co exerts much stronger and more direct influence on the 
operational practices at Software-Co’s workplaces. The client’s preference of 
‘learning from Japan’ underpins Software-Co’s determination in ‘learning from 
Japan’ and transfer the ‘Japanese practices’ they learn from Japan back to 
the Chinese workplaces. As Software-Co’s managers suggest, ‘learning from 
Japan’ is an crucial criteria for Japanese clients in choosing supply firms. 
Through the expatriates’ close and lengthy involvement in the clients’ 
workplace and the training programme, the Japanese client manage to 
regulate the operational procedures and practices at Software-Co’s Chinese 
workplace. Meanwhile, the customerised services required in a captive value 
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chain underlie Software-Co’s emphasis on ‘Hansei’ and continuous 
improvement. Comparing to the continuous improvement in Data-Co, the one 
in Software-Co is more focusing on increasing the capability in providing 
customised service than increasing productivity and speed. These procedures 
and practices ensure the quality of services provided by Software-Co.  
Apart from the quality and the customised service, Software-Co also needs to 
meet the cost requirements so that to survive in the outsourcing market. It is 
in this sense that a core-periphery model, in which Software developers (as 
the core employees) and the programmers (as the periphery employees) are 
managed in contrasting ways is applied. The low cost and flexibility 
associated with the using of programmers allows Software-Co to invest in a 
group of core software developers, who are mainly responsible to deliver 
high-quality and customised service that are required by the dominant client.  
This kind of segmentation is manifested in a few ways. First, developers are 
greatly empowered in day-to-day operation while programmers are closely 
monitored. Accordingly, high-quality software design largely depends on the 
developers’ commitment, responsibility and expertise in their tasks with a 
particular emphasis on customer orientation, whereas the quality of 
programming is mainly a result of coercive and multiple testing processes 
based on the manuals. Second, developers are actively involved in 
management improvements through schemes such as Hansei and Kaizen, 
from which developers are excluded. While the developers are encouraged to 
put forward suggestions, programmers are only required to conform to the 
existing systems and reduce the variability. Third, while the developers 
perceive trust and a sense of camaraderie with their supervisors and 
colleagues, programmers feel they are distrusted and marginalised, as shown 
above in their comments about the security system.  
The core-peripheral segmentation inevitably creates inequality and thus 
causes problems in teamwork. On the one hand, the developers tend to have 
a sense of superiority over the programmers, thus leading them to behave 
inappropriately to the programmers. On the other hand, the programmers feel 
that they are ‘discriminated against’, and thus are not motivated to commit to 
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and contribute to the teams. This tense relationship has become the weak link 
in the quality management in Software-Co. The developer-programmer 
relationship and its consequences will be explored in more detail in the next 
chapter. 
In relation to Japanese management, ‘learning from Japan’ in Software-Co, 
particularly among the developers, in general reveals a process of reverse 
diffusion through which Japanese practices are diffused from the Japanese 
workplaces and the expatriates to the Chinese workplace. In the first place, 
the formalised training system ensures the regular movement of personnel 
across borders and provides a person-based mechanism through which 
Japanese practices can be diffused and implemented in the Chinese 
workplaces. This, to some extent, relates to the developers’ self-identity within 
the company, especially when compared with the software programmers. 
5.3&Summary&
The point of departure of this chapter is that people in both Data-Co and 
Software-Co claim their operational systems to be ‘Japanese’. Intrigued by the 
notion of ‘learning from Japan’ in evidence in both companies, this chapter 
has investigated the operational systems of both companies, particularly in 
relation to ‘Japanese’ management. The findings provide a clear picture in 
response to the questions raised at the beginning of this chapter.  
Why)are)the)companies)keen)on)‘learning)from)Japan’?)
In appearance, it seems that Data-Co and Software-Co ‘learn from Japan’ 
because their clients are from Japan. However, detailed case study finds that 
Japanese clients under different types of supply chains drive the strategy and 
activities of ‘learning from Japan’ in different ways. In a market-based value 
chain, Japanese clients keep a arm’s length relationship with the supply firms 
and focus primarily on the price in the market. In this case, Japanese clients 
rarely get involved in the daily operation of the supply firms and show little 
interests in the policies and practices in their supply firms. In other words, 
Japanese clients do not have direct impact on the overall strategy of ‘learning 
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from Japan’. Despite of this, Japanese clients’ requirements on quality and 
delivery time of the products do push Data-Co to find out the most efficient 
ways to deliver high-quality products in a most cost-efficient way. These 
practices thus feature a ‘double input and multiple checks’ quality system, a 
emphasis on workplace discipline and the implementation of on-the-site 
exercises. These practices are sold to the workers in a label of ‘Japanese 
best practices’, although they carry few characteristics of the typical 
‘Japanese’ operational practices. Overall, in Data-Co, while Japanese clients 
do not directly require the company to ‘learn from Japan’, their requirements 
indirectly shape the practices using in Data-Co and a rhetoric of ‘learning from 
Japan’ is used to justify the existing management system and to control 
employees.   
In a captive value chain where the Japanese clients exert more influence on 
the supply firms’ management system, Software-Co’s overall strategy of 
‘learning from Japan’ represents a direct response to its client’s preference of 
‘learning from Japan’ by supply firms. Since customerised service is the key in 
a captive value chain, quality management and continuous improvement on 
quality become the essential elements for Software-Co to maintain its long-
term and close relationships with the client and to upgrade along the value 
chain in the long run.  
In general, it is oversimplifying to assume that ‘learning from Japan’ in both 
companies is completely driven by the clients’ requirements. There is a need 
to look at the specific supplier-client relationships under different governance 
structures.  
What)is)meant)by)‘learning)from)Japan’?)
One important finding is that ‘learning from Japan’ in both Data-Co and 
Software-Co carries significant rhetoric meanings. On the one hand, ‘learning 
from Japan’ acts as a rhetorical justification for the management systems 
which are specifically designed to serve Japanese clients. For example, both 
companies give priority to quality in their operational management because it 
is seen as one of the most important factors in developing the Japanese 
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market. Both of them establish information security systems because they are 
required by Japanese clients.  This point of view is also noticed in British 
industry, where ‘Japanisation’ is used as a way of legitimating the introduction 
of indigenous changes (Ackroyd et al., 1988). On the other hand, rhetoric of 
being Japanese, complemented by the demonstration of the ‘dominance 
effect’ from Japan (Smith & Meiksins, 1995), is used in both companies to 
enforce management control. For example, workers in Data-Co are told that 
the stringency of the work system manifested in the work procedures, 
disciplines and security rules is copied from Japan because it represents ‘best 
practice’. Likewise, programmers in Software-Co are told to follow manuals 
strictly and accept the security rules because these are claimed to be the key 
to the success of Japanese companies. Managers find it is easier to justify 
their interest and persistence in carrying out certain practices by claiming 
them as ‘best practices’ learnt from the dominant Japanese model. In the 
meanwhile, workers tend to accept and get used to those well-established 
‘best practices’ without questioning and complaining much.  
Apart from the rhetoric meanings, ‘learning from Japan’ in both companies 
also involves the introduction of specific practices used by Japanese 
management, which leads to my second question.  
What)has)been)learnt)from)Japan?)
‘Learning from Japan’ in both companies is based on a ‘perceived model’ of 
Japanese management. As a result, the selection and interpretations of the 
Japanese practices are filtered through the agenda and orientations of the 
different companies. For example, the importance of discipline is stressed in 
Data-Co but not in Software-Co. This may be related to the nature of the BPO 
work which is characterised as low-skill and repetitive, and the nature of BPO 
workers, who are normally young and are seen to lacking in self-discipline. 
Even when the same aspects are perceived, the focal points may be different. 
For example, Data-Co focuses on the ‘hard’ aspects of quality management, 
particularly the importance of checking and double checking, while Software-
Co focuses on customer orientation and incorporates ‘soft’ approaches such 
as employee empowerment and involvement in delivering quality. Meanwhile, 
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the practices may be reinterpreted or repackaged to conform to the specific 
requirements of each of the companies. For instance, ‘continuous 
improvement’ in Data-Co is interpreted as intensive skill practices. In this 
sense, it can be argued that the discussion of ‘learning from Japan’ largely 
depends on what the companies see as ‘Japanese management’ and what 
practices constitute Japanese management. 
Since the discussion of ‘learning from Japan’ largely depends on what the 
companies see as ‘Japanese management’, what practices constitute 
Japanese management, and the interpretation of each practice, it is 
inappropriate to abstract a total package of best practices from the Japanese 
experience and count the incidence of these practices in the local companies, 
as some researchers have done (e.g. Oliver & Wilkinson, 1992). Therefore, it 
is misleading to suggest which specific practices in my case companies are 
‘borrowed’ or ‘copied’ from Japan and which are not. Roughly speaking, it 
appears that the operational management among developers in Software-Co 
share more connotations associated with Japanese management than is the 
case in Data-Co. It also seems that more practices featuring Japanese 
management are carried out in Software-Co among the developers (e.g. 
Hansei, Kaizen, and TQM) than in Data-Co, though these practices are 
adapted to the situation of Chinese workplaces.  
How)are)the)‘learnt’)practices)integrated)with)the)operational)systems)in)China?)
My findings have shown that Data-Co and Software-Co have developed 
different operational systems which enable them to deliver satisfying services 
and ensure market growth. In Data-Co, the operational system focuses on the 
quality and information security, the aspects that Japanese clients are most 
concerned about. The workplace disciplines and the on-the-job exercises 
aimed at bringing about improvements facilitate managers to control 
employees and to enforce the management practices as regards quality 
management and information security. In Software-Co, a core-periphery 
model has developed, in which practices associated with Japanese 
management are carried out among the core employees (i.e. software 
developers) but are largely absent among periphery programmers. This model 
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enables the company to sustain its competitive advantage in software design 
without being dragged down by the huge investment in software developers. 
Meanwhile, the transfer of the ‘Japanese model’ among the developers in 
Software-Co is primarily achieved through a process of ‘reverse transfer’, 
through which Japanese practices are introduced from the Japanese 
workplace and expatriates to the Chinese HQ.  
The process of ‘learning from Japan’ is never a smooth and straightforward 
process. Rather, it involves lots of manipulation, modification and negotiation. 
In some case, the ‘learnt’ practices are tailored to the specific situations of the 
Chinese workplaces. For example, ‘functional equivalents’ are developed to 
deliver quality in Data-Co and Hansei in Software-Co involves both negative 
and positive reflections. These adaptations suggest the ‘societal effects’ 
(Smith & Meiksins, 1995) which emphasises the different social-economic 
contexts surrounding Chinese and Japanese workplaces. In some other 
cases, these companies adopt institutionalised policies and rules 
ceremonially. For instance, the security management in both companies only 
exists in written form while the implementation is neglected. The 5S system in 
Data-Co is introduced at a superficial level aiming to make the workplace ‘look 
like’ a Japanese one. In practice, the implementation of 5S system falls into 
the ‘indulgency patter’ (Gouldner, 1954) in which managers indulge 
misbehaviours of employees but ask for cooperation during customer visits. 
As Meyer & Rowan (1977) suggest,  this pattern of implementation decouples 
the activities from its structure and enables the companies to maintain 
legitimating and formal structure while the activities vary in response to 
practical considerations. 
What)is)the)consequence)of)‘learning)from)Japan’?)
In each company, ‘learning from Japan’, either rhetorically or substantially, 
reflects the managers’ efforts to attract Japanese clients and provide services 
that specifically satisfy the Japanese clients. Through the implementation of 
an operational system which incorporates some Japanese elements, both 
companies manage to meets the clients’ requirements in a cross-country 
context. By the time of my fieldwork, both companies had gained a high 
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reputation in their industries and their performance in terms of quality was 
considered to be outstanding. In this sense, ‘learning from Japan’ has 
contributed to the efficiency and competitiveness of the companies.  
The introduction of the ideology and practices of Japanese management and 
the consequent management systems developed in both companies have had 
mixed effects in terms of the employment relations in both companies. In 
Data-Co, the focus on checking and double checking has increased the 
boredom of the work. The workplace disciplines, the intensive on-the-job 
practices and the lengthy security rules, introduced in the name of ‘Japanese 
practices’, all intensify the operators’ work and increase monitoring. However, 
the team-based organisation allows some responsibilities to be delegated to 
the team leaders and enables the team leaders to offer some leeway to 
workers to relieve their stress. Moreover, there is also evidence that the 
management sometimes make concession to the workers. These limited 
rooms for negotiation provide a hint of ‘humanity’ and ‘flexibility’ to the overall 
rigid operational system, which, to some extent, eases the tension between 
labour and management.  
In Software-Co, the developers are seen as the beneficiary of ‘learning from 
Japan’, enjoying extensive training, work flexibility, employee empowerment 
and participation, as well as ‘camaraderie’ relationships with the other 
developers. In return, they are highly committed to their work and 
continuously contribute to the company’s improvement. However, the 
periphery employees, programmers, do not seem to benefit from ‘learning 
from Japan’. While the core-periphery model greatly improves the relationship 
between management and developers, the conflicts between management, 
developers and programmers is problematic. As a consequence, teamwork 
between developers and programmers imposes lots of stress on the 
management control.  
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Chapter&6&The&HR&policies&and&practices&at&Chinese&workplaces:&
Deviating&from&Japan?&
This chapter discusses the HR policies and practices at the Chinese 
workplaces of both Data-Co and Software-Co. Unlike the operational systems, 
which have been discussed in the preceding chapter, the HR systems in both 
companies are no longer described as ‘Japanese’ or ‘learnt from Japan’. 
Instead, the HR systems of both Data-Co and Software-Co are claimed to be 
‘deviated’ from ‘Japanese practices’, yet in different ways. In Data-Co, 
managers claim that the formation and development of the HR system are 
largely informed by the local environments including the local labour market, 
the local educational system and so on. In Software-Co, managers 
demonstrate a dual HR management system, in which software developers 
are managed in a ‘Japanese’ way while programmers are not.  
As it is the case with operational practices, the comparison between the HR 
practices in the companies and the Japanese practices made by the top 
managers in both companies is based on a model of  ‘Japanese practices’ 
perceived by these Chinese managers. This perceived model of Japanese HR 
practices is largely in line with the typical Japanese HR practices identified by 
Abegglen (1958)  in big Japanese firms among core employees, which 
comprise of lifelong employment, recruitment of school leavers, extensive 
employee training and seniority-based pay system. However, it should be 
noted that this perceived model may not reflect the most updated model of 
Japanese HR practices in reality, especially given the continuous changes in 
Japanese institutions and practices in the past decades (see Lechevalier, 
2014). As many scholars have pointed out, the burst of Japanese bubble in 
the late 1980s has seen great change in Japanese HR system with two major 
developments: the introduction of performance-related pay and the rise in 
non-regular (e.g. part-time, temporary, agency) employment (e.g. Keizer, 
2010). In this chapter, both the traditional model of ‘Japanese practices’ 
perceived by the top managers and the up-to-data account of Japanese 
practices will be taken into account.    
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This chapter details HR practices in recruitment, selection, training, pay, 
performance appraisal, promotion and retention in both companies, and 
examines how and to what extent the HR practices in Data-Co and Software-
Co are deviated from the ‘Japanese’ practices. It also investigates what 
accounts for these differences by assessing the ways HR policies and 
practices have been developed over time, and the experience of these from 
the employees’ perspective. As we shall see, HR systems in both companies 
are not only shaped by the distinctive local, socio-economic, sector and 
historical context in which the companies operate, but are also strongly 
influenced by their specific relationships with the Japanese clients in the 
global supply chains. 
6.1&DataNCo&
In contrast with the managers’ enthusiasm for ‘learning from Japan’ in terms 
of operational policies and practices, managers do not show much interest in 
borrowing HR practices from Japan. In this section, I investigate how HR 
policies and practices in Data-Co are influenced by the nature of a market-
based supply chain, the local labour market, the local educational system and 
the micro-politics within the company. Since HR practices differ quite 
considerably between white-collar/managerial workers on the one hand and 
operational workers on the other, I introduce them separately under each part 
below.   
6.1.1&Recruitment&and&selection&&
White-collar workers are mainly recruited through the open job market, based 
on their educational qualifications and experiences in desired fields such as 
HR, accounting and marketing. Two rounds of interviews are conducted to 
select the appropriate person. The first round of interviews focuses on the 
applicants’ backgrounds and personalities, and the second on the applicants’ 
knowledge relevant to the position. Due to the relatively low demand for white-
collar workers, as well as the low turnover rate among them, the recruitment 
of white-collar workers occurs only occasionally and usually goes quite 
smoothly. By contrast, recruitment of operators is much more frequent.   
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New operators are recruited on an annual basis, and about 90% of them are 
senior graduating students from local technical schools. According to the HR 
manager, there are more than 15 technical schools in and near Dalian City, 
which provide a large pool of job candidates every year. Notably, new recruits 
have to finish a one-year internship assignment before they can sign a 
standard three-year employment contract with the company.  
Data-Co has a clear preference for recruiting young operators, hence its 
recruitment of school-leavers. The HR manager commented frankly that 
operators between 20 and 30 years old are much more productive than those 
who are above that age range. According to the statistics for 2010, 64% of the 
operators were under 25, 13% between 25 and 30, and the remainder over 
30.  
In appearance, both Data-Co and many large Japanese companies prefer 
fresh graduates to mid-career candidates. However, while on-campus 
recruitment in Japan is considered to be associated with the country’s long-
time, committed and stable employment relations (Matanle & Matsui, 2011), 
school-leaver interns are hired in Data-Co to deal with the turnover of labour, 
which fluctuates with the business peaks and troughs. As I mentioned in 
Chapter 3, business in Data-Co largely depends on the season. Every year, a 
large number of employees in Data-Co ‘voluntarily’ exit from work during the 
low seasons (from March to July), while only a few quit during the busy 
season from August to February. For instance, during the period from June 
2010 to June 2011, the majority of labour turnover occurred between March 
and June, reaching a peak of 102 in April2 (Figure 6.1).  
                                            
2 There was a sharp fall in business in Data-Co after the 2011 Tohoku 
earthquake and tsunami in Japan on 11th March, which aggravated the labour 
turnover in March and April 2011. 
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&
Figure!6.1:!Fluctuating!labour!turnover!in!Data<Co!(June!2010<June!2011)!
The high labour turnover during the low season is related to several factors. 
First, workers’ piece-rate income falls sharply during the low seasons (see the 
discussion of the pay system in 6.1.3). This increases their dissatisfaction with 
the company. Second, hundreds of companies are clustered in Dalian City 
doing BPO, each having different seasonal situations. For example, some of 
them are not subject to seasonal business as much as Data-Co is; some of 
them are in their busy seasons while Data-Co is in its low season. Because of 
this, the cluster provides workers with wide availability of alternatives. Third, 
the local labour market is highly fluid and deregulated. The cost of hiring and 
firing workers is low. Most of the workers in Data-Co have a relative or friend 
working in other BPO companies in this local cluster, so they always know 
whether there are vacancies in other companies, and how their pay and 
conditions compare with Data-Co. In this respect, the high rate of quitting has 
been normalised, and consequently produces a great propensity to quit. 
Although the high rate of turnover is reported to be problematic, managers 
think that it provides flexibility for the company, and enables them to cut cost 
by releasing workers. This is particularly true for the managers of the business 
units (BUs), whose performances are assessed in terms of the operational 
cost and the monthly profit they make. As one of them explained:  
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Actually, turnover helps us to deal with the redundant workers, and to 
keep a certain level of profit during the low seasons. When the revenue 
from production decreases during low seasons, the labour cost needs 
to be reduced accordingly; otherwise it becomes difficult to make 
profits. As a result, if workers want to leave, we do not usually say ‘no’ 
– we let them go and save the cost of paying for redundant labour. (5th 
July 2011 in Dalian) 
Benefiting from this labour turnover, Data-Co chooses to accommodate itself 
to the turnover strategically, instead of reducing the volume of it. There are a 
number of accommodating strategies discussed in the literature, among which 
one approach is to segment the workforce into permanent and temporary 
divisions and institutionalise the labour supply through use of temporary 
employment agencies (Smith, Daskalaki, Elger, & Brown, 2004). However, the 
strategy applied in Data-Co is different. Managers in Data-Co do not use 
temporary agencies because ‘agencies charge a lot of money’, and are ‘less 
selective than the company itself in recruiting the right workers’. Rather, they 
partner with local technical schools and ‘hoard’ labour during the low seasons 
at a much lower wage rate than that of the established workers and the mid-
career entrants (who generally receive 1,100RMB – 3,000RMB per month). 
These interns are hired in March, and given three months of off-the-job 
training from April to July, during which a minimum training subsidy (400RMB 
per month) is paid. Those who pass the training test are then assigned to 
teams before August, in order to get ready for the coming busy season. 
Before they are upgraded to regular workers, they are paid the lowest level of 
the basic wage (600RMB per month). This strategy also endorses the 
discussion in the literature on organisational flexibility, to the effect that it is 
possible for companies to obtain numerical flexibility and reduce cost by using 
non-standard workers (Kalleberg, 2001). In the case here studied, this means 
school interns.  
The use of student interns reflects the move of Chinese employment system 
from a state-centric to a more fragmented market-centric one. Friedman and 
Lee (2010) suggested that the employment system in China has been going 
through the processes of commodification and casualisation since the 
economic reform. Such commodification and casualisation have led to the 
increase of labour mobility, the great deregulation and informalisation of 
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employment, and the prevalence of temporary and ‘dispatch’ workers in all 
sectors of the economy (see also (Friedman & Lee, 2010; Kuruvilla, Lee, & 
Gallagher, 2011; Sheldon, Kim, Li, & Warner, 2011). Under this new 
deregulated system, student labour and interns become a growing component 
of Chinese workforce and an importance source of temporary and flexible 
workforce (Brown & deCant, 2014; Smith & Chan, 2015). In their recent 
paper, Smith & Chan (2015) discussed the organisation of student interns at 
one electronic company in China and revealed the unprotected and 
constrained nature of the student workforce at Chinese workplaces. The use 
of student interns to strategically accommodate to high labour mobility in 
Data-Co further endorses these arguments.  
Apart from the above contractual segmentation based on the use of student 
interns, there is also a geographical segmentation of the labour force into the 
home-based workers and those who are based in a ‘satellite’ unit in a less 
developed city with lower labour costs, called Chongqing. This satellite unit 
was established in 2010, in an attempt to escape from the constraints of the 
local labour market in Dalian, where the labour supply from technical schools 
has been gradually declining and becoming unsustainable. One senior 
member in the HR department explained that the BPO industry, characterised 
by a low-wage and low-skilled workforce, was becoming less attractive to job 
candidates than it used to be:  
When I joined the company 20 years ago, working for a BPO company 
was such a dream job that people would admire anyone who had such 
a job. At that time, BPO was considered a promising industry, and 
people preferred working in offices as white-collars to standing in 
factories as blue-collars. However, due to the low wage in BPO and the 
availability of other opportunities, fewer job candidates choose BPO 
nowadays...As you might have already discovered, we have been 
having problems hiring sufficient interns from technical schools 
recently, because fewer candidates have been applying. This could not 
have happened 20 years, or even five years ago. (8th June 2011 in 
Dalian) 
This ‘satellite’ unit hires local workers, and receives orders from the operation 
units based in Dalian. Largely due to the relative scarcity of job opportunities, 
and the lower cost of living in Chongqing as compared with Dalian, 
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recruitment at this ‘satellite’ unit has gone well so far, and workers in the 
‘satellite’ unit have appeared to be more stably settled in their jobs than those 
in Dalian. The general manager was very positive about the potential of 
‘satellite’ operations and concluded that ‘it is the tendency for all BPO 
companies to move operations to lower cost cities in western and central 
China to deal with the labour shortage’. It again confirms the view that the 
company does not follow conventional ways of attracting and retaining labour 
through pecuniary power (e.g. increases in wages), but, instead, deploys 
segmented labour, either contractually or geographically, in order to balance 
labour mobility with cost efficiency.   
In terms of selection, managers pay closer attention to a candidate’s 
personality than to possession of particular skills. Specifically, people who are 
‘diligent, obedient and introverted’ are preferred: 
We are looking for people who can take on monotonous and repetitive 
work. People who are aggressive, ambitious and talkative do not suit 
our jobs, regardless of their skills. In this industry, working hard is more 
important than intelligence, and action counts for more than words. (HR 
manager, 21st June 2011 in Dalian) 
Besides, an ‘intern-to-regular’ route is applied as a selection device. Interns 
are introduced into the labour process as regular workers after training, not 
allocated special tasks or pushed into special areas, so that managers can 
observe and evaluate their ability and motivations more accurately. The 
contracts of interns who do not meet the requirements are not renewed after 
the internship.  
At the time of my fieldwork, female operators accounted for 75% of the total 
number of operators. The HR manager suggested that there were usually 
more females than males applying for the post of BPO operator, because 
being a BPO operator is widely considered a ‘woman’s job’. As Curran (1988) 
argued, some jobs can be gendered because of the social and ‘tacit’ skills 
required in the performance of such jobs. In the BPO industry, the public tend 
to regard women as having the dexterity and patience for meticulous (and 
probably boring) work such as data inputting and editing, so that BPO work is 
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commonly gendered female. This point of view was confirmed by several 
male interviewees: 
I have difficulties in inputting data quickly, I mean, as quickly as the 
girls in my team. I have stubby fingers, not like the girls’. (2nd June 
2011 in Dalian)  
When I applied for this job, I thought it [BPO] was a job dealing with 
computers and technology [which should be male-dominated]. I could 
not have been more ignorant in thinking so. It is actually a ‘women’s 
job’, requiring lots of carefulness and dexterity! (17th June 2011 in 
Dalian) 
Despite the gender stereotype, the HR manager shows no explicit gender 
preference in selection and declares that both females and males have 
advantages and disadvantages: 
There is no difference between females and males in terms of skills. 
Both can be very good or very bad…In general, the turnover rate 
among males is probably higher than females, but females take longer 
marital leave and maternity leave…So, no, we do not have any 
preference in terms of the gender. (4th July 2011 in Dalian)  
The above accounts suggest that while BPO work is socially gendered female 
in terms of its required ‘social’ and ‘tacit’ skills (Curran, 1988), this view has 
not been adopted by the employer. In fact, during selection, women’s roles as 
potential wives and mothers are considered disadvantages. The HR manager 
concluded, ‘since we are trying to keep some kind of gender balance at the 
workplace and we usually have much fewer male candidates than female 
ones, there is actually a greater chance for the male candidates to be 
selected than the female ones’. 
6.1.2&Training&
Training is provided to operational workers. Interns have to take three months 
of off-the-job training on entry. Unlike those in many Japanese companies 
which are strongly embedded in firm-specific knowledge and involving 
socialisation, team activities, character building and introduction to the 
company to allow employees to absorb and refine any formal and tacit 
knowledge about the organisation (Matsuzuka, 2002) training programmes in 
Data-Co exclusively focus on skills, particularly the basic skills of typing 
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Japanese characters, letters and numbers. Interns are taught to use an 
application, which enables them to type Japanese characters based on their 
structures (appearances), rather than on pronunciations or meanings. It is in 
this light that managers demonstrate that ‘the company is able to train 
workers within three months to become semi-skilled workers in terms of typing 
Japanese, even if they know neither Japanese nor about computers before 
they join’. This demonstration is highlighted by a worker who recalled her 
experience: 
The training programme was intensive and effective. I knew little about 
Japanese, but it was not a big issue. We were taught a few Japanese 
words in order to use the operating system in the Japanese language. 
Then we were trained to type Japanese without knowing its meaning 
and pronunciation. After we learnt to type Japanese correctly, the 
instructors gave us a large amount of practice in order to improve our 
input speeds and accuracy. We kept practising every day, until we met 
the standards of the final test. (7th June 2011 in Dalian) 
To a large extent, this training programme facilitates the recruitment of 
employees and enables the company to ‘hoard’ a large number of interns 
during the low seasons. Since such skill training is not commonly offered by 
the other employers in Dalian, Data-Co has built a distinctive reputation as a 
good workplace in the local labour market, and thus has easy access to new 
graduates from the technical schools. One HR department employee proudly 
claimed that provision of skills training had become a crucial selling point for 
the company in its recruitment, and had successfully attracted a large number 
of qualified employees who were keen on learning. 
Conventionally speaking, job training should be built upon long tenure so that 
the company does not surrender its investment in training through high 
turnover. However, in a highly fluid and deregulated labour market, trained 
operators from Data-Co are free to leave and work for competitors. In 
addition, the skills that interns gain from the training program are not firm-
bounded. Instead, they are transferrable skills which can be applied in any 
other BPO companies or indeed other companies which require the ability to 
input Japanese characters. This means that other companies can simply 
poach trained operators from Data-Co without investing in training 
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themselves. As I shall discuss in the next section, since the pay in Data-Co 
largely relies on the seasonal fluctuations, operators are constantly watching 
for other employers for whom they can leave to work during the low seasons. 
Due to its corporate reputation and the training programme which provides 
operators with these transferrable skills, Data-Co is widely considered by job 
applicants as a ‘springboard’ from which they can seek other employers with 
better conditions. Several informants told me that operators who had been 
trained by Data-Co were recognised as well-trained and competent in the 
labour market, and that some employers would offer higher pay in order to 
poach skilled operators from Data-Co. In this respect, instead of generating 
employee loyalty and ensuring a stable workforce, the training programme 
‘encourages’ higher turnover by furnishing employees with important skills. 
Indeed, company statistic shows that 58% of interns left the company after 
they finished training in 2010, and that the majority of them joined the other 
companies. 
Despite the high turnover, managers still insist on the necessity of in-house 
training, explaining that there are not enough qualified workers available from 
the labour market: 
The entry requirement in my company is 45 Japanese words per 
minute, 180 numbers per minute and 160 English words per minute. 
However, we cannot find many candidates who can meet this minimum 
requirement from either technical schools or labour markets, even if 
they have learnt Japanese or computing in technical schools. Because 
of this, while small companies without in-house training schemes may 
possibly free-ride on the training efforts of others, we have to run our 
own training program because we want a large number of interns at 
lower wages. (Personal assistant to the BPO manager, 27th June 2011 
in Dalian) 
The above reflection suggests the weakness of the educational system in 
China, particularly in vocational education. As Li, Sheldon, & Sun (2011) 
suggest, the educational content of Chinese technical schools is often 
misaligned with company needs, as linkages between educational 
organisations and companies are generally absent. Because of this, 
companies, especially ones with a large demand for labour, have to invest in 
training, even under conditions of short job tenure and a high turnover rate. 
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The HR manager further commented that the lack of a complementary 
educational system had pushed the company to make every effort to keep the 
training-related costs to a minimum. For instance, training is conducted during 
the low season, so that there is no lost productivity and no costs involved in 
‘backfilling’ positions; instructors are senior operators within the company who 
are paid much less than external ones; training materials, facilities and 
relevant administrative costs are rigidly controlled. 
6.1.3&Pay&system&and&performance&
For the white-collar workers and the managerial staff at the level higher than 
section chief, their monthly salary consists of basic pay and performance pay. 
Basic pay is mainly determined by the nature and requirements of the job. 
Performance pay is calculated through each individual’s performance index, 
which is given by his/her direct supervisor: 
Monthly pay = basic salary+ basic salary * performance index (between 
0~1.5) 
Instead of the monthly performance pay, BU managers receive an annual 
bonus at the end of each year, depending on each BU’s performance. This 
annual bonus accounts for a major part of each manager’s annual income. 
However, its amount is subjectively decided by the general manager without 
any established procedure or method.  
Before I arrived, the CEO had set out to establish a comprehensive system of 
performance assessment. He introduced an approach based on the ‘balanced 
scorecard’, that is, a performance management tool designed to assess each 
worker’s activities from four perspectives, namely financial, customer-related, 
business procedures and learning. The primary aim of this system is to 
provide a fair and accurate basis for decisions on both the performance index 
and the annual bonus. The CEO pointed out the weakness of the existing 
performance system and emphasised the importance of a new performance 
assessment system: 
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The performance index has not worked effectively because we have 
not developed any specific standards and measures, without which 
superiors are not able to make a sensible evaluation. I found that some 
superiors have tended to give everyone a score between 0.9 and 1.1, 
which does not make a big difference to their income, and so would not 
motivate workers either. Likewise, decisions on the annual bonus for 
the BU managers are too subjective to be transparent and fair. (13th 
May 2010 in Beijing) 
In order to carry out the new scheme, the general manager organised one 
training session for all department managers. This session took half a day and 
the general manager stressed the importance of a systemic performance 
system and introduced the idea of the ‘balanced scorecard’. She then decided 
to experiment with this new approach on three BU managers, asking HR staff 
to hold discussions with each BU manager and come up with the key 
performance indicators (KPI). However, this initiative was resisted by the BU 
managers, because they felt that the new approach was likely to exert more 
pressures and controls on them, and threaten their future income. As a result, 
they refused to participate in the discussion of KPI, and gave negative 
feedback to every proposal. Their resistance was also expressed by means of 
rhetoric. All of them emphasised that this new approach lacked feasibility and 
would possibly damage the ‘humanistic and harmonious’ culture in the 
company: 
Of course it is easy and straightforward to set a standard there, and 
compare our performance with it every month. However, the reality is 
far more complicated. For example, how to adjust the profit target, 
given the uncertainties and fluctuations we face every month; how to 
measure the work attitude; how to obtain scores of customer 
satisfactory? (Manager of KPO, on 3rd June 2011 in Dalian at a 
management meeting) 
Too stringent a performance target does not fit our ‘humanistic and 
harmonious’ culture…it perhaps could work better in a company which 
managed workers in a military way, such as XX. Their management is 
based on authority, but we are not. We prefer a harmonious work 
environment. (Manager of EPO, 3rd June 2011 in Dalian at 
management meeting) 
Despite this resistance, both the CEO and the general manager insisted on 
the inevitability of undertaking this scheme. They urged BU managers to 
corporate with HR staff, and set a deadline for them to decide on the KPI. 
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Realising that they were not able to ‘beat this system’, the BU managers 
changed their strategy to that of ‘moderating the system’ (Delbridge, 1998). 
They actively got involved in the discussion of KPI to make sure it was 
favourable to their interests. They also negotiated hard with the general 
manager about the performance criteria, especially those ‘hard’ indicators, 
such as the ‘target output’ and ‘target profit’, to ensure these criteria would not 
be difficult to meet. All these activities attempted to secure some control over 
this new performance system, and decrease the possible stress and negative 
effects that it might bring. By the end of my fieldwork, the KPI for each BU 
manager had been produced but no agreement had been reached on the 
specific target under each KPI.  
Compared with that of the white-collar workers and the managerial staff, the 
pay system of the operators is more well-established and results-oriented. 
There is no specific performance appraisal system in place for the operators, 
but managers believe operators’ performance has been reflected in their 
monthly pay. As shown below, the fixed part of an operator’s monthly pay 
consists of the ‘basic salary’ and the ‘seniority subsidy’, and the variable part 
includes the ‘piece-rate bonus’ and the ‘full-attendance bonus’.  
Monthly pay = basic salary + seniority subsidy + piece-rate bonus + full-
attendance bonus 
As for the fixed pay, a ‘seniority subsidy’ is paid to operators from their second 
service year onwards, though its amount is small and restricted. The subsidy 
starts at 30RMB and increases by 30RMB each year until it reaches 250RBM. 
Workers do not get paid for seniority beyond that. ‘Basic pay’ is determined by 
each operator’s level of skills. This is the opposite of the Japanese seniority-
based pay system, in which difference in skill level is not reflected in basic pay 
(Berggren & Nomura, 1997). To set the ‘basic salary’, each operator’s skill 
level is assessed annually in the form of a skills examination. Operators are 
required to take this exam every June, regardless of their length of service, 
and the exam results decide their basic salaries for the upcoming year. The 
exam usually lasts 90 minutes and consists of three parts. The first part 
concerns the speed of input, including the inputting of Japanese, English and 
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numbers. The second part consists of mock tasks, in which employees are 
given several tasks in simulated real environments and are asked, 
independently of one another, to complete these tasks. In the third part, 
workers are asked to compare two similar pieces of work with minor 
differences, and identify the differences quickly. Recently, an extra 20 points 
have been given to employees who learn by themselves in their spare time 
and obtain certificates or diplomas on Japanese. The whole procedure for the 
exam is claimed to be ‘fair and transparent’. Instructions are distributed to 
every worker one month in advance, to make sure that everyone understands 
the objective, the form, the criteria and the content of the exam. In addition, a 
mock exam is organised one week beforehand, in order to help workers to get 
used to the exam atmosphere. Exam questions are set by a senior project 
manager and reviewed by another in a confidential manner. A group of 
administrative staff are responsible for marking them afterwards on a 120-
point scale. The distribution of score and basic salary is shown below (Figure 
6.2).  
Score 0-50 51-70 71-90 91-100 above 100 
Grade grade 1 grade 2 grade 3 grade 4 grade 5 
Basic salary (in 
RMB) 
600-699 700-799 800-899 900-999 1000-1100 
% of employees* 5% 50% 25% 15% 5% 
Figure!6.2:!Distribution!of!scores!and!basic!salaries!in!Data<Co!
Source: Interviews (10th July 2012 in Dalian; 8th November 2012, by 
telephone) and corporate documents.  
* the % of employees is based on estimation. It is said that the markers are 
expected to maintain this distribution so that the wage bill does not fluctuate 
too much. 
The exams, along with the workplace discipline, bell-controlled schedules and 
on-the-job exercise discussed in Chapter 5, all represent typical practices that 
are adopted in schools. Therefore, they produce and enhance workers’ 
feelings of working in a ‘school’. Managers, who are perceived as ‘teachers’, 
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‘teach’ skills and knowledge (i.e. skill training), arrange practices (i.e. on-the-
job exercises) and assess performance (i.e. annual skill exams). The effect of 
this particular teacher-pupil sentiment will be discussed in 6.1.6. 
There is little dissent from the idea that workers can be motivated by the skill 
exams. However, there is a widespread feeling that the implementation of the 
exam lacks flexibility. In particular, some workers felt disappointed that 
managers did not show empathy to those who are badly subpar in the exam 
due to unexpected issues. At a lunch with five BPO workers, one worker told 
me that one of his colleagues had been sick on the exam day and only got 
grade two whereas he normally got grade five. Given the big loss of about 
3000RMB the following year, his colleague went to ask his team leader 
whether he could be given a second chance to re-sit. His team leader passed 
this request on to the project manager, but then told him it was impossible 
because the managers thought it unfair to others.  
The proportion of variable pay is high, especially the piece-rate bonus. The 
statistics for 2010 showed that the piece-rate bonus accounted for an average 
of 55% of an operator’s monthly income. The piece-rate pay system is 
institutionalised in the BPO industry in Dalian. Each operator in Data-Co is set 
a target minimum number to meet by the end of the day. If operators finish 
less than this minimum, they get no piece-rate bonus at all to add to their 
basic salary. In other words, they are only paid the piece-rate bonus for 
pieces of work over that minimum target number. As I described in the 
preceding chapter, each operator has a daily performance sheet on which the 
quantity of items of data input and the number of errors are entered. The team 
leaders check the number, and work out the number to be paid for by 
deducting the target number from this. The team leaders then send the filled 
sheets to the HR office every day. The number to be paid for, multiplied by the 
unit price, and after deducting any penalties for errors, gives the daily piece-
rate bonus for the operator. 
Much existing research has shown that piece-work systems can encourage 
workers to actively deceive management and to regularly restrict output (e.g. 
Edwards, 1979; Roy, 1952, 1955). In particular, Haraszti (1980) presented a 
 
185 
case in which the bureaucratic rules governing the piece-work system were 
flouted by workers and resulted in an ‘indulgence pattern’ (see Gouldner, 
1954) on the parts of both management and the workforce. The noted 
inefficiency of the piece-work system could also be spotted in Data-Co, 
especially in relation to how errors made by operators are recorded and 
reported and lead to the monetary penalty. As I discussed in the preceding 
chapter, the team leaders tend to underreport the number of errors made by 
their team members so that these team members get fewer penalties, and this 
is even considered a tactic team leaders can use to build up a reciprocal 
relationships in teamwork.  
Compared with the other employers in the BPO cluster in Dalian, informants 
noted that while the pay structure of Data-Co was similar to many of the 
others, the basic pay in Data-Co was clearly inferior to the best rates in the 
cluster. For example, in 2010 the basic pay in Data-Co ranged from 600RMB 
to 1,100RMB depending on the results of the annual skill exams, whereas 
those at many other companies were between 800RMB and 1,200RMB. 
Despite the lower basic pay, the piece-rate bonus in Data-Co is considered to 
be high, especially during the busy seasons when operators have lots of 
overtime opportunities. Informants also mentioned that the piece rate set by 
Data-Co was slightly higher than that set by other companies for similar work. 
An experienced operator compared the pay in big companies with that in 
small-sized and new companies: 
New arrivals and small-sized companies tend to set higher basic pay in 
order to attract experienced and well-trained workers from the labour 
market. However, workers in small companies normally do not earn as 
much piece-rate bonus as we [workers in Data-Co] do. We have big 
customers who provide large orders. For example, we sometimes have 
to work 14 hours a day during busy seasons, but they [workers in new 
and small companies] seldom have this opportunity even during their 
busy seasons. (27th June 2011 in Dalian)   
The relatively low basic salary and seasonal fluctuation in business further 
explain the seasonal turnover in Data-Co, which I noted before. One informant 
reflected, ‘we stay during the busy seasons and we are free to job-hop during 
the low seasons to secure a higher basic pay’. 
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Contrary to the seniority-based pay system in many Japanese companies, the 
pay system in Data-Co minimises the effect of seniority. Actually, in many 
cases, old operators earn less basic salary and piece-rate bonus than the 
young ones because their productivity in data input drops as they get older. 
During the fieldwork, complaints were often heard from senior operators 
whose productivity and salary had decreased over time. They argued that the 
seniority pay (up to 250RMB per month) did not make up for their loss in 
piece-rate bonus, and that the company did not reward them enough for their 
loyalty. In spite of the complaints, it appears that these senior operators do 
not attempt to take any action to improve their situations and they tend to 
accept their decreasing pay quite stoically. This is perhaps because senior 
workers have very limited options in the job market, and thus lack bargain 
power with managers in Data-Co. One 38-year-old senior worker, who had 
been serving the company for about ten years, suggested that workers older 
than 35 years old were considered ‘old’ in BPO industry. She reflected:  
Young people join in, learn skills quickly and they reach the peak level 
[in terms of productivity] in about three or five years. After that, there is 
not much room for improvement. After 35 years old, like me, it is 
difficult to adapt to this kind of work physically –sitting, typing and 
staring at the screen all day – and my fingers are not as flexible as they 
used to be for data input…the pay system [in Data-Co] is not 
favourable to us [older workers] because it focuses on productivity, say 
how much data you have input within a certain period of time…what 
can I do? If I complain to the boss, they will say, ‘you can leave if you 
are not satisfied with us.’ In fact, they [managers] would be pleased if 
older workers left because they could easily replace us with young 
workers. In this industry, you either move to managerial positions 
before you get old, or you accept what you have. Experience does not 
count in BPO. (5th July 2011 in Dalian) 
6.1.4&Promotion&
Compared with the relatively slow and gradual promotion based on seniority 
in large Japanese companies, promotion in Data-Co is claimed to be fast and 
ability-based, especially for the operators. Managers claim that the company 
seeks to promote from within and everyone has an equal chance to reach the 
middle and high level positions such as those of project managers or BU 
managers. Managers also suggest to operators that they progress up the 
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internal job ladder step by step, starting with team leader, then section chief, 
project manager and ultimately BU manager. Some employees regarded this 
prescriptive career path quite positively: 
I remember that they [HR staff] played an introductory video about the 
company on my first day at work. I remember that there was a picture 
illustrating a career path in Data-Co, from ordinary operator to BU 
manager. It was clear, and it made me strive to improve. (EPO worker, 
1st June 2011 in Dalian) 
However, many employees do not find this career path attractive, and express 
reservations. One significant problem is that junior managerial employees 
(including team leaders and section chiefs) feel undervalued and underpaid 
for the work they are doing. Specifically, these people complain that their 
efforts in managerial work are not financially compensated, and that they 
could have earned more as an ordinary operator than as a team leader or 
section chief. One BPO worker, Qiang, explained: 
I was promoted to team leader last year, but I quit after three months. I 
got 200RMB subsidy to compensate me for the time I spent on all the 
managerial work such as organising the operations, managing team 
members and completing paper work. But apart from that, I was paid 
the same as ordinary workers [i.e. a basic salary plus a piece-rate 
bonus]. The catch here was that being a team leader meant that I had 
to sacrifice achieving my piece-rate bonus to managerial work, and 
200RMB was not enough to make up for my loss. The time I spent 
doing managerial work would have been better spent doing data input 
as an ordinary worker, and would have earned me more of a piece-rate 
bonus, which would have been more than 200RMB. It would make 
more sense if we [junior managers] were paid more, and were paid a 
stable salary, like the project manager. (8th June 2011 in Dalian) 
As mentioned in the above comment, while the pay of junior managers does 
not sound appealing, that of higher positions such as project managers, which 
consists of a basic salary and an annual performance bonus, is much higher 
and more stable. For this reason, I assumed that junior managers would be 
motivated to get further promoted up to project managers. However, in the 
interviews the majority of junior managers expressed pessimism about their 
prospects of moving up to the level of project managers. Their scepticism is 
not groundless -- while the company used to promote junior managerial staff 
to more senior positions, since 2005 there has been a tendency for it to hire 
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managers directly from outside. One section chief who was keen on further 
promotion perceived the erosion of promotion possibilities: 
Some project managers were promoted from within, normally the old 
ones who joined the company early. They started as ordinary operators 
and then moved to the higher positions step by step. However, I have 
found in recent years that most of the newly promoted project 
managers have not been promoted from the ordinary operators any 
more. Liu [a newly promoted project manager] is a typical example. He 
holds a bachelor degree in business management. He worked as an 
assistant to a section chief for a while, and then as an assistant to a 
project manager, and he was promoted to project manager early this 
year. I feel that nowadays managers emphasise educational 
background more than experience, in promotion. You know, as project 
managers they prefer graduates in management, and we, though 
experienced, end up just as section chiefs. (21st June 2011 in Dalian)  
One HR member confirmed the above account, explaining that the majority of 
junior managers who were promoted from workers did not have the basic 
Japanese language skills and managerial skills to be project managers, but 
there were lots of qualified job applicants in the external job market.  
The unappealing salary for junior managerial positions and the constrained 
opportunities to rise to more senior positions, result, to some extent, in a high 
rate of turnover of skilled team leaders and section chiefs, and a reluctance 
on the part of ordinary operators to move up the internal job ladder. At one of 
the meetings I attended, one member of the HR department argued that the 
company is in short of skilled operators. Based on the typical learning pattern 
of the operators in Data-Co, she assumed that the majority of skilled 
operators should be between their 25 to 30 years old, thus she expressed 
concern about the loss of skilled operators by reference to the age distribution 
of the company: 
The operators’ first three years at Data-Co can be seen as a ‘learning 
phase’. Considering that most of the school leavers are about 22 years 
old, they have reached 25 by the end of this learning phase. The next 
five years constitute a ‘mature phase’ during which operators become 
skilled and their proficiency in data input reaches a peak. They can 
make the most contribution to the company compared with the 
employees in other phases. They are the people we want to retain. 
After that, operators get to a ‘declining phase’ during which their 
productivity and efficiency are all in decline. They start feeling it difficult 
to adapt physically to the BPO work. Based on this, it can be seen that 
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in 2010, 64% of our operators were in the learning period (under 25 
years old) and 23% of them were in the declining period (over 30 years 
old). Only 13% of them were skilled operators in the mature phase. It is 
not optimal in terms of the challenges and risks to the management in 
trying to decrease labour costs and increase productivity. (19th June 
2011 in Dalian, at a meeting with the HR staff) 
In order to boost morale and retain skilled employees, the company launched 
a ‘managerial elites program’ in 2010. Under the program, potential 
candidates were nominated from each team and then tested in examinations. 
These exams, unlike the skill exams, focused on candidates’ knowledge 
about management, the Japanese language and the English language. 
Selected candidates were kept in the talent pool of ‘future managers’ and 
received regular training to fit them for senior managerial positions such as 
project managers and department managers. During my fieldwork in 2011, the 
first batch of ‘future managers’, a total of 12, had just been selected. All of 
them were team leaders or section chiefs. I talked to two of them and both 
spoke very positively of the programme and were looking forward to receiving 
training soon.  
6.1.5&Employee&turnover&
As I have noted, operators in Data-Co are very open-minded about the idea of 
moving to jobs in other companies, particularly in the low seasons. Many of 
them were actually thinking of making a move at the time of my fieldwork. 
There are a number of reasons for this: the seasonality of the business 
combined with the very much season-dependent pay structure, which tend to 
push operators to seek other employment during the low season; the training 
and reputation of Data-Co, which enable the operators to find other higher-
paid jobs; the limited internal promotion opportunities; and the highly fluid and 
deregulated local labour market. Further, the existence of the local cluster of 
BPO companies provides ample job opportunities for operators; and, equally 
important, it is becoming a widely held view that BPO is a low-return and 
‘sunset’ industry which does not suit young people, as one 26-year-old male 
worker commented: 
As we Chinese say: a wrong career for a man is as bad as a wrong 
man for a woman. BPO is not a good option in the long run – it does 
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not make a big profit, so the salary is low regardless of how hard I work 
and how good the company is. I think I will leave when it is appropriate 
– not just the company, but the entire BPO industry. (9th June 2011 in 
Dalian) 
Apart from the above, gender and family circumstances appear to underpin 
variations in turnover. HR statistics show that 70% of workers who have been 
serving for more than five years are married females while the turnover rate is 
the highest among single males. In particular, young men tend to attribute 
their difficulties in finding a partner in life to their low salary in Data-Co, and 
hence leave for a higher salary: 
You know that young girls nowadays see a house as a condition of 
marrying their boyfriends. Even if you cannot afford a house now, you 
should at least be making good money, to show that you have the 
potential to buy a house in the near future. I find this is almost 
impossible for us who work in BPO, unless you become a senior 
manager. No wonder most of my colleagues are single! (BPO worker, 
9th June 2011 in Dalian) 
By contrast, married women complained less, partly due to the male-
breadwinner model I discussed in Chapter 4: 
I used to care about salary most, but since I got married I have 
preferred a stable life, which allows me to take care of my son. It is a 
man’s job to earn money outside… I am not saying I am happy with the 
salary here, you know, but it is not my priority at this moment. (KPO 
worker, 20th June 2011in Dalian) 
As I have noted, workers do not normally quit before or during the busy 
seasons, because it is the time when they can earn most. However, the threat 
of leaving may be occasionally used as a bargaining counter, to gain 
improved conditions. This kind of bargain is likely to involve a group of 
conspiring workers, who threaten to leave just before the busy season arrives. 
This happened during my fieldwork in June 2011. The BU manager of the 
BPO section said that he received ten resignations in one day, and he was 
worried that many more would follow. This manager told me that a similar 
situation had occurred in 2006, when more than 50 workers had quit before 
the busy season. He urged senior managers to take action to avoid a potential 
mass resignation, and his suggestion was strongly supported by one HR 
member: 
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They [the operators] have all been schoolmates, classmates or even 
roommates at school, so they are close to each other, and form small 
or large groups in the workplace. If one of the groups leave, the others 
are likely to follow. That is a headache, you know. What we are most 
worried about is a mass resignation right before the busy season, like 
in 2006. You know, the company recruitment has finished by June, so it 
would be difficult to replace them in a short time. I do think the 
company should do something. (21st June 2011 in Dalian) 
Senior managers took their advice. At the beginning of July, the company 
announced an extra subsidy of 150RMB for operators during August and 
October, which were predicted to be the busiest months in 20113.  
In the interviews, all managers claimed that the company did not dismiss 
employees, and it appeared to be a move towards the concept of ‘lifetime 
employment’. However, I did observe two instances within one month when 
employees were dismissed. In both instances, workers were said to have 
made serious mistakes which infuriated the clients, and people explained to 
me that ‘the company has to fire the operators as a response to the clients’. 
One day, the project manager who was involved in one dismissal came to my 
office, and asked the HR employee, Ding, to prepare the personnel 
documents for Nan, the girl who was dismissed. The interaction went as 
follows:  
‘We were told to input and edit the content of an advertising leaflet for 
one Japanese company. Nan [the girl who was being dismissed] got 
the number wrong – it was supposed to be a 5% discount, but she put 
15% instead – and this mistake was not discovered until thousands of 
leaflets had been sent out,’ the project management recalled.  
‘Oh, that’s terrible. How come you did not discover the mistake before 
delivery?’ Ding asked.  
The project manager shrugged and replied briefly, ‘Who knows. We 
were in a rush at that time.’ He continued, ‘Anyway, Li [the BU 
                                            
3 Since the company refused to disclose the names of the operators who were 
involved in the mass resignation in 2006 and 2011, I did not get the chance to 
talk to them. 
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manager in KPO] is still negotiating with Kondo-san [the Japanese 
client].’  
‘How about Nan? Did she ask to leave, or are you firing her?’ 
‘We have to fire her. It was a big mistake, and it is not the first time she 
has made such a mistake. Her attitude to work is problematic.’ (5th July 
2011 in Dalian) 
The above dialogue suggests that the company does dismiss incompetent 
employees, but it is always under the rhetorical explanation: ‘We have to fire 
someone because of the Japanese client’, or ‘Japanese clients are so strict 
that we have to fire someone in order to show our determination and sincerity 
in taking responsibility for the mistakes’. In Nan’s case, apart from the 
pressure from the clients, it seemed that Nan’s chronic underperformance and 
problematic work attitude were also important reasons. 
6.1.6&Case&summary:&managing&‘school&pupils’?&
In his influential books, Dore (1973, 1987) traces two fundamentally different 
capitalist models. They are the organisation-oriented system, the ideal type of 
which is approximated by Japan, and the market-oriented system, which 
pervades most western economies, especially the US. Despite the diversity in 
different countries and the changes over the years of these two systems, it 
appears that the HR system in Data-Co possesses many common features of 
a market-oriented system. Under such a system, labour is mobile, and the 
individual can decide on a regular basis whether or not to be on the move, 
seeking the best price for his/her skill. HR policies and practices in Data-Co 
are largely influenced by the seasonal fluctuation in its business, and the 
highly fluid local labour market. The central theme of its HR system is to 
achieve a balance between turnover rate and cost efficiency. By use of a 
segmented labour force, Data-Co manages to accommodate to its high yet 
seasonal rate of turnover of labour, and control labour costs. In line with this, 
the performance-based pay system was introduced in order to maximise 
employee productivity, although it involves negotiations among various 
corporate actors (e.g. top managers, BU managers, white-collar workers, 
shopfloor workers etc.). One significant problem with this HR system is the 
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difficulty in retaining skilled workers, which also reflects the tension between 
labour mobility and cost efficiency.  
This market-oriented HR system is significantly shaped by the market-based 
relationships between Data-Co and its Japanese clients. The transactional, 
one-off business, to a large extent, underlies the uncertainty and fluctuation of 
Data-Co’s business, which leads to the use of student labour and the 
expansion to the second-tier cities in China. In the meanwhile, the 
standardised and low value-added nature of the business in a market-based 
supply chain results in a highly competitive market based on the price and this 
adds great pressure to Data-Co to continuously increase productivity and 
reduce the labour cost. This also largely explains the use of student labour, 
who are paid significantly less than the regular workers, the pay-by-piece 
system and the other practices that aim to increase workers’ efficiency.  
Overall, although Japanese clients are not directly involved in the construction 
and implementation of the employment practices in Data-Co in a market-
based supply chain, client’s requirements in reducing cost and increase 
efficiency add pressures to Data-Co, which are then transferred to the 
workers in their daily work and are manifested in short-term employment 
practices discussed above. 
Apart from the supply chain relations, the HR system in Data-Co also reflects 
the modern style capitalism in China, which has moved away from the 
centrally-planned economy towards a market-based economy. Accordingly, 
the employment system under this modern style capitalism is market-oriented 
and is based on voluntaristic and individualistic labour contract system (Lee, 
2007). In particular, the use of the student interns in dealing with the business 
fluctuations endorses the casualisation and deregulation of employment 
system in China  (Friedman and Lee, 2010).  
In relation to the Japanese practices, the use of student interns in Data-Co 
shares some similar tendency found in Japanese employment systems, that 
is, the rise of non-regular employment. As Keizer (2010) argues, the rise in 
non-regular employment has stood out as a major development in Japanese 
employment practices. This does not only help to increase the labour flexibility 
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but more importantly, brings in cost advantage to the companies. Likewise, 
the performance-based pay system applied in Data-Co also, to a large extent, 
is resonant with the introduction of performance-related pay in Japanese 
companies. In this sense, while the HR system in Data-Co appears to be 
different from the traditional model of Japanese practices, featuring life-long 
employment, extensive training and seniority-based pay, it does share some 
commentaries with the more updated and recent model of Japanese HR 
systems under their neo-liberal reform, although the underlying mechanisms 
that drive these tendencies are very different (see Friedman & Lee, 2010; 
Keizer, 2010; Lechevalier, 2014). 
Linking with the preceding chapter, which discussed the operational system, it 
is found that there is a strong ‘teacher-pupil’ sentiment in the employment 
relations in Data-Co. This sentiment can be explained through various 
aspects. First, the majority of the operators are graduating students from 
technical schools. They are in their early 20s, and they start working in Data-
Co as interns during their final year at school. In this sense, many operators 
are mentally in transition from student to worker, and they often describe their 
work experiences in Data-Co as ‘an extension of ordinary school life’. Second, 
since the company offers systematic and effective training and is widely 
considered as a springboard to other better jobs, many young employees 
value their learning experience in Data-Co more than other factors such as 
salary and promotion. This further enhances employees’ perception of the 
company as a school. Third, many elements in Data-Co’s management 
system are similar to those of schools, such as: the use of bells, the emphasis 
on discipline, the importance of exams, the exercises arranged during work, 
and so on. These elements naturally remind the operators of their school 
lives. Specifically, one operator drew a contrast between ‘family’ and ‘school’ 
in describing Data-Co: 
It [Data-Co] is like a school. We sit in the ‘classroom’, do exercises, 
and always expect the bells to ring for breaks. Our supervisors are like 
teachers, teaching us skills and constantly urging us to practice more. 
We have exams every year, just like the final exams we had at school. 
I feel exactly the same before I take exams in Data-Co as I did at 
school, I mean, worried and nervous…It is not a ‘family’. Family 
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members do not leave the family. In Data-Co, people come and go. 
Lots of people leave as soon as they have learnt the skills, as if they 
have graduated. (7th June 2011 in Dalian) 
The teacher-pupil sentiment is also concerned with the operators’ identity as 
‘kids’. It appears that operators in Data-Co are cast as naughty children, who 
lack self discipline, so that managers have the right and responsibility to guide 
them in the right direction and keep urging them to work and learn hard. For 
example, supervisors always call their operators ‘kids’. I often heard the team 
leaders admonish their members to ‘behave like an adult and take 
responsibility for your own future,’ which implies that the operators are not 
seen by their supervisors as adults. 
In line with this teacher-pupil sentiment, the company is portrayed as a 
‘school’ which provides operators with skills and knowledge. Therefore, 
improving the learning efficiency of the operators becomes a rhetorical 
justification for the introduction of disciplines, exams and extra exercises 
during work. Under various different circumstances, I heard team members 
and managers stress the fact that operators work and practice hard, not for 
the company, but for the sake of their own individual achievements, and that 
the company is offering valuable facilities and ‘teachers’ to help the operators 
learn skills and pursue a promising future. By doing so, the capital-worker 
relationship is hidden through the concepts of ‘teaching’ and ‘learning’. This is 
evident in the speech the company president gave at the 2010 annual 
meeting: 
What we have done and achieved is beyond a company, which purely 
focuses on profits. Since our establishment, we have taken 
responsibility for training people and make them skilled workers in the 
BPO industry. We have established a whole system to provide qualified 
and skilled operators to the whole country. This is the social 
responsibility of the company. (Company documentary, video of the 
annual meeting in 2010) 
In interviews, a sense of identity as a ‘school teacher’ did not come naturally 
to top and middle managers. They rarely described themselves as ‘teachers’ 
unless I mentioned this term. This was probably because their daily work did 
not involve many interactions with shop-floor operators, who were cast as 
‘school pupils’. However, the junior managers, including section chiefs and 
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team leaders, did seem to enjoy taking on the role of ‘teachers’. Many of them 
stressed in interviews that they themselves had worked as operators before 
becoming team leaders or section chiefs, so that they had the enthusiasm and 
capability to ‘teach’ and ‘guide’ the operators, telling them how to deliver high-
quality work, and, in the long run, how to pursue a good career. By identifying 
themselves as ‘teachers’, these team leaders and section chiefs tried to 
emphasise that they pushed the workers to work hard not because they were 
superiors and the workers were subordinates, but for the workers’ sakes, 
because the workers were so young and therefore needed guidance 
concerning their skills development, careers and lives. 
A teacher-pupil sentiment is also found in Fleming's (2005) study on an 
American-owned call centre in Australia. In this study, a teacher-pupil 
sentiment was evoked through a management programme with a strong 
paternalistic culture and Fleming found that some employees resisted this 
paternalistic management approach because the instigated identity under this 
approach (i.e. that of school pupil) was seen as an affront to the person they 
thought they were or could be (i.e. a rational and capable adult). Likewise, the 
concept of teaching and learning in Data-Co engenders resistance and 
dissonance among employees, especially the senior and experienced 
operators. On the one hand, senior operators do not feel convinced about the 
ideology of learning, and they value substantial motivations such as salary, 
promotion and welfare more than learning opportunities. On the other hand, 
senior operators do not feel comfortable being treated as ‘kids’. As I noted in 
the preceding chapter, the senior operators complained about the exercises, 
saying that they were working for money, not for practice ‘as if we were 
students at school’. These negative responses from these employees partly 
explain the company’s preference for young operators, but at the same time, 
creates more difficulties for the company in retaining skilled operators. 
6.2&SoftwareNCo&
The HR system in Software-Co features core-periphery segmentation just like 
in the operational system discussed in the preceding chapter. The 
management of developers, the corporate elite, share lots of similarities with 
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typical Japanese practices among core employees, including recruitment of 
fresh graduates, huge investment in training and a significant role for 
seniority. This is all related to their deep involvement in Japan (see Chapter 
4), but also associated with the company’s ownership and history. By 
contrast, HR practices for programmers differ remarkably from Japanese 
practice. In each section below, I discuss separately the HR policies and 
practices relating to each of software developers and programmers, and seek 
to explain these practices in terms of the workforce segmentation, the 
company’s historical context, ownership, and actors’ interests and power 
within the company. 
6.2.1&Recruitment&and&selection&
Software)developers)
All software developers are hired directly from the top four universities in 
Shanghai. Graduates from other universities are avoided because managers 
believe those from top universities are of the highest quality (‘suzhi’ in 
Chinese). Meanwhile, mid-career candidates are not hired because managers 
do not want people who have been ‘polluted’ by the culture and techniques of 
other companies. 
The selection process consists of a written test and a face-to-face interview. 
The written test, drawn from standardised IQ tests and Graduate 
Management Admission Tests (GMAT), is taken in the English language for 
the purpose of assessing candidates’ IQ and analytical ability. The face-to-
face interview pays attention to hiring employees who fit into the company 
culture. Given that the company serves Japanese customers, one vice 
general manager said he preferred ‘candidates who show interest in 
Japanese culture such as Japanese cartoons and Japanese fashion’. He 
particularly stressed that people who liked the US style of work were not 
suitable for Software-Co because ‘they are likely to be too aggressive to fit 
with the collective culture in Japan’. Indeed, developers are hired for their 
general characteristics and abilities rather than specific skills. Many of them 
have studied completely irrelevant subjects at university such as history, 
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biology, Chinese literature and so on. One manager explained this by means 
of an impressive metaphor:  
The whole point of selection is to make sure we hire people with good 
‘hardware’, say a strong CPU, enough memory and a stable 
motherboard etc. For example, even though English is not directly 
related to their work, we test their English because it suggests their 
learning ability, especially their language learning ability. The IQ test is 
another factor related to the quality of their ‘hardware’. We do not care 
about the ‘software’ because we are going to ‘install’ that, such as 
Japanese language, software programming, software design and so 
on. Software can function well only if with good hardware, can’t it? (23rd 
January 2012 in Shanghai) 
While BPO work is gendered female, software design is considered a man’s 
job. It is a widely held view in China that men are better at logical thinking and 
are more focused than women, and thus are more capable of software 
development work. Because of this, the HR manager told me that there were 
always far more males than females applying for the position of developer. 
Despite this, the HR manager demonstrated explicitly that the company had 
no gender preference in selection, and she believed that both men and 
women were good at software design. During my fieldwork, male developers 
account for about 80% of the total number of developers.  
Once selected, developers undergo a lengthy (at least five years) training 
programme, including one year of off-the-job language training at university, 
one year of on-the-job training (OJT) at the Shanghai HQ, and three years of 
on-the-job training in Japan. During the first year, trainees learn nothing 
technical, but only the Japanese language. The Japanese lessons are held at 
the university and are given by university lecturers. Every year there is a small 
class of about 30 new trainees, and they describe this period as ‘an extension 
of university life’, going to school, having lectures, taking exams and 
considering their colleagues as ‘classmates’. At the end of this period of 
study, those who are certificated at the highest level (N1) of the Japanese 
Language Proficiency Test are able to start the second phase of training in 
the HQ. At this stage, trainees are assigned to different teams. They are not 
given specific tasks, but told to observe and learn the basic procedures and 
techniques involving in software programming and design. After preparation 
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relating to both language and basic skills, trainees are then expatriated to 
Japan and given three years of OJT in Japanese clients’ companies. As 
described in Chapter 4, they are trained and supervised by both Japanese 
clients and Software-Co’s Japanese office during their expatriation in Japan, 
and this is the period during which they get familiar with the management 
system of Japanese companies, learn how to communicate with Japanese 
clients and deliver high-quality work that meet clients’ requirements. 
Meanwhile, these trainees live in two buildings that the company offers, and 
spend lots of their spare time together. They are colleagues at work and close 
friends in life. It is this experience of collective living in a foreign country that 
creates strong camaraderie among developers and makes them a solid 
group. It is worth noting that before trainees leave for Japan, economic control 
is exerted in order to guarantee a trainee’s return. Trainees have to sign a 
legal agreement with the company before they leave for Japan, agreeing to 
serve the company for at least five years after they complete their training in 
Japan. Those who fail to fulfil this commitment have to pay the company 
liquidated damages of 100,000RMB. The completion of OJT in Japan marks 
the end of the training programme, and trainees can choose to go on working 
in Japan at the clients’ site, or go back to the Chinese HQ. 
The HR policies on recruitment, selection and training in Software-Co are very 
similar to those applied in Japanese companies among core employees, 
especially the large-scale Japanese companies. While one cannot deny the 
Japanese influence on the formation and development of these practices 
given the company’s involvement in Japan, it should be emphasised that the 
company’s history as a Chinese-Japanese joint venture engaged in training 
Chinese talent graduates in Japan has had a great impact too. First, in 
accordance with the corporate mission ‘to cultivate the best software 
developers for the future of China’, Software-Co adopted a very demanding 
and selective method of recruitment, and developed a comprehensive training 
scheme covering language, culture and skills in both China and Japan. 
Second, the university which owns the company not only sourced the talent 
graduates, but also funded the huge investment in staff training without which 
the company could not have survived. Third, the alliance with the Japan 
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International Development Organisation (JAIDO) ensured sufficient 
opportunities for OJT in big Japanese companies, again, without which the 
training scheme would not have been carried out. In other words, it was the 
former form of Software-Co as a training agency, rather than the current form 
as a contractor of Japanese business, that originally created the policies and 
practices on recruitment, selection and training, and these practices have 
been retained until the present. 
Software)programmers)
In contrast with developers, programmers are sourced from various channels, 
including universities, local job centres, job agencies and personal 
recommendation. Specifically, campus recruiting is conducted every spring at 
colleges and universities all over China, and other sources (e.g. job agencies, 
local job centres) are used whenever needed. Unlike the selection of 
developers in which candidates’ personalities are emphasised, the selection 
of programmers focuses on programming skills and experience. Therefore, 
the selection is mainly based on candidates’ qualification in computer-related 
areas and a very brief face-to-face interview. Again, there is claimed to be no 
gender preference in the selection. Male programmers accounted for 56% of 
the total at the time of my fieldwork. 
Apart from a three-day orientation session, there is no formal training for 
programmers. Nevertheless, each programmer was allocated a mentor, 
normally a senior and experienced programmer, and the mentor helps the 
newly-hired programmer to get used to the work procedures and environment. 
In line with the managers’ preference, when undertaking recruitment and 
selection, for experienced and skilled programmers, programmers are 
expected to be ‘plug-in-and-play devices’, fully ready for use shortly after 
recruitment. 
The arrangements for training developers on the one hand, and programmers 
on the other, represent the most striking difference in the treatment of the two 
groups, in terms of the HR system. Developers receive systematic, lengthy, 
expensive and cross-national training, whereas programmers are offered only 
 
201 
minimal training. Largely because of this, developers are considered to be 
members of the corporate elite, who are superior to programmers. 
6.2.2&Pay,&performance&and&promotion&
Software)developers)
Developers are paid a monthly salary. Compared with other companies in this 
industry, the developers’ monthly salary is at the top level. Although all 
developers in the interviews said their pay system was based on seniority and 
was the same as the Japanese one, closer examination of it reveals 
differences. Berggren & Nomura (1997) have explained that ‘under nenko 
(seniority)-based pay (in Japanese companies), individual pay increases 
every year but not equally among employees’ (p.75), because the increase 
depends on the result of the individual assessment. By contrast, in Software-
Co, people who join the company in the same year receive the same amount 
of basic salary, and their basic pay increases every year by the same amount 
as one another. In this sense, developers’ pay is egalitarian, determined 
entirely by their length of service. Meanwhile, Software-Co lacks a formal 
performance assessment system. Two informants told me that there were a 
few team leaders who informally evaluated team members’ performance, but 
their evaluations were restricted to the team level, and the results did not 
affect the developers’ salaries.  
Likewise, the promotion scheme is based on seniority too. All the managers 
are internal promoted. Those in higher managerial positions are generally 
older than their subordinates. For instance, at the time of my research, the top 
managers including the general manager and the vice general managers, 
were all 2nd and 3rd year cohort members who joined the company in 1992, 
and the lower level positions, including department managers and project 
managers, were all taken by 4th and 5th year cohort members.  This promotion 
scheme significantly prevents the younger cohorts from moving up the internal 
job ladders, as remarked upon by an 8th year cohort developer: 
In terms of promotion, my career in Software-Co has come to an end. 
There are still 6th and 7th year developers waiting to be department 
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managers and project managers. When will it be my turn? For the even 
younger cohorts, they should not have any dreams of promotion unless 
the company reforms the existing seniority-based system. (17th 
January 2012 in Shanghai) 
Under a culture based on seniority, young developers not only lack 
opportunities to be promoted, but also lack the confidence to manage people 
who are more senior than them. One senior developer told me that he once 
made an exception and tried to promote an outstanding 12th year cohort 
developer to project manager, but the young developer was not keen on 
taking the position. I talked with this young developer, and her concerns about 
the promotion turned out to be very common among young developers: 
I do not know how to manage people who are older than me. You 
know, they are from the 9th cohort, 8th cohort or even earlier. I do not 
feel confident to lead them. I bet they would not feel convinced about 
my promotion either, and they would not want to follow me. It is 
complicated, given the culture here…I do not want to be the first 
person to take the risk, because most people in this company believe 
in seniority, and it will not be challenged or changed by individuals like 
me. (24th February 2012 in Shanghai) 
The egalitarian pay and seniority-based promotions in Software-Co share 
common features with the typical HRM practices in Japanese companies, 
particular in the sense that seniority is emphasised in both Software-Co and 
Japanese companies. Meanwhile, these practices also reflect the traditional 
Chinese models of three ‘irons’ - the iron rice-bowl, the iron chair and iron 
wages – in the centrally-planned economy (the three ‘irons’ were discussed in 
Chapter 2; see also Ding & Warner, 2001; Hassard, Morris, & Sheehan, 
2004). As quite a few researchers have agreed, despite their different 
underlying institutional roots, traditional Chinese HRM are similar to Japanese 
HRM in appearance ( Chan, 1995; Zhu & Warner, 2000). These researchers 
point out that although the Japanese system is organisation-oriented whereas 
the traditional Chinese system is state-oriented, both of them promote 
employees in terms of salary and position largely based on their seniority at 
the workplace, and both of them take care of their employees’ welfare. 
Considering Software-Co as a spin-off subsidiary of the state-funded 
university which has been involved in the Japanese market since its 
establishment, the egalitarian pay and seniority-based promotions in 
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Software-Co may be a product of both the traditional management system in 
Chinese state-owned companies and the influence of the Japanese 
companies.  
A related question here concerns the sustainability of this system. As I 
discussed in Chapter 2, the Chinese government has launched a series of 
systematic reforms since the mid 1990s in order to break the ‘three irons’ 
model, and to drive Chinese companies towards marketisation. One important 
aspect of the reforms has been the introduction of an award system that is 
related to the quantity and quality of work done, rather than seniority. At the 
same time, there are evidences that many Japanese companies have been 
actively considering and conducting performance-oriented pay and promotion 
after the bursting of the bubble economy (Aoki, Delbridge, & Endo, 2012; 
Keizer, 2010). In Software-Co, it is widely acknowledged that developers are 
not motivated by the egalitarian pay system, and the practice of seniority-
based promotion is problematic, as more and more young developers join. 
Under these circumstances, it is appropriate to ask why traditional practices 
remain unchanged in Software-Co, and how far they are immune to the 
general influence of market ideology in both China and Japan? 
To answer this question, it is found that senior developers, who have ‘grown 
up’ under the established system, and have become the management cadre 
of the company, have played a crucial role in maintaining the existing system. 
In 2007, the director who supervises Software-Co on behalf of the university 
questioned the egalitarian pay system, and urged the company to establish a 
performance assessment system. He also proposed that the company should 
be divided into business units, with each unit being responsible for its own 
production and for maximising its own profits. As I have already mentioned, 
this director does not get involved in the daily work and management, but only 
concerns himself with how much profit Software-Co is able to deliver to the 
university each year. In this sense, this proposal is in line with his interests, in 
creating a more competitive work atmosphere and motivating managers to 
work harder and make more profit. However, this proposal was resisted by 
senior developers. These senior developers have benefited from the existing 
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system, and have now secured satisfying salaries and positions in the 
company. Therefore, they are unwilling to accept the new system, which 
would potentially threaten their positions and income, and impose more stress 
on their work than under the existing system. Their resistance was mainly 
expressed by means of rhetoric. They argued that length of service was a 
sensible parameter to differentiate between developers, because developers 
shared homogeneous internal experience and were similar in terms of skills 
and abilities. They also stressed that the existing pay system had provided 
lots of advantages, by diminishing internal competition and maintaining a 
‘harmonious’ work relations, without which the company’s culture would be 
destroyed: 
Egalitarianism might not be good as a means of motivating employees, 
but from another perspective, it is fair. For example, if the company 
does not make a good profit this year, everyone’s salary will be cut, 
which means everyone takes responsibility of the loss. Also, it fosters 
the spirit of teamwork, since we are not competing with each other. We 
help each other, and we only have one goal, which is to deliver good 
work on time. I have to say that this pay system works just right in 
Software-Co… Judging from my experience, I am motivated by the 
training opportunities, by the close relationship with colleagues, rather 
than by the money. (General manager, 24th November 2011 in Tokyo) 
Realising that the Chinese ‘three irons’ system has been widely criticised as 
the root cause of Chinese workers’ laziness and low productivity (Child, 
1994), senior developers tend to link their HR practices with the dominant 
Japanese ‘best practices’, but try to distinguish it from the traditional Chinese 
‘three irons’ system. By doing so, they get around the criticisms of the 
traditional Chinese ‘three irons’ system and obtain legitimacy for sustaining 
these practices. The general manager clearly drew a line between the 
company’s ownership as a state-owned company, and its management 
system: 
Frankly, we do carry some characteristics of the traditional Chinese 
state-owned system, but that is at the higher level, I mean, in relation to 
corporate governance. For example, we hand over our profits to the 
university every year; and the university has the most power in financial 
issues. However, at the level of daily operations, we are ‘Japanised’ – 
we are trained in Japan, deal with Japanese clients, speak Japanese, 
emphasise seniority, work hard, and we are loyal to the company. 
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These are all typical characteristics of Japanese companies and 
employees. (18th January 2012 in Shanghai) 
Resistance from senior developers greatly slowed down the progress of 
enforcement. There had been a long discussion on the advantages and 
disadvantages of this proposal, and no substantial activity had been taken. In 
mid 2008, the director decided to postpone this proposal, because the 
company had a business crisis in 2008, and the director wanted to avoid a 
radical change during this downturn. Even so, the director would not give up 
his proposal. At the time of my research in 2011, he told me that he would 
enforce it again, because the business had recovered from the crisis, and he 
would be more determined this time: 
I know they [senior developers] do not want to change, but this will 
happen sooner or later. I will push them hard to come up with a 
detailed plan, and there will be no excuse. If they do not want to carry it 
out, I will get someone younger to replace them. I am going to break 
this system. (11th January 2012 in Shanghai) 
To conclude, despite the recognised disadvantages of the established 
system, the incumbent developers have kept it from a market-oriented reform, 
because they benefit from this system. The ‘dominant effect’ (Smith & 
Meiksins, 1995) of Japanese management is used as a rhetorical justification 
for the established system, and masks the disadvantages of it. 
Software)programmers)
Programmers are paid a monthly salary, which is also determined by their 
lengths of service. In contrast to the top level salary of software developers, 
the salary rates for programmers are below the average for the industry, and 
many programmers are dissatisfied with their earnings. Managers had 
promised two increases per year in the programmers’ salaries from 2004 
onwards, which did help the company attract and retain programmers for a 
few years. However, managers failed to keep this promise between 2008 and 
2010 due to the crisis, and this resulted in half the programmers (about 700) 
quitting their jobs in Software-Co.  
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Since all the managerial positions in the company are occupied by 
developers, the chance for programmers to move up the internal job ladder is 
very limited. Programmers have to be promoted to developers in the first 
place, in order to be qualified to further compete for managerial positions step 
by step from team leaders to project leaders, department managers and 
general managers. According to the HR policies, those who have served the 
company for more than two years can be selected to become junior 
developers. Junior developers will then be trained, assessed and selected 
again to become developers, who are then qualified for managerial positions. 
Nevertheless, although a few new recruits regard this career path as a way of 
encouraging and rewarding them, most of them do not feel it is achievable. 
One common argument is that the number of developers in the company is 
more than enough compared with the number of programmers, so there is no 
need for the company to promote programmers from within. Indeed, 
managers told me that the ideal ratio between developers and programmers 
was 1:10, yet this ratio had reached 1:2 in Software-Co. This clearly suggests 
a redundancy of developers, as one new recruit realised after a few months’ 
observations: 
The company said that there would be selection in two years. 
Programmers who are selected will become junior developers, and will 
be sent to Japan for training. I felt like I had a bright future, clear and 
straightforward. However, as I have got to know the company better, I 
do not feel so good anymore. I noticed that almost all project teams 
said that they lacked programmers. I am very confused now, because it 
seems I am going nowhere because they [the company] do not really 
need more developers. (10th February 2012 in Shanghai) 
In practice, as many programmers pointed out, the selection of junior 
developers had stopped since 2008, and programmers did not feel optimistic 
about its return: 
Managers said it [the suspension of the selection of junior developers] 
was due to the crisis and was temporary. We have recovered from the 
crisis since 2010, but the selection has never started again. They [the 
managers] keep recruiting more programmers and more developers 
directly from top universities. (10th February 2012 in Shanghai) 
Those who have already been promoted to junior developers have also had 
difficulty moving up further to become developers. In fact, no junior developer 
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has become a developer so far. This scepticism was voiced by a junior 
developer who was contemplating leaving the company. He said he was 
among the first group of programmers who were promoted to junior 
developers, but his superior had not made any attempt to promote him further. 
Given his performance and amount of experience in Software-Co, he felt he 
was definitely capable of finding a job as a software developer in another 
company and if there was no hope of being further promoted in Software-Co, 
then moving became more attractive. 
6.2.3&Employee&turnover&
Software)developers)
Turnover of developers is extremely low. According to company statistics, 
from 2005 to 2010, no single developer quit after completing training. This 
zero turnover was a product of a mixture of reasons, including the contractual 
obligation concerning length of service after training, the top salary rate, a 
high level of organisational identification developed during the training 
programme, the relaxing work environment and the relatively low work 
pressure. The immobility of developers was most obvious during the 
company’s crisis between 2008 and 2010. At that time, developers’ monthly 
salaries were cut in half through a series of employment adjustments such as 
reducing working times, stopping recruitment and voluntarily taking holidays 
by turns. Yet, no one left the company. It is worth noting that apart from the 
above reasons, one special reason for the low turnover rate during the crisis 
was that there were few outside opportunities which were seen as better, as 
one developer explained: 
Every company was affected by the economic recession. It was not just 
Software-Co. Let me tell you, during the crisis, a large number of 
people went back to the job market seeking for new jobs. Therefore, 
many companies took the advantage to hire capable employees at 
lower rates. In my opinion, it was not a good time to look for a new job. 
I would rather to wait and see. You see, one year later, we [Software-
Co] were back to the right track. (7th February 2012 in Shanghai) 
Despite the low turnover rate, senior managers are concerned about the 
retention of young and capable developers. Some of them suggested that 
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young developers stayed with the company during hard times because ‘there 
were no better choices available in the job market’, rather than because they 
were committed and loyal. Particularly, managers feel worried that young 
developers have limited space to move up the internal job ladder based on 
the existing seniority-promotion system, and hence will choose to leave 
sooner or later. One senior project manager (5th year cohort) remarked, ‘the 
factors that keep the older generations in Software-Co do not work effectively 
on the younger generations’: 
Young developers are less patient than the older generations. While 
we [older generations] are satisfied with the incremental salary 
increase and feel very appreciative about having had such a good 
training in Japan, they [young developers] are less grateful, and are 
always seeking other opportunities that could get them money or power 
more quickly. You know, it is a result of the fast economic growth in 
China. We used to think monetary incentives and promotions did not 
make a big difference to workers’ motivation in our company, because 
we have provided other incentives like training, and a good work 
environment, but it might not be the case for these young developers, 
because they want something substantial, and they do not want to wait. 
(17th January 2011 in Shanghai) 
This project manager’s concern is confirmed by several young developers, 
who complained about the salary decrease during the crisis, and said they 
would have left if the downturn had lasted longer.  
Software)programmers)
Given the limited career development prospects within the company, many 
young programmers use Software-Co as a springboard for their careers, and 
expect to accumulate as broad an experience and as many skills as possible 
in Software-Co, so as to become more competitive in the labour market in the 
future. For this reason, the turnover rate among programmers is high. I was 
told that the average turnover rate among programmers was above 50% 
every year. In particular, the turnover rate among male programmers (about 
60% per year) is much higher than that of female ones (15%). Just as in Data-
Co, this may reflect Chinese social expectation that men will deal with 
external affairs, and women will look after internal (family) affairs. Many 
females, especially the married ones, prioritise job stability over career 
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development, so that they can spend more time caring for family and children. 
These female programmers thought that although the career development 
was limited in Software-Co, they were compensated by the stable work and 
incremental salary increases. For this reason, females are in general less 
dissatisfied than males with the situation in Software-Co. 
6.2.4&Case&summary:&managing&‘elites’?&
Different HR strategies are applied to software developers and programmers 
which, like the operational system, reveal the segmentation of labour within 
the company. While lots of attention is paid to the selection and training of 
developers, the management of programmers focuses on minimising the cost 
of labour. As I suggested in the preceding chapter, such a dual management 
system shares many characteristics with the duality of Japanese companies, 
which distinguishes between core employees and periphery employees 
(Keizer, 2010; Whitehill, 1991). That is, the privileged treatment of developers 
is made possible by the inferior employment conditions among programmers. 
A straightforward reason for this dual system is associated with the 
developers’ deep involvement in Japan, which is absent among programmers 
(details in Chapter 4).  
The HR system in Software-Co is informed by its captive relationship with the 
Japanese client. Captive relationship with a dominant client requires long-term 
and particularistic commitment from the suppliers. This means that Software-
Co could not rely on short-term employment of non-regular employees, as 
Data-Co does. In addition, captive relationship also requires continuous 
investment on cross-national training so that the employees could keep up 
with the development of the client and provide the most updated and 
customised solutions. All these lead to a long-term and captive employment 
relations in Software-Co. Employees are locked into the 10 year contacts (5 
years training and 5 year post-training with major financial penalties binding or 
constraining software developers to the firm) with the company and are 
provided lengthy and particularistic training. This captive employment relation 
is complemented by a set of old SOE practices, which emphasise the 
importance of long-term commitment and the incremental pay increase based 
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on seniority. These practices are further justified and maintained under the 
label of ‘Japanese’ best practices.  
Overall, while the HR practices in Data-Co reflect the modern capitalism in 
China, the ones in Software-Co reflect the old Chinese capitalism which was 
dominated by large SOEs.  
The privileged treatment of developers creates a strong sense of elitism 
among the developers. This elitism is justified and reinforced through 
recruitment from top-universities, long periods of training, good opportunities 
to develop competence, cooperation with bright people, high salaries and 
career prospects. Many developers equate themselves with the graduates 
from ‘Whampoa Military Academy’, an influential Chinese military academy 
which trains military elites and is known as the ‘the cradle of leaders/elites in 
China’. 
Such elite identity has a significant impact on developers’ day-to-day work.  
First, ‘being a member of the elite group’ promotes a strong feeling of 
corporate pride, as well as of belonging. This consequently drives developers 
to get involved in the managerial improvement activities through practices 
such as Hansei and Kaizen (details in Chapter 5). Second, developers in the 
elite group are peer-pressured to work in a way that can be accepted by the 
other members in this group, and those who do not follow these norms are 
criticised or excluded. For example, developers who are considered not to be 
making enough effort in their work and those who refuse to take overtime 
work get criticised as slackers. Meanwhile, individuality is downplayed, and 
there is an emphasis on cooperation, conformity, collection and routine 
among developers. Third, since everyone is part of what is perceived as the 
elite, a high standard of performance and a habit of always trying to perform 
to the best of one’s ability are self-imposed. One senior developer highlighted 
that ‘being a member in the elite group’ was an important source of his high 
commitment, demonstrating that ‘I have to work hard to deserve my label as 
“a software developer in Software-C”’. Overall, high commitment and 
involvement are both clearly in evidence among the developers. 
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The elitism among developers is in sharp contrast with the programmers, who 
are seen as the second class citizens in the company. During the interviews, 
few programmers spoke positively about their positions in the company. Some 
of them considered their jobs in Software-Co to be nothing more than a way of 
earning, and some others actively considered leaving as soon as they were 
prepared. I discussed in the preceding chapter the fact that the relationship 
between developers and programmers has been problematic, and has caused 
difficulties in teamwork. I also mentioned that some developers have been 
trying to improve their relationships with the programmers by stressing the 
partnership between them, and showing respect for the specialism of 
programmers. Some developers also make efforts in HR-related issues. For 
example, there were a few positive assessments of the company’s salary 
adjustment during the crisis. These highlighted that the policies on salary cuts 
during the crisis was targeted more on developers than on programmers, and 
suggested that managers had tried to reduce programmers’ losses during the 
crisis. One programmer gave examples, and expressed her gratitude:  
At that time, every team was forced to take a certain number of hours 
of unpaid holidays, and team members were asked to volunteer to take 
those hours. In most teams, developers took these hours in order to 
protect our [programmers’] working hours and salary. Likewise, the 
policy of rotating days off was not applied to us either…I guess they 
[developers] understood that we [programmers] were more vulnerable 
to the salary cut, so they’d rather bear more of the loss themselves. I 
did not take it for granted, you know – no one wanted to take holidays 
or leave at that time, but developers did make that sacrifice. I heard 
that the basic salaries of some developers were cut by 50% during that 
period, but ours were basically kept at the same level, apart from there 
being no increases any more… well, I knew that they were paid much 
more than me, but I still felt grateful. (9th February 2011 in Shanghai) 
Likewise, since many programmers consider Software-Co as a springboard, 
they are keen on going beyond their own work as programmers, and show 
enthusiasm for learning different skills and getting involved in project 
management. Some team leaders notice this motivation, and actively get 
them involved in project management and decision making. These team 
leaders receive positive feedback from the programmers, and have a good 
relationship with their programmers.  
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In general, while the entire focus is on the management of the developers and 
this does create a group of highly committed and involved employees, the 
problems and risks it has caused have been given attention in recent years, 
particularly at the team level.  
6.3&Summary&
This chapter has discussed the HR policies and practices in the two 
companies. My data confirms that managers in both companies compare their 
HR practices with a perceived ‘Japanese model’, which is primarily found in 
large Japanese companies among core employees. However, as Keizer 
(2010) and Lechevalier (2014) have suggested, there have been a neo-liberal 
transformation of Japanese capitalism, which has lead to changes in 
Japanese labour practices since the 1980s. These changes embrace an 
introduction of performance-related pay and an increase of non-regular 
employment, and they highlight the duality of Japanese labour market and 
practices. In these sense, it is hard to conclude whether the HR practices in 
both companies are deviated from ‘Japanese’ practices or not. Given the 
duality of Japanese labour practices, it appears that the HR system in Data-
Co shares some similarities with the practices that are used among non-
regular employees in Japan, while the system in Software-Co carries many 
elements of core practices in large Japanese firms. However, the underlying 
factors that drive and shape these practices are different from those of 
Japanese companies.  
At the first place, the HR systems in both companies reflect the system effects 
of China capitalism. Given the transitional nature of Chinese economy, the 
system effects of Chinese capitalism are manifested in the companies in 
diverging ways. While the HR practices in Data-Co reflect the modern style of 
Chinese capitalism and fit with the commoditification and casualisation of 
China, the ones in Software-Co is much shaped by the old style of Chinese 
capitalism. This diverging effects of Chinese capitalism are also associated 
with the ownerships types of Chinese companies. As shown in the cases, the 
SOE (Software-Co) has kept practices that characterise the Chinese ‘three 
irons’ model, while the privately owned company (Data-Co) is more open to 
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systematic learning and easier to adapt to the modern style of Chinese 
capitalism.  
Societal effects play a crucial role in shaping the HR systems in both 
companies. This is most evident in terms of the condition of labour market. 
China’s newly developed labour market is characterised by high fluidity, 
deregulation and a high level of labour turnover. This labour market effect is 
strengthened by the uncertainty and fluctuation of business demand, which is 
particularly evident in the case of Data-Co. In order to manage labour mobility, 
both companies apply the strategy of labour segmentation, in which different 
HR policies and practices are applied to different group of employees. In 
Data-Co, employees are contractually segmented into interns and regular 
workers, or geographically into home unit workers and ‘satellite’ unit workers. 
In Software-Co, employees are segmented based on their job responsibilities 
into ‘elite’ software developers and programmers. This labour segmentation 
facilitates the balance between labour mobility and cost in different ways. 
Internships from technical schools allows Software-Co to tackle seasonal 
fluctuations in business at a relatively low cost, and to accommodate to the 
high level of turnover; the satellite unit provides another labour source beyond 
the local labour market; the low-cost oriented HR system relating to 
programmers in Software-Co protects the interests of the company elite – 
developers, and so ensures the feasibility and sustainability of the high-cost 
and long-term oriented HR system relating to developers.  
From the actors’ point of view, the conflicting interests of employees and the 
micro-politics between different interest groups within the company influence 
the formation of HR policies and the development of HR practices. For 
example, BU managers in Data-Co resisted the new ‘balanced scorecard’ 
approach because they felt it threatened their income. Likewise, senior 
developers in Data-Co were unwilling to reform their pay and performance 
system, due to their vested interests in the existing system. My findings also 
show that resistance can be expressed by means of rhetoric or substantial 
activities. Rhetoric used by actors includes ‘ontological rhetoric’ (Suddaby & 
Greenwood, 2005) which emphasises that certain aspects cannot coexist 
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(e.g. the proposed stringent performance appraisal system is incompatible 
with the ‘humanistic’ corporate culture), and ‘rationalisation rhetoric’ (Vaara, 
2006) which highlights the effectiveness of the existing system (e.g. the 
fairness and transparency of the egalitarian pay system). Activities of 
resistance involve actors’ efforts to ‘beat the system’ in an attempt to secure 
counter-control in relation to management, as well as actors’ efforts to secure 
some control so as to ‘moderate the system’ (Delbridge, 1998). 
Also, the historical context of the company shapes the formation and 
development of its HR policies and practices. This is particularly evident in the 
case of Software-Co, where practices of recruitment, selection and training 
were developed to fulfil the company’s mission as a training agency, and has 
been kept until the present even though the company has developed into a 
subcontractor in the software industry. As a result of these historically derived 
practices, the company has gradually formed an elite group of developers, 
and has built its competitiveness upon this group of employees, which in 
return reinforces these HR practices. This reveals the influence of path 
dependence.  
Last but not least, as it is case in the construction of operational systems, 
supply chain relationships play an important role in shaping the HR practices 
and employment relations in both companies. Arm’s length  transactions in 
market-based supply chains require the suppliers to quickly respond to the 
market changes and uncertainties at the lowest cost. Therefore, Data-Co has 
developed a HR system with high labour flexibility and short-term based 
employment relations. These are reflected in the use of non-regular 
employees (e.g. student interns), the lack of intention in retaining employees, 
and the piece-rate pay system. All these practices enable Data-Co to adapt to 
the intensive price competition in the BPO market and to expand market 
share. By contrast, captive relationship with a dominant client requires the 
supply firms to retain a group of core employees on a long-term basis, which 
leads to the captive employment relations in Software-Co. These captive 
employment relations are evident in the cases of the lengthy training 
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programmes of Software developers, the financial restraints for labour 
turnover and the seniority-based pay and promotion systems.  
Combining the findings from the preceding chapters, it is evident that 
employees in both companies are controlled through identity. In Data-Co, 
employees are cast as school pupils who come to the ‘school’ to learn skills, 
and the ‘teachers’ are responsible for their behaviour and performance. In 
Software-Co, developers are seen as members in elite group and 
programmers are treated like second class citizens. These identities serve 
rhetorically to justify the existing management practices and normatively 
regulate employees’ behaviour. This pattern of management control is termed 
‘identity regulation’ in Alvesson & Willmott (2002). As there noted, identity 
regulation may not be at the forefront of managers’ minds, but is a by-product 
of the institutionalised pattern of activities and arrangements within the 
companies. Given both companies’ involvement in Japan, it is also found that 
the construction of identity in both companies is closely associated with the 
dominant Japanese ‘best practices’. For example, ‘school pupils’ in Data-Co 
are educated to adapt themselves to a system which is claimed to be learnt 
from ‘Japanese best practices’. The term ‘elite’ in Software-Co is used to refer 
to those who have been ‘Japanised’ in terms of their modes of 
communication, their thinking and their behaviour. 
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Chapter&7&Discussion&and&conclusion&
The purpose of this research was to contribute to the study of global 
suppliers, by investigating how Chinese supply firms under different supply 
chains manage to meet their Japanese clients’ requirements. As we have 
seen, both companies are under pressure from their Japanese clients, who 
are the leading firms in the global  supply chains. Supply firms need to meet 
their clients’ requirements in quality, cost, information security and delivery 
time. However, the specific ways through which the Japanese clients 
influence their supply firms and the extent to which they are involved in their 
supply firms’ daily operation are not the same. Rather, they are strongly 
shaped by the specific supply chain relationships and power relations 
between supply firms and their clients. Based on the concept of ‘governance 
structure’ in global value chains (GVCs) (Gereffi et al., 2005), this study 
reveals supply firms under two different governance structures, namely the 
market-based GVC and the captive GVC. Data-Co operates in a market-
based supply chain, in which the Japanese clients govern supply firms in a 
arm’s length approach primarily based on price. Software-Co operates in a 
captive supply chain, in which the Japanese client heavily engages in the 
management and daily operation of the supply firm. 
In order to understand the management and work in supply firms, it is found 
that the dynamics in supply firms could not be fully explained by the powerful 
influence exerted by their clients. On the one hand, the work dynamics are not 
only shaped by the supply chain relationships, but also strongly influenced by 
the other structural forces at the international, national and corporate levels 
(i.e. the SSDC effects). As I have argued in the previous chapter, the GVC 
discussion on global suppliers should be complemented by a social-
institutional perspective, considering the national and local embeddedness of 
the suppliers. On the other hand, corporate actors are not passive and 
trapped in the social-institutional environments in which they are embedded. 
Corporate actors actively respond to and manage these structural forces in 
order to improve their relationships with the clients and to enhance their 
positions in the supply chains. As a result, there is a need to understand how 
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different governance structures and structural forces at  the international and 
national levels are played out at the corporate and workplace levels, and how 
they are responded and experienced by the corporate actors. A analytical 
framework, which combining the global value chain discussion (Gereffi et al., 
2005) and the SSDC framework (Delbridge et al., 2011; Smith & Meiksins, 
1995), is thus proposed as a holistic approach to understanding the complex 
world of management and employment in global supply firms. The intensive 
observation and interviews in the companies’ Chinese workplaces as well as 
in their Japanese workplaces have allowed me to obtain first-hand information 
about the evolvement of the client-supplier relationships over time, the 
experiences both of managers and employees and to capture the dynamics 
between the structural influences at the international, national and corporate 
levels, and the actions and responses of various corporate actors at the 
corporate and workplace levels. 
As shown in the table below (Table 7.1), this research has revealed two very 
different work organisations and sets of employment relations, despite their 
similarities in terms of the country-of-origin (China), outward foreign direct 
investment (FDI) destination (Japan), sector (the international service 
outsourcing sector), and adoption of a demonstrated strategy of ‘learning from 
Japan’. In order to understand how these corporate strategies, policies and 
practices are constructed, implemented and institutionalised in both the 
Chinese and Japanese workplaces and to address the research questions of 
this study, this chapter will discuss three interwoven themes. Firstly, I focus on 
the structural forces apart from the influence of clients in the global supply 
chains. Drawing on the SSDC framework, I particularly discuss the 
construction of the dominance effects of ‘Japanese’ management and 
practices, the societal effects in different Chinese cities and the corporate 
effects. By looking into how these structural forces are constructed in both 
companies, I am able to offer a holistic picture on the environments in which 
the supply firms are embedded, taking account both the supply chain 
relationships and the institutional environments. I find that none of these 
effects is predetermined because they are interdependent and interactional in 
nature. Thus their manifestations in the supply firms are complicated and 
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diverse. Secondly, I focus on how these structural forces are managed under 
different supply chain relationships. I argue that the actual practices adopted 
by the companies are mediated through the supply chain relationships 
between the leading firms and the supply firms, and the corporate actors’ 
strategic choices. I also show how societal and dominance effects are put to 
use by the managers in order to exercise management control. This analysis 
looks into the interplay between structural forces and the supply chain 
relations, and the corporate actors’ strategies and practices to manage these 
relationships and structural forces. Thirdly, I ‘zoom in’ on the labour process 
and employment relations of the Chinese supply firms in different global 
supply chains. Drawing on the process of management control, I discuss the 
indeterminacy of labour power and the contested construction of workplace 
relations under different supply chain relationships. On the one hand, I 
recognise that the supplier-client relationships and the SSDC effects not only 
inform (but do not determine) corporate practices, but also give opportunities 
to and impose constraints upon the employees, and consequently shape their 
relations with the companies. On the other hand, I find that the specific 
patterns of management systems and worker experiences cannot be 
mechanically read off from the local and corporate contexts in which the 
management operates. The labour process at workplaces itself is contested 
and disconnected. By doing so, a multi-level analysis that considers the 
supply chain relationships, the effect of globalisation, the national and local 
institutions, the corporate strategies and the workplace relations is established.  
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Table!7.1:!Summary!of!case<study!findings!!
Pseudonym Data-Co Software-Co 
Country and 
place of 
origin 
Dalian City, China Shanghai City, China 
ODI 
destination 
Japan Japan 
Ownership Chinese private company Initially Chinese/Japanese joint 
venture. Chinese state 
university-owned company since 
2001 
Industry and 
type of 
service 
International service outsourcing, 
mainly providing business 
process outsourcing (BPO) 
services to Japanese 
organisations 
International service 
outsourcing, providing software 
design and programming 
services 
Levels of 
skills 
Low-skilled and semi-skilled 
routinised work 
High-skilled (software design) 
and semi-skilled (software 
programming) 
Supplier-
client 
relations 
Market-oriented; arms-length 
contracting and one-off 
transactions 
Captive relationship; 
Particularistic and long-term 
relationship with a single client 
Role of the 
Japanese 
offices 
Initially an administrative office, 
then developed into a marketing 
unit focusing on developing new 
clients 
Managing and training 
expatriates (trainees) 
Dominant 
feature of 
operational 
system 
Stringent implementation of 
productivity and quality controls; 
quality management largely 
based on multiple checks and 
rectifications; highly routinised 
work; team-based work units; 
team leaders have limited 
autonomy in work allocation and 
in dealing with employee 
grievances; high degree of 
supervision; no employee 
High level of work autonomy 
among developers with an 
emphasis on effective 
communication with the clients; 
routinised coding work among 
the programmers with the focus 
on rigid procedures for multiple 
testing; high involvement among 
the developers but none among 
the programmers; developers 
and programmers work together 
in teams, but with lots of 
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involvement tensions between the two 
HRM system Recruitment of student labour 
and a preference for young 
employees; initial intensive three-
month job training as interns; pay 
system combining daily piece-
rate pay and monthly basic pay 
determined by an annual skill 
assessment; long-term 
collaboration with technical 
schools thus guaranteeing the 
labour supply thereby allowing 
accommodation to the high yet 
seasonal labour turnover 
Sharp contrast between 
developers and programmers. 
For developers: high pay, 
systematic training and 
structured career paths, with low 
turnover. For programmers: 
relatively low pay, minimal 
training and limited internal 
promotion opportunities, with 
high turnover. 
Dominant 
features of 
employment 
relations 
and foci of 
tension 
 
Strong ‘teacher-pupil’ sentiment; 
lack of formal mechanism for 
employees to express 
grievances; informal employee 
efforts to manage and moderate 
the impact of management 
control system 
 
A core-peripheral model; strong 
sense among developers of 
being a member of the 
‘corporate elite’; but among 
programmers of being ‘second-
class citizens’; tensions between 
developers and programmers 
create uncertainties and 
difficulties for the teamwork; it is 
a challenge to retain core 
employees as the market 
changes 
 
This chapter is organised in the following way. The first three sections discuss 
the construction of the structural forces, the development of corporate policies 
and practices, and the employment relations and labour processes at the 
workplaces, respectively. The latter sections outline the contributions of this 
research to the field, the limitations of this project and the directions for future 
research.  
7.1&Beyond&the&supply&chain&relationships:&Construction&of&the&SSDC&effects&
As I pointed out in Chapter 2, existing studies on supply firms overemphasise 
the influence exerted by the clients within the global supply chains while 
neglect the social-institutional embeddedness of the supply firms. In order to 
fully understand the management and work in global supply firms, there is 
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need to think beyond the supply chain relationships, and examine the 
structural forces faced by the supply firms at the international, national and 
corporate levels. It is in this sense that the SSDC framework is introduced.   
Existing studies on SSDC frameworks have articulated the different 
mechanisms through which these effects are constructed (Delbridge et al., 
2011; Elger & Smith, 2005; Smith & Meiksins, 1995; Smith, 2008). While 
acknowledging the different forces that underlie each effect, my research on 
these two Chinese supply firms show the interplay and dynamics between 
these effects in terms of their construction, changes and continuity. According 
to my research findings, the interplay of SSDC effects is most evident in the 
following three ways, namely (1) that the ‘dominance effects’ of a ‘Japanese’ 
model in both companies are constructed and carried on through either 
‘societal effects’ or ‘corporate effects’; (2) that the ‘systemic’ transition of 
China from a centrally-planned economy to a market-oriented economy 
results in different ‘societal effects’ between state-owned companies and 
private companies in China, and between different areas of China. These 
consequently influence the construction of the ‘corporate effects’; (3) that the 
‘corporate effects’, which are manifested through the construction of corporate 
strategies, are shaped, but not determined, by the SSD effects. I now proceed 
to discuss each of these in turn. 
7.1.1&Construction&of&‘dominance&effects’&
One major finding of this research concerns the dominance effect of a 
‘Japanese’ model. In both Software-Co and Data-Co, ‘Japanese’ practices 
represent a central reference point for both the managers and employees. 
‘Japanese’ management is claimed to be a superior portfolio of operational 
techniques and HR approaches from which the companies seek to learn. In 
other words, ‘Japan’ and ‘Japanese’ practices appear to have taken on a 
‘dominant’ role in evolving work organisation and business practices in the 
Chinese companies in my study. 
At first sight, the dominance of a ‘Japanese’ model is associated with the 
argument, that leading firms within a specific global supply chain have the 
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power to set parameters not only on what services are to be provided, but 
also on how they are to be provided, including aspects of the working 
procedures, managerial practices and working conditions (e.g. Humphrey & 
Schmitz 2001; Gereffi et al. 2005). The presence of such ‘governance’ of 
suppliers is related to the ‘dominance effects’ derived from the leading firms 
within global supply chains, which may explain the dominance of ‘Japanese’ 
practices in the cases of Data-Co and Software-Co. However, as Gereffi et al. 
(2005) have suggested, there are different patterns of governance structures 
resulting in various relationships between leading firms and their suppliers. 
While the issue of ‘governance’ is more evident for ‘captive suppliers’ like 
Software-Co, it is less relevant for ‘market-oriented suppliers’ such as Data-
Co.  In a market-oriented supplier-client relationship, in which transactions are 
coordinated through markets, clients normally keep their hands off the 
operation and management of their suppliers, and suppliers enjoy a great deal 
of autonomy to manage their operation and employees in their own ways 
rather than following a specific set of managerial policies and practices. As I 
have shown in the preceding chapters, the interference from Japanese clients 
in Data-Co is minimal and stays at a superficial level, focusing on the 
paperwork, the appearance of the workplace and so on. In this sense, the 
governance of the global supply chain does not adequately explain the 
dominance of ‘Japanese’ practices in Data-Co. So, what would be a better 
explanation of the dominance effects of a ‘Japanese’ model?  
The ‘dominant’ position of a ‘Japanese’ management model is partly derived 
from Japan’s position as an ‘early developer’ in relation to China, which is 
considered to be a ‘late developer’. Here, the notion of ‘early/late 
development’ is relative. While Japan has been viewed as a classical case of 
‘late development’ in industrialisation in relation to the more advanced 
economies such as Britain and the US (Dore, 1973), it becomes an ‘early 
developer’ when compared with China, especially in terms of its development 
of a market-oriented economy and engagement in the international market 
(Child & Rodrigues, 2005; Warner, Hong, & Xu, 2004). Japanese FDI in the 
service sector started before the 1970s, and in the manufacturing sector in the 
1970s and 1980s, covering developing economies in Asia as well as 
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developed economies in North America and Europe (Dicken, 1988). By the 
early 1980s, Japanese companies had already achieved great economic 
success, and Japan had successfully become the second largest economy in 
the world. By contrast, China did not start its industrial reforms towards 
marketisation until the 1980s, and there was no evident spread of overseas 
Chinese affiliates until the 1990s. Although the 2000s witnessed a number of 
leading Chinese companies which were developing capability to manage their 
overseas operation proactively and systematically, the majority of Chinese 
companies were still at a very early and immature stage, and faced many 
problems that arose from a lack of strategic focus, insufficient expertise in 
international markets and inexperience in coordinating overseas operations 
(Warner et al., 2004). The ‘late development’ of Chinese companies has 
generated a tendency for them to ‘catch up’ with the ‘early developers’, and 
the success of the Japanese economy, and especially of famous Japanese 
companies such as Toyota, provides a reference point, or benchmark, from 
which Chinese companies, including the two in my study, can learn. 
According to Elger & Smith (2005), the ‘dominance effects’ of one nation, 
region or leading company is usually tied to its economic success. Therefore, 
it is cyclical – ‘stars of yesterday may become dogs of today’ (p.67). However, 
my findings show that Japan’s ‘dominance’ in Data-Co and Software-Co has 
not been much challenged by Japan’s long economic recession, which started 
after the bursting of the ‘bubble economy’ in the late 1980s. The enthusiasm 
for ‘learning from Japan’ has continued even after China surpassed Japan as 
the world’s second largest economy in 2010. In fact, it is found that the 
enduring ‘dominance effect’ of the ‘Japanese’ model in both Data-Co and 
Software-Co is divorced from the current economic performance of Japan. 
Instead, it is constructed and maintained by both corporate and local societal 
mechanisms. 
In Data-Co, the Japanese dominance is associated with local people’s high 
level of acceptance of it, and their identification with Japanese culture and 
working values. Given its long-standing historical as well as close 
geographical links with Japan (see Chapter 3), Dalian is a city with a large 
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number of people who know about and dedicate themselves to disseminating 
the Japanese language and Japanese culture in China. One third of Dalian 
residents start learning Japanese at high school. Japanese architecture, 
restaurants, teahouses and shops can be found all over the city, which 
reflects the prevailing Japanese culture and lifestyle in Dalian City.  
Aside from matters of culture and language, Japan has played a key and 
dominant role in revitalising the local economy in Dalian. By heavily ‘courting’ 
investment from Japan since the 1980s, Dalian has successfully transformed 
itself from a sleepy backwater into a technology and foreign investment hub 
and one of the top spots in Asia for outsourcing (see Chapter 3). By 2012, 
there were 4,519 Japanese-invested companies in Dalian, and around 
128,000 employees providing information technology outsourcing (ITO) and 
business processing outsourcing (BPO) services to Japanese organisations in 
Japan (Statistics of Dalian Municipal Government, 2013). Historically, when 
Japanese companies first came into Dalian in the 1980s, they were believed 
to be superior to the Chinese companies, most of which were still under a 
traditional ‘three irons’ system (Chapter 2) and were criticised for being over-
manned and inefficient. This was the first time that local Dalian people had the 
chance to get familiar with a market-oriented management system, and 
people were impressed by its efficiency, formalisation and standardisation. 
Moreover, employees in Japanese companies were usually paid more, and 
had more promising career developments, than those in Chinese companies, 
which generated further respect from Dalian people’s toward Japanese 
companies, and enhanced their identification with Japanese management. 
Since then, ‘Japanese management’ has become the benchmark for both 
established companies and start-ups in the city. Despite Japan’s stagnant 
economy, it is widely considered among Dalian people that working for a 
Japanese company is a symbol of individual achievement, and that Chinese 
companies which learn from Japanese companies are advanced. In short, it is 
through close historical and successful economic links between Japan and 
Dalian that the ‘dominance effects’ of ‘Japanese management’ are 
constructed and maintained.  
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Unlike Data-Co, Software-Co is not based in a city which has such strong and 
dominant links with Japan. However, ‘Japanese’ practices are still considered 
to be superior, and play a ‘dominant’ role. Here, the interpretation of the 
dominance effect must be cognizant of some typical corporate features of 
Software-Co, including its corporate history, the segmentation of labour and 
the HRM system. 
As I have mentioned in Chapter 4, Software-Co was established as a part of 
Japanese Official Development Assistance (ODA) to China, a programme 
which was started by the Japanese government in 1979, and which aimed to 
promote the economic and technical development of developing countries, 
through financial and technical aid. Under this ODA programme, software 
developers from Software-Co were provided with on-the-job training in 
Japanese companies in the fields of software design and programming. As a 
recipient of Japanese technical aid, people in Software-Co held the belief that 
they went to Japan in order to ‘learn advanced techniques and management 
systems from Japan’. Therefore, the mentality of ‘“Japanese” practices being 
superior’ emerged as soon as the company was established, and this initial 
mentality set the foundation for Japan’s dominant position in Software-Co. 
Consequently, through the extensive and long-term period of living in Japan 
and receiving training there, more and more Chinese developers are 
effectively being trained to be ‘Japanised’ --  speaking fluent Japanese, being 
familiar with Japanese culture, and working in the ‘Japanese way’ (see 
Chapter 4). These ‘Japanised’ developers go back to China upon completion 
of their training, and, through internal promotion in the Chinese HQ, become 
the managerial staff, leading hundreds of programmers who themselves have 
never received training in Japan. As I have stressed in Chapter 6, when the 
developers work with the programmers in the HQ, ‘being Japanised’ (i.e. 
following ‘Japanese’ work procedures, adopting ‘Japanese’ practices, 
speaking Japanese, showing a ‘Japanese’ attitude to work) creates a strong 
feeling of superiority and elitism among the developers, and distinguishes 
them from the programmers. In other words, these developers’ self-identity as 
members of the elite club is closely associated with their degree of 
‘Japanisation’. By accepting and claiming Japanese practices as ‘dominant’, 
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the developers’ collective self-identity as a member of elite is justified and 
enhanced. It is in this light that the developers have been making efforts to 
maintain the dominant position of ‘Japanese’ practices within the company, 
including labelling their existing practices as ‘Japanese’ rather than ‘Chinese’, 
emphasising the advantages of ‘Japanese’ practices in quality management 
and market development, and resisting the proposed reforms of the existing 
systems of pay and performance assessment. In conclusion, the ‘dominance 
effects’ of ‘Japanese’ practices in Software-Co are constructed through its 
corporate history and maintained by the corporate managers and senior 
employees under the specific corporate culture, strategy and management 
system.  
In essence, my findings reveal the interplay between societal effects, 
corporate effects and these dominance effects.  It is shown that ‘Japan’ 
exercises ‘dominance effects’ through the historically-established and 
enduring influence of the perceived superiority of a supposed ‘Japanese 
model’, which is now divorced from current economic circumstances. These 
‘dominance effects’ were constructed through local environments, corporate 
practices, processes and discourses, and are influential at local and corporate 
levels.  
7.1.2&System&in&transition&and&‘societal&effects’&
In my study, China presents a case which has been undergoing considerable 
social and economic change from a centrally-planned economy to a market-
based economy over the past three decades. Structural transitions have led to 
a series of changes in the labour market and education system, which 
constitute an important part of institutional and societal environments 
surrounding both companies in my study.  
China’s labour market has been undergoing a dramatic transition since the 
Chinese government deepened the market-oriented reforms in the early 
1990s. The state has retreated from owning firms, and since then the bulk of 
new jobs are to be found in the non-state sectors such as foreign invested 
companies, joint ventures (JVs) and private companies. The remaining state-
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owned companies have departed from the dominant danwei (work unit) 
system, under which the state employers offer employees lifetime 
employment and a wide range of social welfares (Ding & Warner, 2001). New 
entrants to the workforce are no longer allocated positions by the state, and 
companies have adopted temporary employment contracts to specify the 
rights and responsibilities of employers and employees. Meanwhile, the 
market-oriented reforms have led to the birth of three new groups of 
employees, namely, the vast number of migrant workers from rural areas, the 
increasing number of graduates emerging from colleges and technical schools 
every year, and the ‘40/50’ age-group of workers who were laid off by state-
owned companies and forced to seek re-employment in the labour market 
(Zheng, 2013). All these changes have resulted in a diverse labour market 
with increased labour mobility. Many companies in China have reported 
difficulty in sourcing and retaining skilled workers, engineers, and managers 
(Howard, Liu, Wellins, & Williams, 2008). In this study, labour mobility is very 
high in both companies’ embedded labour markets. Data-Co is located in an 
industrial cluster which accommodates hundreds of similar companies, hence 
there are sufficient opportunities for labour to move around in search of better 
and more secure earnings. Likewise, Software-Co is in the most prosperous 
and international city in China, which has the most job opportunities for the 
talented job seekers. This means that both companies are under great 
pressure to compete for qualified employees in the labour market and to 
retain skilled employees.  
The Chinese system of education, training and acquisition of skills has also 
undergone great changes during the economic reform. This has seen an 
unprecedented expansion in the higher education sector since 1999. The 
number of university enrolments and of university graduates entering the 
labour market in 2012 was about seven times of what they had been in 1999 
(National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2013). In comparison, the expansion 
of technical school education was relatively slow. The number of technical 
school graduates increased by only 80% during the same period (National 
Bureau of Statistics of China, 2013). This contrast suggests that the build-up 
of the Chinese education system has tended to emphasise intellectual skills 
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over vocational and technical skills, as noted by Li et al. (2011). Meanwhile, 
as higher education expands, there seems to be among Chinese people a 
strong disinclination with regards to technical training. As Brabasch et al. 
(2009) argue, technical training is widely seen to be related to manual labour, 
and is considered as a sign of having failed at school. Furthermore, even in 
the technical schools, the educational content is always found to be 
misaligned with corporate needs. Linkages between educational institutions 
and companies are very rare (Li et al., 2011). These changes and 
circumstances have a couple of implications for the labour market and for 
companies. First, companies which source employees from technical schools 
face a decline in the number of candidates over the years, and there is a need 
for them to find other channels for sourcing labour. In my study, although 
there are many technical schools in Dalian City in order to try to satisfy the 
large corporate demand in this industrial cluster, nevertheless, managers in 
Data-Co still find that the candidate pool is shrinking, which explains why they 
have set up satellite plants in other cities as alternative labour sources. 
Second, given the curricula, neither university graduates nor technical-school 
graduates have usable skills when they enter their first workplaces. Therefore, 
it is always up to the companies which hire the graduates to provide in-house 
training. This is the case in both Data-Co and Software-Co.     
While the labour market and the education system represent societal effects 
resulting from the ‘systemic’ transition of the Chinese economy, which have 
acted upon both companies in my study, my findings also reflect the fact that 
the economic reform has produced different types of institution in different 
areas of China, and has created unequal conditions in companies with 
different forms of ownership.  
In terms of the regional diversity, as I discussed in Chapter 2, China’s 
transition marks the decentralisation of decision making from the central 
government to the local governments, which produced the ‘variegated’ 
capitalism in China. Specifically, Dalian City, where Data-Co is located, 
develops a strategy which relies on providing relatively low-skilled outsourcing 
services to Japan. This strategy leads to a booming industrial cluster with 
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hundreds of outsourcing service providers, and a local labour market with a 
large amount of migrant workers from the rural areas. By contrast, Shanghai 
City has one of the largest labour markets and one of the most advanced 
higher educational systems in China, which provide Software-Co a large pool 
of talented university graduates. 
As to the diversity of ownership-types, private enterprises (such as Data-Co) 
and state-owned enterprises (SOEs) (such as Software-Co) face different 
regulatory and institutional environments, which influence their decision-
making. One of the biggest difficulties faced by many Chinese private 
companies is limited access to bank loans. This is, to a large extent, because 
state banks and official sources of credit in China are still controlled and 
dominated by the state, and they adopt a lending policy which is biased in 
favour of SOEs (see Chapter 2). Therefore, private companies such as Data-
Co have very limited sources of finance. This has largely constrained the 
company’s future growth, and prevented it from making large investments in 
technology and in employee training. It has also pushed the company to focus 
on cost-reduction and short-term profit maximisation, rather than long-term 
value creation. This partly explains Data-Co’s competitive strategy of cost 
reduction (Porter, 1986).  
SOEs, in contrast, enjoy much easier and more reliable access to credit and 
many other resources than do private companies, due to their political backing 
and close relationships with local government (Naughton, 2007). Software-Co, 
which is established, funded and managerially controlled by a public 
university, is a particular kind of SOE (see Eun et al. (2006) for a discussion of 
Chinese university-run enterprises). Because of this, Software-Co’s activities 
in the market are not only governed by the principle of economic efficiency, 
but also by the university’s social responsibility as a higher education 
institution. This underpins the company’s initial establishment as a training 
agency, and its huge investment in training during it first ten years (1991-
2001), even at a loss of profit every year. Meanwhile, given the company’s 
close link to the university, Software-Co can take advantage of the university’s 
assets, including financial resources, educational resources, physical spaces, 
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social links, and the ‘title’ of the university as part of its commercial brand. 
This enables Software-Co to provide developers with one-year systematic 
Japanese language training at the university, as well as offering employees 
subsidised use of the university’s canteens, gyms, swimming pools and of 
university-run training courses. More importantly, its ready access to bank 
loans supports Software-Co’s long-term strategy of being focused (Porter, 
1986), and helps the company to continue to offer lengthy and expensive 
training programmes for developers, even after the company’s complete 
transformation from a training agency into an outsourcing company in 2001.  
Despite all the above advantages from which private companies are excluded, 
SOEs face certain other institutional pressures, which do not normally exist in 
private companies. First, SOEs have the historical legacy of the traditional 
‘three irons’ system, namely the ‘iron rice-bowl’, the ‘iron chair’ and ‘iron 
wages’ (Chapter 2, also see Ding & Warner 2001). Despite the broad 
consensus on the inefficiency of this ‘three irons’ system, there has been a 
great deal of organisational inertia about moving towards a new system. This 
means that state-owned companies are likely to face more obstacles to 
accepting a market-oriented ideology and introducing new practices that 
deviate from the existing ‘three irons’ system (Child 1994; Hassard et al. 
2004). My findings in Software-Co have supported this conclusion – although 
it is over three decades since the economic reform process was initiated, 
many practices typical of a traditional ‘three irons’ system are still evident in 
Software-Co, including an egalitarian mentality in the pay system, lack of a 
performance-appraisal system and emphasis on seniority in promotion. 
Second, SOEs are prone to continued government intervention, interference 
and broader political pressures, which limit their autonomy and incentives in 
market competition (Morris, Sheehan, & Hassard, 2001). These constraints 
are evident in Software-Co. All the corporate HR and financial decisions have 
to go through the board of directors of the university. A certain proportion of 
the profits have to be handed over to support the university’s development 
every year. Moreover, Software-Co is pressured by the university and the 
local government into hiring employees it does not really need. These 
employees are often the relatives or friends of university or governmental 
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officials. University staff members who are no longer needed by the university 
are often transferred to the company. There is a department in Software-Co 
which has become notorious as a place in which to keep these ‘allocated but 
undesired’ employees. As one manager describes it, ‘lots of them (in this 
department) do not even show up. We do not expect them to, and we just pay 
them anyway’.  
In sum, this research reveals the interplay between system effects and 
societal effects, as well as their impacts on corporate strategies and practices. 
My findings highlight that the development of ‘system effects’ are not even 
across and within countries. A system in transition, such as China, can lead to 
divergent institutional arrangements within the country. This departs from the 
coherent and unitary models of national capitalism (for example, the ‘national 
business systems’ of Whitley (1999) and the variants of capitalisms of Hall & 
Soskice (2001)) and offers a typical case of within-country variations.     
7.1.3&Construction&of&‘corporate&effects’&&
‘Corporate effects’ are produced by corporate actors in their construction of 
corporate strategies. Here, the notion of ‘corporate strategy’ refers to an array 
of strategies covering general competitive strategy and specific marketing 
strategy, operational strategy and managerial strategy. As shown in the table 
below (Table 7.2), Data-Co and Software-Co have adopted quite contrasting 
strategies, with the sole exception that they both profess a managerial 
strategy of ‘learning from Japan’.  
!
 
 
!
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Table!7.2:!Corporate!strategies!in!Data<Co!and!Software<Co!
!!
Pseudonym Data-Co Software-Co 
Corporate 
competitive 
strategy 
Cost reduction Focused, highly customised 
and specialised 
Market 
strategy 
Expansion in the Japanese 
market, pursuing a big market 
share 
Dedication to a single client, 
developing long-term 
interdependency with this 
client 
Operational 
strategy 
 
Providing large-scale 
standardisation; economies of 
scale 
Providing a highly customised 
and specialised service; 
emphasising the importance 
of communication with the 
client 
(Claimed) 
Managerial 
Strategy 
‘Learning from Japan’  ‘Learning from Japan’ 
The construction of corporate strategies is strongly influenced by two factors, 
namely, specific corporate features and the supplier-client relationships. First, 
specific corporate features (or ‘administrative heritage’, to use Bartlett & 
Ghoshal's (1989) term) such as ownership types, corporate history, founding 
contexts and the early decisions on how to organise the company, create path 
dependency and influence the construction of corporate strategy. For 
example, the enthusiasm for ‘learning from Japan’ in Software-Co is 
associated with the company’s history as a training agency and its early 
cooperation with JAIDO as a part of the ODA programme. In addition, given 
that the annual remuneration of the SOE managers in Software-Co is not 
significantly related to the firm’s performance, these managers do not have 
sufficient incentive to put effort into business expansion or profit maximisation. 
This, in part, explains Software-Co’s total dedication to a single client.  
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Second, the governance structures in global supply chains play an important 
role in the construction of corporate strategies. For example, the market-
oriented relationships between Data-Co and its clients largely explain why 
Data-Co endeavours to expand its Japanese market by providing a 
standardised service. In contrast, the particularistic and long-term relationship 
between Software-Co and its single Japanese client underlies Software-Co’s 
great efforts at customisation.  
In summary, this section has explored the construction of SSDC effects by 
focusing on the international, national, local and corporate contexts in which 
Data-Co and Software-Co are embedded. I find that there is no clear and neat 
discrete separation among these four sets of effects, because they are 
interdependent and interactional in nature. Meanwhile, it is noticed that the 
manifestation and construction of the corporate effects are also influenced by 
the supplier-client relationships within the global supply chains. All these 
complicate the construction and manifestations of SSDC effects and call for a 
detailed investigation of interdependence between SSDC effects and the 
supply chain relationships.  
7.2&Development&of&managerial&policies&and&practices&
The above section has outlined the systemic, societal, dominance and 
corporate effects surrounding Data-Co and Software-Co, and has revealed 
how they interact with each other in the process of construction, change and 
continuity. The focus of this section is on how these structural forces are 
played out under different supply chain relationships and how they are 
managed by the corporate actors.  
7.2.1&Management&of&‘societal&effects’&in&marketNbased&and&captive&supply&chains&
New institutionalists argue that institutions create pressures on managers to 
adopt management practices that are perceived to be legitimate in a given 
institutional setting (for example, DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). My findings, 
however, suggest that corporate actors engage in managing the institutional 
pressures faced by their companies in divergent ways. In particular, supply 
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firms strategically respond to the structural forces in order to better manage 
their relationships with the clients and meet their clients’ requirements. One 
challenge that both companies in my study face is the high fluidity of the local 
labour market. Managers in both companies reported challenges and 
difficulties in recruitment, retention and internal promotion, due to the high 
mobility of the labour market. Nevertheless, the ways they manage this 
pressure differ considerably.  
In a market-based supply chain in which price is the most important 
parameter in transaction, Data-Co’s goal in managing the highly mobile labour 
market is to avoid high cost in labour retention and labour replacement and to 
retain the competitive edge in winning new business and developing new 
clients by offer competitive price. Based on this, Data-Co endeavours to 
‘accommodate’ to the high mobility of labour. First, it has developed close 
collaborations with local vocational schools, which serve as a stable source of 
student labour. This exemplifies the use of external resources in search of 
‘spaces’ for strategic choice under the institutional constraints (Child, 1997). 
Second, the recruitment of graduating students from technical schools is 
accompanied by a well-established and short-term training system, through 
which the inexperienced recruits are trained to be qualified semi-skilled 
workers within three months. Third, these recruitment and training activities 
are strategically scheduled to take place before the busy season every year, 
so that there is enough ‘hoarded’ labour for the coming business. Moreover, 
based on this relatively stable source of labour, Data-Co manages to achieve 
a certain level of labour flexibility and cost efficiency by ‘letting’ workers 
voluntarily leave for other companies during the low seasons, without making 
much effort to retain them. In this sense, high labour turnover does not lead to 
increased labour costs (e.g. increased wages) in search of employee 
retention, but instead serves as a cost-control function in dealing with the 
seasonal fluctuation in business.  
In contrast, in a captive supply chain, Software-Co is required to keep a stable 
and long-term group of employees so that to provide highly specialised and 
customised services to the clients. In this sense, an ‘accommodation’ 
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strategy, which is based on short-term employment relations and the use of 
non-regular employees, is not appropriate for Software-Co. Rather, a 
‘buffering’ strategy is developed to allow Software-Co to keep their core 
employees stable and to keep investing a huge amount money in employee 
training. The main idea of ‘buffering’ is to create a ‘close’ system for its core 
employees (i.e. the developers) and to decouple them from external 
influences as much as possible. The ‘close’ nature of the system for 
managing developers is achieved as a result of four aspects. First, the 
corporate knowledge base among the developers is largely internally 
embedded, and is not open to external sources. This means that managers 
gain their work knowledge, skills and experience as they work within the 
company and through internal on-the-job and off-the-job training, rather than 
from external sources such as professional education or work experience in 
different companies (see Zheng, 2013). As I have described, all the new 
developers were school-leavers who have never worked anywhere else. They 
develop their knowledge through the lengthy training they undergo in both 
China and Japan within the company. Although the other group of employees 
(i.e. programmers) consists mostly of mid-career employees, who thus are 
likely to have developed experience and knowledge at other companies, their 
impact on the corporate management is marginalised, because they are 
managed as periphery employees and are excluded from internal promotion 
in the company. Moreover, all the managerial members of staff are internal 
promoted and this further limits the potential input from external sources. 
Second, the systematic training programme develops a homogeneous and 
isolated group of developers who not only accepted but indeed very much 
appreciated the existing corporate culture and work environment. This is most 
evident during the developers’ expatriations in Japan. The collective 
accommodation in Japan, the stressful long working hours at the same 
Japanese workplaces, the homesickness and anxiety about working and living 
in a foreign country push these developers to rely on each other in both work 
and life. They see each other as the best colleagues, friends and even family. 
They spend most of their time within their ‘comfort zone’ with each other, to 
the extent that they lose opportunities and motivation to socialise with other 
people. This reinforces the current internal-embedded knowledge base. In 
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addition, the five-year training provides them with sufficient time to learn and 
understand the corporate culture and working environment and to assess 
whether they fit in with it. Those who do not fit in this homogeneous culture 
can always choose to leave before they finish training without restraints. 
According to the managers, 98% of the turnover among developers occurs 
during the first two-year training in China and the other 2% happens during 
the expatriation. Very few developers quit after they complete the training 
programme. Given this, it is fair to say that most of the remaining developers 
feel comfortable with the distinct corporate culture and working environment in 
Software-Co. A common thought shared by most developers is that ‘it 
(Software-Co) is not the best, but it is the most suitable place for me’. Third, 
the top salary, the structured internal career progression and the feeling of 
superiority of being a member of ‘elite’ all constitute a working situation which 
is seen by many developers as being too comfortable to leave. This in part 
explains why many developers were not tempted to leave for other companies 
even during the crisis. Last but not least, even if there are developers who 
want to quit, they face financial and skill constraints. As I have said, 
developers had to pay liquidated damages of 100,000RMB to the company if 
they failed to serve the company for five years after they completed their 
training. Besides, the skills they learnt in Software-Co were highly firm-specific 
and therefore unlikely to be very helpful in their job hunting. These restraints 
limit developers’ outside choices. To conclude, by developing a ‘close’ 
system, the potential impacts from the labour market upon the developers, 
such as fluctuations in labour supply and demand, as well as blandishments 
from other employers, are mediated by the management systems in Software-
Co. On the one hand, developers are provided with top work conditions, with 
which they are quite satisfied. On the other hand, they are restrained from 
leaving for other companies due to their skills and the potential financial loss 
entailed by leaving. Meanwhile, the corporate culture and environment under 
this ‘close’ system are so distinct, that these homogenised developers do not 
normally feel confident about getting used to a different one. This increases 
the interdependency between the company and the developers, and further 
reduces the developers’ chances of leaving.  
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In sum, the above accounts show that managerial policies and practices are 
seldom the direct manifestation of the institutional and organisational 
pressures faced by the companies. Corporate actors in supply firms not only 
have the capacity to work with other local institutions and develop distinctive 
approaches to managing their local environments, but also have the space to 
strategise in accordance to their relationships with the clients.  
7.2.2&Translation&of&corporate&strategy&&in&marketNbased&and&captive&supply&chains&
The role of corporate actors in developing managerial policies and practices is 
also reflected in how corporate actors translate corporate strategy into 
strategic actions and deliver them within the companies. My findings show 
that the same corporate strategy can be interpreted and applied in contrasting 
ways under different supply chain relationships. One important example in my 
study concerns how the managers in the two companies interpret the strategy 
of ‘learning from Japan’, and how they use this strategy in management 
control.  
In a captive supply chain where the supply firms have opportunities to closely 
work with the Japanese clients and ‘being Japanised’ is seen as a essential 
criteria in maintaining clients, ‘learning from Japan’ is interpreted and 
understood as the company’s attempts and activities aimed at ‘borrowing’ 
Japanese practices, and transferring Japanese practices back from the 
Japanese workplaces to the Chinese HQ. Indeed, many core practices among 
the developers represent the results of ‘reverse diffusion’, through which the 
developers return to the Chinese HQ upon completion of their expatriations in 
Japan and continue to develop and apply the systems and practices that they 
have learnt in Japan. These include a ‘water flow’ work procedure, a system 
of ‘continuous improvement’ through employee participation and involvement, 
Hansei reports and Hansei meetings (see Chapters 5 and 6). The ‘reverse 
diffusion’ of Japanese practices is based on a systematic process of learning 
about management in both China and Japan. In particular, the on-the-job 
training in Japan provides the developers sufficient time and opportunities to 
acquire and accumulate knowledge of Japanese management, to adopt 
Japanese practices in their daily work, and to update their experience and 
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perceptions about Japanese management during their socialisation with 
Japanese colleagues and clients. This first-hand knowledge and experience 
of Japanese management facilitates the developers in understanding the tacit 
or less codified aspects of Japanese practices, thus reduce the ‘stickiness’ of 
such practices in terms of cross-national diffusion.  
By contrast, in a market-based supply chain where clients do not have direct 
requirements on Japanisation, ‘learning from Japan’ in Data-Co does not 
involve activities of reverse diffusion. HQ managers do not show much 
interest in encouraging and spreading the practices that have developed in 
the Japanese workplaces, nor does it build any channels for the repatriates to 
share their experience and knowledge of Japanese practices. Unlike 
Software-Co, which invests a huge amount of money on enabling 
management to learn directly from the Japanese companies, Data-Co has not 
established any effective mechanisms for direct management learning. As I 
have shown, most of its on-site expatriates in Japanese companies are short-
term oriented and task-based. They are isolated from and managed in 
different ways from the Japanese employees. Therefore, they do not have the 
chance to learn and get a feeling for the practices that are deployed at the 
Japanese workplaces. In fact, people’s knowledge and perceptions of 
Japanese management are normally gained through second-hand sources 
such as other people’s experience, books and even hearsay. This relatively 
superficial understanding of ‘Japanese’ practices makes it possible for 
managers to reinterpret ‘Japanese’ practices (for example, managers 
reinterpret Japanese ‘Kaizen’ as intensive on-the-job exercises) and 
rhetorically label non-Japanese practices ‘Japanese’. 
The presence or absence of reverse diffusion, and the differences in 
management learning between the two companies, demonstrate different 
corporate choices in handling ‘societal effects’ and ‘dominance effects’ under 
different supply chains. In a captive supply chain, Japanese operational 
practices and HR practices are more likely to be considered as an un-
problematically superior portfolio. Under the most ideal circumstance, 
‘learning from Japan’ is expected to result in the direct reproduction of a 
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‘Japanese system’ in China. Any failure of such reproduction is to be 
explained in terms of the obstacles that arise from the Chinese social 
environment. In other words, ‘dominance effects’ is prioritised under a captive 
supply chain. This is in accord with Software-Co’s approach of ‘buffering’ 
external influences and developing a ‘close’ system for the developers. By 
contrast, managers in a market-based supply chain emphasise the 
importance of developing policies and practices that are a best fit with the 
local settings. In this sense, transferring established ‘Japanese’ practices is 
less relevant, and the development of new practices which can help the 
company to make the best use of the local workforce, becomes more pressing 
for Data-Co. This conforms to Data-Co’s competitive strategy of ‘cost 
reduction’.  
In both forms of supply chains, One important observation from my study is 
that ‘learning from Japan’ in both companies is put to use in management 
control. This is closely associated with the ‘dominance effects’ of ‘Japanese’ 
practices. At Software-Co, ‘learning from Japan’ is seen as a mark of the 
‘corporate elite’. By choosing and defining typical ‘Japanese’ practices (such 
as Kaizen and Hansei) as well as the qualities of ‘Japanese’ employees (such 
as being hard working, responsible, committed, loyal and customer-oriented) 
as the criteria for evaluating one’s degree of ‘Japanisation’, corporate 
managers stimulate a shared understanding and identity for the corporate 
‘elite’. Only those employees who adopt the defined ‘Japanese’ practices and 
behave as ‘Japanese’ employees are considered to be members of the ‘elite’ 
within the company. Those who do not show interest in learning from Japan 
are excluded from the ‘elite’ group. In this sense, the strategy of ‘learning from 
Japan’ is translated into a form of ‘identity regulation’ through which managers 
regulate employees’ working behaviour by influencing their self-construction 
of identity (Alvesson & Willmott, 2002). This form of ‘identity regulation’ is 
essential and powerful in management’s control of developers, considering 
that the developers’ daily work is very loosely monitored and supervised. To 
be in the club of the ‘elite’, developers have to meet certain requirements and 
guidelines in their daily work, including the ability to speak Japanese fluently, 
working as hard as Japanese employees, embracing overtime work as readily 
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as Japanese normally do, being highly commitment to clients, pursuing 
‘perfect’ work rather than just ‘completed’ work, showing interest in learning 
Japanese practices, being loyal to the company, and so on. In this sense, the 
‘elite’ identity, which stems from the translation and delivery of a strategy of 
‘learning from Japan’, forms an ‘iron cage of subjectivity’ (Karreman & 
Alvesson, 2004; Knights & Willmott, 1985) and, to a large extent, enables 
Software-Co to achieve a high level of commitment to their work, while 
allowing sufficient autonomy and flexibility to the developers. 
In Data-Co, a rhetoric of ‘being Japanese’ is used to justify the policies and 
practices adopted in the company. For example, the stringent quality control, 
disciplinary workplaces and intensive on-the-job exercises are all presented 
as features of the advanced ‘Japanese’ system. By doing so, employees are 
made to feel obliged to accept and follow these corporate practices and 
policies, because they are told that every surviving and thriving company has 
to manage their employees in this way. As is the case in Software-Co, 
‘learning from Japan’ is also used in identity regulation. ‘Learning from Japan’ 
underlies the management discourse that ‘workers are school pupils who 
come to school (the company) to learn advanced Japanese practices’. It thus 
reinforces workers’ identity as school pupils, and justifies the school-related 
activities such as on-the-job exercises and examinations. Parallel to 
Karreman & Alvesson's (2004) observation of the interplay of ‘technocratic 
control’ and ‘social-ideological control’ in one company, my study in Data-Co 
further reveals the interrelations between different forms of management 
control. While the rigid quality control, stringent performance measures and 
organisational bureaucracy form a ‘hard iron cage’ for the employees to 
conform to work procedures and requirements under close surveillance, the 
construction of a ‘teacher-pupil’ identity motivates the workers to go beyond 
the work routine at workplaces and to take the initiative in improving and 
learning skills in their spare time. Managers keep reminding the workers that 
they are ‘learning for themselves, rather than working for the company’ so that 
workers are willing to get involved in personal development of their skills.  
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In sum, following the previous argument that corporate strategies of global 
supply firms are not predetermined but emerge through the interplay of SSD 
effects and the supply chain relationships, this part further explores how these 
structural forces are played out in different supply chains. It is demonstrated 
that even under a similar corporate strategy, corporate actors have the 
capacity to manage the extent of the enactment of this strategy (i.e. selective 
learning), and choose the ways in which the strategy is manifested (i.e. 
reverse diffusion, rhetoric or/and management control), depending on their 
supply chain relationships and how they coordinate the corporate effects with 
the other effects.  
7.3& Employment& relations& at&workplaces:& scope& and& limits& of&management&
control&
I argued in Chapter 2 that studies on supply firms have not paid much 
attention to the internal dynamics between managers and employees at 
suppliers’ workplaces, especially employees’ experiences at workplaces and 
their responses to management. Therefore, following the above discussion on 
the construction of SSDC effects and the corporate actors’ actions in 
developing policies and practices at both the corporate and workplace level, 
this section continues to ‘zoom in’ on the workplace, and investigates the 
employment relations at the Chinese workplaces of the two companies. In 
particular, I focus on how employees respond to and implement the 
management policies and practices in their daily work, and interrogate the 
scope and limits of management control in both companies.  
According to labour process theory, the outcomes of any management 
ideology, technique and practice at workplaces is subject to the extent and 
contour of employee consent and dissent, and the employees’ strategy of 
survival, negotiation and accommodation in the workplace (Ackroyd & 
Thompson, 1999). In particular, Smith (2006, p.390) argues that labour power, 
‘what the employer hires and the worker exchanges’, has two elements: the 
power over work effort and the power to move between firms. Accordingly, 
two forms of bargaining in workplaces are seen to shape the organisation of 
labour process and the outcomes of management strategies and practices. 
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The first is known as effort bargaining, which involves employees’ efforts to 
maximise money income and employers’ efforts to ensure workers’ endeavour 
during the working day. The second is called mobility bargaining, through 
which employees express their discontent by exiting or/and using their 
mobility power to negotiate with management for desired working condition 
and rewards. It also involves employers’ strategy over labour movement and 
retention, selection, reward and career development. Based on this, the scope 
and limits of management hegemony in both companies will be investigated, 
looking at both effort bargaining and mobility bargaining.  
Before I move on to each form of bargaining, it is important to note that an 
organised ‘voice’ for employees is rudimentary or absent in both companies. 
As I mentioned in Chapter 3, trade unions in both companies are not so much 
representatives of workers as they are basically the state’s tool for 
maintaining social stability. The functions of these unions do not go beyond 
acting as a welfare unit which focuses on labour entertainment and well-
being. Workers in both companies are indifferent to the trade unions and 
some of them are completely ignorant of their existence. Given that both trade 
unions in my study are under the control of the local government and of the 
Chinese Communist party, they are unlikely to become a formal mechanism 
for the employees to express their grievance and bargain with the companies. 
This is in line with the conclusion made by Ding et al (2002), that Chinese 
unions are more ‘an offshoot of the HR department’ and are ‘primarily 
concerned with supporting managerial interests’. Meanwhile, there is no 
organised process of employee consultation in either company. This means 
that employees lack any independent channel through which they might 
address differences in their own agendas and priorities. In other words, 
managers by and large monopolise authority and power within the workplace. 
The overall situation of strong capital and weak labour in China is evident in 
both cases. 
7.3.1&Managing&labour&effort&in&marketNbased&and&captive&supply&chains&
One key strategy for Data-Co to manage the market-based supply 
relationships with its clients is to continuously attract new student interns 
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every  year at a low labour cost, and to train them to be semi-skilled workers 
in a short time. Indeed, Data-Co is very attractive for the young, 
inexperienced, new employees who have just graduated from the technical 
schools. Specifically, the reputation of Data-Co in the local district and its 
highly effective training programme have made it a perfect starting place for 
employees’ career development and job hunting. This, together with the 
‘dominance effects’ of Japanese practices and the ‘learning from Japan’ 
strategy I discussed above, underpins the company’s management rhetoric of 
employees being school pupils. As I have argued, this ‘school pupil’ identity 
not only justifies the practices which carry ‘teacher-pupil’ sentiment such as 
the on-the-job exercises and the examinations, but also motivates employees 
to go beyond the work routines at workplaces and engage in learning 
activities and skill improvement in their spare time. However, this ‘teacher-
pupil’ ideology and its attraction to employees do not work for the skilled 
workers and the old workers. These employees retain an instrumental 
attachment to work as a basis for earning money, and are basically critical 
about the pupil-oriented rhetoric and practices. For example, they thought the 
on-the-job exercises to be ‘a complete waste of time’ and felt offended at 
being treated as ‘kids’. 
In order to provide standardised products that are required in a market-based 
supply chain, Data-Co has developed a management system, which in 
appearance, is quite successful in monitoring and regulating workers’ daily 
working behaviour and performance. The stringent operational and quality 
control processes are only modified at the margins. For example, in cases 
where the team leaders indulged their members by not reporting their errors, 
the extent of this misbehaviour and its potential negative effects were 
considerably restricted by the peer pressure in the teams, and by the intense 
pressure exerted upon team leaders to meet the targets set by management 
(see Chapter 5). In effect, team leaders’ misbehaviour did not mitigate 
management control, but, rather, enhanced it by creating a hint of ‘humanity’ 
at the workplace and developing a ‘reciprocal’ relation between team leaders 
and their members. Likewise, there were instances where employees resisted 
certain management practices (e.g. the 5S system, the use of the punched-
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card machine) or got involved in informal negotiations with the management 
(e.g. over on-the-site exercises), and, as I reported, managers did sometimes 
make concessions for the employees. Nevertheless, it is found that the extent 
to which and the ways in which these concessions were made for employees, 
were strictly controlled by management, so that customer satisfaction, 
efficiency and the general principle of ‘a disciplined workplace’ would not be 
compromised. This was partly achieved by the organisational hierarchy, the 
close surveillance and the information system in Data-Co. The small span of 
control (about ten workers in one team), the pyramidal hierarchy, the close 
interaction between the shop-floor supervisory team and the middle 
managers, and the daily report system ensure that any potential problems and 
uncertainties at the workplaces are noticed and reported immediately so that 
supervisors and managers have sufficient time to discuss and come up 
appropriate strategies to prepare for them and handle them. They also ensure 
that some of the misbehaviour and indulgence is visible to senior 
management so that these actions only take place with the tacit acceptance of 
the management. One limitation of Data-Co’s management system lies in the 
fact that shop-floor workers are not involved in any sort of problem-solving 
and innovation activities. Management stresses the importance of skill 
improvement by each individual worker, but does not expect workers’ 
participation (such as constructive suggestions) in managerial issues. This is 
similar to what has been observed in Delbridge (1998) and Dedoussis (1995).  
By contrast, the captive relationships between Software-Co and its client drive 
the employment relations in Software-Co towards a relatively long-term and 
captive one. For Software-Co, the systematic training programme, especially 
the long-term on-the-job training in Japan, acts as the biggest lure to talented 
individuals. Besides, recruitment from top-universities, secure jobs with high 
salaries and a structured career path are thought to be attractive too. For a 
long time, these management practices have not only guaranteed the best 
candidates from the top universities, but have also created a strong feeling 
among employees of ‘working with the brightest people’. However, these 
elements are becoming less attractive in light of the changing socio-economic 
situation in China. First, as more and more foreign-invested enterprises 
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(FIEs), especially world-leading MNCs, enter China and offer employees 
training opportunities all over the world, the training programme in Software-
Co is not seen by employees as being as unique as it was before. Young 
employees feel less grateful and excited that senior ones about the training 
opportunity. As one young developer reflected: 
Things have changed a lot due to China’s economic reform and 
opening up. For senior developers who joined in the early 1990s, going 
abroad was a once-in-a -lifetime opportunity, and only the most 
talented people could make it. But now, lots of companies offer 
opportunities to go abroad, either for training or for business. To be 
honest, the opportunity to work in Japan is much less attractive 
nowadays than it was ten or twenty years ago. People prefer the US or 
European countries. (15th December 2011 in Tokyo) 
Second, as more and more companies in the market tend to offer good 
performers substantial and even massive salary increases, or promotion 
opportunities, young developers in Software-Co feel de-motivated and 
reluctant simply to receive a stable salary. There is also widespread 
scepticism about the company’s promotion system among the young 
developers. Against the background of dramatic socio-economic changes and 
wide job opportunities, these young talents are less concerned about job 
stability but rather are eager to get salary increases and career advancement. 
Therefore, while the senior developers fought hard to resist the proposed 
performance-based system, many young employees actually welcomed it.  
In general, the attractions that companies offer to their employees turn out to 
be quite partial and unsustainable. As a result, while these attractions do to 
some degree form certain common ground between management and 
employees, they also caused antagonism between them, and within different 
groups of employees (e.g. between younger and senior employees, this was 
seen in both Data-Co and Software-Co).  
Compared with Data-Co, the workplace in Software-Co had a number of 
characteristics in common with ‘high involvement, high commitment’ 
workplaces, which incorporate ‘soft’ human resource management (Legge, 
1995). It also featured the ‘learning factory’, where knowledge was created, 
learnt and applied by highly trained workers (Fruin, 1997). Core employees 
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(i.e. developers) are given great autonomy and flexibility in planning and 
organising their daily work. Developers’ work performance is evaluated by 
their clients, and there is no internal established performance system. 
Nevertheless, as I have mentioned, developers’ working behaviour is highly 
regulated and guided by their self-identity as a member in the ‘corporate elite’, 
and by the corporate norms of being part of an ‘elite’. To a large extent, this 
identity-regulation of developers being a member of corporate ‘elite’ is the 
essence of the management control among developers in Software-Co. It is 
this elitism that underpins developers’ high commitment to the company and 
to its clients, and their continuous pursuit of quality.  
However, my findings show that this management system, based on the elite 
identity, is problematic and fragile because the social and corporate 
embeddedness of such an elite identity is being eroded. There are three 
reasons for this. Firstly, as I discussed in Chapter 6, developers’ ‘elite’ identity 
was not only corporate-constructed, but also socially-embedded. This was 
associated with the developers’ background as top university graduates, who 
were very few in number, and thus socially recognised as ‘elite’. However, 
due to the expansion of higher education in China, the number of top 
university graduates has increased sharply, and these graduates are now 
viewed as more ‘ordinary’ than ‘elite’. This means that the consistency 
between developers’ corporate identity and their social identity is broken, and 
developers tend to show more scepticism and reservations about their ‘elite’ 
identity in the company. My findings show that the sentiment of elitism among 
young developers was not as strong as it was among the senior developers. 
In fact, few young developers demonstrated themselves as being in the elite 
club. Secondly, the elitism among developers has nurtured significant 
grievances among the periphery programmers. As I described in Chapter 5, 
lots of programmers felt that they were being ‘discriminated’ against, and were 
quite hostile to the developers. This resulted in some programmers’ attempts 
to impede developers’ work in teams by refusing to take overtime work even 
when the teams had very tight deadlines, or by being deliberately unhelpful in 
teamwork. As a consequence, the team leaders and managers had to 
constantly react to the resistance and uncertainties caused by the 
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programmers. Given that the formal management system is not helpful in 
alleviating the estrangement between developers and programmers, the 
work’s progress and quality, and especially the efficiency of teamwork, largely 
rely on how well the developers get along with the programmers through 
informal and personal interactions, which is beyond the scope of management 
control. Related to this, due to the interdependency between the programmers 
and the developers in teamwork, the developers’ feeling of ‘superiority’ and 
‘privilege’ compared with the programmers is gradually disappearing. In fact, 
my findings have revealed the tendency for managers to break the developer-
programmer distinction (for example, programmers are provided with internal 
promotion opportunities), and for the developers to see the programmers as 
‘partners’ rather than ‘subordinates’.  Because of the erosion of the social and 
corporate embeddedness of the elite identity, the norms of being an elite 
(such as being loyal to the company, showing high commitment to quality), 
which guide and regulate the developers’ work behaviour, are no longer as 
acceptable as they were before. My findings show that young employees are 
more pragmatic about their effort and salary than the senior ones. Many of 
them expressed their reluctance to work overtime and to pursue 
perfectionism. This was in line with the senior developers’ complaints about 
the young ones. In sum, while identity regulation did play a crucial role in 
management control, its sustainability should be well examined given the 
economic-social change, and its effect should not be overstated. 
7.3.2&Managing&labour&mobility&in&marketNbased&and&captive&supply&chains&
Mobility power is one element of labour power, and workers’ mobility choices 
are closely associated with the organisation of labour process (Smith, 2006). 
Given the highly mobile labour market and the lack of organised ‘voices’ of the 
employees in both companies, quitting or threatening to quit is one of most 
commonly used approaches for employees to express their dissatisfaction 
and sense of grievance to the management, and, occasionally, to bargain with 
the company. Despite management efforts to either ‘accommodate’ or ‘buffer’ 
the high mobility of the labour market, as discussed above, the challenges 
and problems arising from the high turnover of labour is far from settled.  
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The mobile local labour market and the increasing job opportunities elsewhere 
provide employees, especially the skilled and experienced ones, with 
sufficient opportunities to move between companies. This is particularly true in 
the industrial cluster where thousands of similar companies aggregate without 
restraints against labour ‘poaching’ and in a employment system that are 
largely based on non-regular employment. Under this circumstance, 
employees’ mobility power is strengthened and the company is pressurised to 
take actions to retain skilled employees. In this study, the high turnover 
among the young, skilled employees is a major challenge for Data-Co’s 
management, and is believed to be the underlying cause of the problematic 
composition of the employee ages and skill levels in the company. On the one 
hand, the young, skilled employees do not stay in the company for long 
because they represent the most competitive group in the labour market and 
they always move between companies for better earnings. On the other hand, 
the old and less productive employees are immobile because they do not 
have many outside choices in the labour market. This leaves the young but 
unskilled, inexperienced new employees being the major workforce, and 
consequently imposes pressures in employee recruitment, training and quality 
control. By the time of my fieldwork, the company had just launched a 
‘managerial elites’ programme through which workers with good performance 
and junior managers were selected and trained to fit senior managerial 
positions. This aimed to retain skilled employees by providing them with 
opportunities for career advancement. However, as the HR manager 
commented, ‘this (programme) will be helpful but it will not solve the problem. 
The retention of skilled employees is a long fight, given the nature of this 
industry and the labour market.’ 
Labour mobility is expected to be much lower in a captive supplier than in a 
market-based supplier. In appearance, retention of skilled employees was 
quite successful in Software-Co, especially after the company’s huge 
investment in employee training. As I have said, the company achieved zero 
turnover during 2005 and 2010 among the developers who had completed 
training. However, this did not mean that labour mobility in Software-Co was 
completely under control. My findings show that many young and junior 
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developers are critical about the current management system and are quite 
open to the opportunities for ‘job hopping’.  Diverse and open access to 
industrial and job information make it difficult for the company to keep the 
system ‘close’, and young employees feel unsecure about receiving long-term 
training on firm-specific skills, given the rapid pace of socio-economic 
changes and developments in technology. Meanwhile, more and more young 
employees feel dissatisfied with the seniority-based promotion system in 
Software-Co, and feel that they will not have the chance to pursue career 
development unless they quit. Even the contractual liquidated damages are 
less restraining, because many young developers believe it is better to pay 
their way out in order to gain better personal development, than it is to be 
constrained within one company. All these considerations suggest that 
despite its previous successes, the management of labour mobility in 
Software is now under threat. As the corporate director reflected in relation to 
the zero turnover of developers during the economic crisis, ‘they (the 
developers) did not quit because other companies were in crisis as well and 
could not make good offers. They would have left if they had had a choice or if 
we had kept cutting their salaries over a longer period of time. ‘ 
Apart from exiting, labour mobility power can also be used to negotiate with 
management for improved conditions. My findings in Data-Co show that the 
threat of leaving was used by the employees before the busy season, and that 
managers announced an extra subsidy to avoid a potential mass resignation.  
Employee gender plays a role in the degree of ‘mobility bargaining’ that goes 
on. In both companies, many female employees, especially the married ones, 
tend to prioritise job stability over salary and career development. Therefore, 
they appear to be more tolerant of the unsatisfactory wages and slow 
promotion opportunities, and are less likely to use their ‘labour mobility’ 
power. This is in line with the overall ‘male-breadwinner’ model, in which 
women are expected to take on more responsibilities in family care, and men 
to earn more money. Nevertheless, it is found that these female employees 
are normally from low-level positions such as shop-floor workers in Data-Co 
and programmers in Software-Co. Female employees in the middle- and top-
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level positions do not show such tolerance. This suggests that the male-
breadwinner model is not as strong in China as in other countries such as 
Japan.  
In short, both companies in my study have developed a management system 
which combines technical, bureaucratic, normative, and identity control 
approaches. In spite of this, both of them face problems with labour retention 
and employee discontent. Neither of them has found a sustainable system to 
support the hegemony of management. My study shows that the tensions and 
challenges that managers confront are, on the one hand, strongly influenced 
by the wider institutional arrangements around the companies, as well as by 
the supply chain relationships; and, on the other hand, are informed by the 
employees’ identity, interests and relations.   
7.4&Contribution&to&knowledge&
By drawing on the GVC discussion and the SSDC framework, this thesis has 
developed a multi-level analysis for the purpose of understanding 
management, organisation and employment in global supply firms. This multi-
level analysis not only consider the power relations between supply firms and 
leading firms within the global supply chains, but also locate the development 
of management policies, practices and work relations within their contexts at 
the international, national, local and corporate levels. On the one hand, it 
recognises that the supply chain relationships shape the management 
systems and workplace dynamics in supply firms. On the other hand, it 
stresses that these dynamics could not be fully understood without 
considering the supply firms’ local embeddedness and the labour process at 
the workplace level.  
In relation to the literature on global supply firms, this thesis extends the 
existing discussion in three ways. In the first place, in order to correct the 
overemphasis on the powerful influence of clients in shaping supply firms’ 
management systems, this study has compared the supply firms in two 
different patterns of global supply chains. It has shown that the influence of 
clients is exerted in different ways under different governance structures and 
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this leads to divergent consequences in terms of the management practices 
and employment relations in supply firms. Therefore, instead of assuming an 
equally powerful influence from the clients, there is a need to examine the 
specific power relations between supply firms and leading firms under 
different supply chains.  
In the second place, this thesis extends the GVC analysis of global supply 
firms by considering the social-institutional embeddedness of the supply firms. 
By combining SSDC framework with the GVC discussion, this study has 
shown that the management and work in supply firms are not only shaped by 
the clients’ requirements, but also strongly influenced by the structural forces 
surrounding the firms at the international, national and local levels. These 
structural forces interact with each other and manifest themselves in different 
forms at the corporate and workplace levels. Corporate actors respond to and 
manage these structural forces according to the governance structures in the 
supply chains so that they can meet the requirements from their clients and 
survive in the market competition. In addition, by emphasising the regional 
diversity and the diversity of ownership-types in China, this study has also 
suggested that there is no stable set of institutions in the Chinese context. 
There are multiple institutional settings determined by regional politics and 
ownership structures. The diverse and variegated nature of Chinese 
capitalism makes for a complex and unexpected combination of institutions 
compared to the developed countries, and this in turn influences the corporate 
strategies, practices and employment relations in Chinese supply firms. By 
undertaking local-level analysis and paying attention to the specific types of 
firm, this study has shown that supply firms from various areas of China, with 
different ownership structures, carry distinctive historical legacies and face 
diverging institutional environments. Therefore, they develop specific policies, 
practices and work relations to respond to and manage these legacies and 
institutional environments. In Child (2009), the author suggests that ‘one 
feature that has characterised China above all since the end of the 1970s is 
the rapid change and hectic growth it has experienced…it has developed a 
number of different constituent business systems and contrasting regimes at 
different levels of government’ (p.68-69). Therefore, we cannot ‘treat the 
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context of China’s management as a fixed or even uniform phenomenon’ 
(p.69). This study has responded to this argument and offered a way of 
advancing theories on the inter-relationships between the home-country 
institutional context and the management and organisation of Chinese firms.   
In the third place, this thesis has discussed the workplace dynamics in global 
supply firms, by focusing on the indeterminacy of labour power and the 
contested construction of workplace relations. It is argued that extant literature 
on global suppliers did not adequately examine the internal dynamics at the 
workplace level. This study shows that ordinary employees get involved in the 
formation and development of management policies and practices by 
negotiating with management, resisting and ‘beating’ the management system, 
or surviving and accommodating to the system. In particular, in the absence of 
effective ‘organised’ voices and within an overall situation of strong capital 
and weak labour, it is shown that the ‘mobility power’ of labour can pose great 
challenges to management. Meanwhile, this study has shown that the 
normative control and identity regulation, acting as ‘iron cages of subjectivity’, 
are combined with technical and bureaucratic control, acting as a ‘hard iron 
cage’, in complementary ways, in order to control labour’s effort and mobility. 
However, the efficacy and sustainability of such management controls are 
strongly influenced by the specific institutional arrangements at the local, 
national and international levels, and the composition of employees in terms 
of nationality, ethnicity, gender, age, and class. By drawing on labour process 
theory and incorporating workplace-level analysis, this study has provided a 
comprehensive understanding of the internal dynamics within global supply 
firms, and of the relational dynamics between organisational actors within the 
global supply chains and the complex structural forces they face. 
This study has also extended the SSDC framework in two ways. First, 
although extant studies on the SSDC framework have articulated the 
mechanism through which each effect is constructed (Delbridge et al., 2011; 
Elger & Smith, 2005; Smith & Meiksins, 1995; Smith, 2008), these studies 
have not explicitly discussed how these effects interplay with each other. 
Regarding this, this study pays particular attention to the interdependent and 
 
253 
interactional nature of these effects. It extends the SSDC framework by 
elaborating the interplay between these four sets of effects and investigating 
their diverse manifestations in global supply firms. In particular, it has been 
shown that the dominance effects may be constructed and carried on through 
the corporate effects and societal effects. The system effects may lead to 
diverse societal effects in a specific context and consequently influence the 
corporate effects in MNCs. In addition, the system effects, societal effects and 
dominance effects all impact the construction of corporate effects. This 
provides a means of going beyond the ‘one effect versus another’ model, and 
towards a recognition of the structural inconsistencies and interdependence. 
Second, while the SSDC framework has been primarily discussed and applied 
in terms of subsidiary management (e.g. Elger & Smith 2005; Smith et al. 
2008), this thesis provides one of the first attempts to apply the SSDC 
framework to the global supply firms. It shows that the GVC discussion on 
global suppliers could be complemented by the SSDC framework, thus 
provides a holistic picture on the management and work in supply firms. 
Finally, a CR approach allows for a mechanism and process-based analysis 
of global supply firms, which thus rejects the contingent cause-effect 
assumption between structural factors and the strategies and practices in 
these firms. One essential element for undertaking a mechanism and 
process-based analysis is to understand the global suppliers, clients, the 
corporate actors, and the interrelation between the social structures at various 
levels (i.e. the SSDC effects). In this respect, CR provides an ontological 
depth that neither positivism nor social constructionism can reach. In this 
study, I explain the managerial practices, work relations and interactions in 
global supply firms by identifying the underlying structures, examining how 
these structures are manifested at different levels of analysis, and exploring 
how corporate actors respond to and interact with these structures. Indeed, 
considering the interplay between multiple structural forces and the actors’ 
actions can allow researchers to move beyond the ‘determinant’ mode of 
explanation to disclose more precise mechanisms and processes which 
explain the construction and development of practices and work relations in 
global supply firms.  
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7.5 Limitations 
Practical limitations to the size and scope of the case studies meant that 
certain areas of interest could not be discussed. First, given this study’s aim 
on exploring how supply firms manage to meet the international clients’ 
requirements, this study has focused on the supply side and collected data 
from the supply firms, without much ‘voice’ from the clients – for example, 
what clients say about their relationships with the suppliers; how they interact 
with the suppliers; what their comments are on the performance and capacity 
of the suppliers; and how their strategies impact on the management and 
organisation of the suppliers. While I have focused on the suppliers’ 
engagement and strategies in managing the supplier-client relationships, it 
should be noted that the construction and development of supplier-client 
relationships is a two-way process, in which suppliers and clients both 
strategise to achieve their distinct interests. In this sense, the incorporation of 
clients’ perspectives would have offered a more comprehensive picture on 
how the interactions between suppliers and clients affect the management, 
organisation and employment within the supply firms. Second, the research 
design of this study is based on two Chinese supply firms which are involved 
in international contracting with a single host country, Japan. Thus, 
explanations provided in this thesis are strongly informed by the particular 
host-country effects of Japan. Broadening the case studies to some other 
countries might have embraced other structures and processes that have not 
been explored in this thesis. In addition, this study was conducted in two 
Chinese supply firms, based in two different areas of China. Having more 
cases of Chinese supply firms might have shed more light on the diverse 
nature of the Chinese context. Given these limitations, there is a possibility 
that the evidence was not ‘saturated’ (Houston, 2010), and that other social 
activities and relations could have explained elements of the analysis 
differently.  
Research, and particularly qualitative research, is an iterative process that 
can also be influenced by factors outside of the researcher’s control (e.g. 
access to informants). Therefore, an element of pragmatism has to be used. 
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Given the budget and time scale of this research project, I believe that the 
choice made in this thesis was the best possible one. However, the necessity 
of reflection does allow for some awareness of where those limitations lie, and 
indicates ways in which the study could have been further enhanced.  
 &
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